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Abstract1
The proliferation of handheld devices such as smartphones and tablets brings a new
scenario for biometric authentication, and in particular to automatic signature verification.
Research on signature verification has been traditionally carried out using signatures acquired
on digitizing tablets or Tablet-PCs.
This PhD Thesis addresses the problem of user authentication on handled devices using
handwritten signatures and graphical passwords based on free-form doodles, as well as the ef-
fects of biometric aging on signatures. The Thesis pretends to analyze: (i) which are the effects
of mobile conditions on signature and doodle verification, (ii) which are the most distinctive
features in mobile conditions, extracted from the pen or fingertip trajectory, (iii) how do dif-
ferent similarity computation (i.e. matching) algorithms behave with signatures and graphical
passwords captured on mobile conditions, and (iv) what is the impact of aging on signature
features and verification performance.
Two novel datasets have been presented in this Thesis. A database containing free-form
graphical passwords drawn with the fingertip on a smartphone is described. It is the first publicly
available graphical password database to the extent of our knowledge. A dataset containing
signatures from users captured over a period 15 months is also presented, aimed towards the
study of biometric aging.
State-of-the-art local and global matching algorithms are used, namely Hidden Markov Mod-
els, Gaussian Mixture Models, Dynamic Time Warping and distance-based classifiers. A large
proportion of features presented in the research literature is considered in this Thesis.
The experimental contribution of this Thesis is divided in three main topics: signature verifi-
cation on handheld devices, the effects of aging on signature verification, and free-form graphical
password-based authentication. First, regarding signature verification in mobile conditions, we
use a database captured both on a handheld device and digitizing tablet in an office-like scenario.
We analyze the discriminative power of both global and local features using discriminant anal-
ysis and feature selection techniques. The effects of the lack of pen-up trajectories on handheld
devices (when the stylus tip is not in contact with the screen) are also studied.
We then analyze the effects of biometric aging on the signature trait. Using three different
matching algorithms, Hidden Markov Models (HMM), Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), and
distance-based classifiers, the impact in verification performance is studied. We also study
the effects of aging on individual users and individual signature features. Template update
techniques are analyzed as a way of mitigating the negative impact of aging.
Regarding graphical passwords, the DooDB graphical password database is first presented.
A statistical analysis is performed comparing the database samples (free-form doodles and sim-
plified signatures) with handwritten signatures. The sample variability (inter-user, intra-user
1Un resumen extenso de la Tesis en espan˜ol se incluye en el Ape´ndice A.
and inter-session) is also analyzed, as well as the learning curve for each kind of trait. Benchmark
results are also reported using state of the art classifiers.
Graphical password verification is afterwards studied using features and matching algorithms
from the signature verification state of the art. Feature selection is also performed and the
resulting feature sets are analyzed.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. A thorough analysis of
individual feature performance has been carried out, both for global and local features and on
signatures acquired using pen tablets and handheld devices. We have found which individual
features are the most robust and which have very low discriminative potential (pen inclination
and pressure among others). It has been found that feature selection increases verification
performance dramatically, from example from ERRs (Equal Error Rates) over 30% using all
available local features, in the case of handheld devices and skilled forgeries, to rates below 20%
after feature selection. We study the impact of the lack of trajectory information when the pen
tip is not in contact with the acquisition device surface (which happens when touchscreens are
used for signature acquisitions), and we have found that the lack of pen-up trajectories negatively
affects verification performance. As an example, the EER for the local system increases from
9.3% to 12.1% against skilled forgeries when pen-up trajectories are not available.
We study the effects of biometric aging on signature verification and study a number of ways
to compensate the observed performance degradation. It is found that aging does not affect
equally all the users in the database and that features related to signature dynamics are more
degraded than static features. Comparing the performance using test signatures from the first
months with the last months, a variable effect of aging on the EER against random forgeries is
observed in the three systems that are evaluated, from 0.0% to 0.5% in the DTW system, from
1.0% to 5.0% in the distance-based system using global features, and from 3.2% to 27.8% in the
HMM system.
A new graphical password database has been acquired and made publicly available. Verifi-
cation algorithms for finger-drawn graphical passwords and simplified signatures are compared
and feature analysis is performed. We have found that inter-session variability has a highly
negative impact on verification performance, but this can be mitigated performing feature selec-
tion and applying fusion of different matchers. It has also been found that some feature types
are prevalent in the optimal feature vectors and that classifiers have a very different behavior
against skilled and random forgeries. An EER of 3.4% and 22.1% against random and skilled
forgeries is obtained for free-form doodles, which is a promising performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How does automatic signature verification perform on handheld devices with touchscreens?
Is it feasible to reliably authenticate users with signatures traced with the fingertip, or even just
with finger-drawn gestures? How does signature verification performance vary over long periods
of time? These topics, among others, arise with the proliferation of touchscreen-enabled hand-
held devices (e.g. smartphones and tablets), as they have dramatically changed user interaction
schemes, from keyboards and mouses to natural gestures.
In the current era of electronic services and pervasive access to information, secure access
control and user authentication are common tasks which are usually performed with tokens or
passwords. In this field, biometrics has become a focus of interest as it relies on anatomical (e.g.
fingerprint, iris) or behavioral (e.g. voice, signature) traits to authenticate a user (Jain et al.,
2008). These traits cannot be easily stolen or forgotten. It is now common to find fingerprint
verification systems in laptops, face recognition systems on smartphones or for border control
purposes and iris verification in a number of airports.
Within biometrics, signature verification is a convenient authentication method that has been
an active research field in the last three decades (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008; Impedovo and
Pirlo, 2008; Impedovo et al., 2012; Plamondon and Lorette, 1989). However, reliable automatic
signature verification is a challenging task, mainly because of the notable variability among
signatures from the same individual and the risk of highly skilled forgers which, due to their
unpredictable nature, are not completely possible to model during the design of a verification
system. Since signatures are a behavioral biometric trait, they present a considerable variability
even between successive realizations, which can be increased over medium or large periods of
time (i.e. biometric aging) (Galbally et al., 2013). Thus, a signature verification system designer
must face a high intra-class variability (among the signatures of a specific user) and a low inter-
class variability, when forgeries are considered.
Despite these challenges, signature is one of the most socially accepted biometric traits, as
it has been used in financial and legal transactions since long time (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008;
Plamondon and Lorette, 1989).
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1. INTRODUCTION
In contrast with the recent growth of mobile smart devices, little research has been car-
ried out in the field of dynamic signature verification on handheld devices. In most works
related to automatic signature verification, experiments are reported using samples captured
on a pen tablet (Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008). As a matter of fact, most research-oriented sig-
nature databases have been acquired with a pen tablet (Martinez-Diaz and Fierrez, 2009), al-
though there is an emerging interest in signature-based authentication on mobile devices (Blanco-
Gonzalo et al., 2013a,b; Houmani et al., 2012, 2008; Impedovo et al., 2012; Sae-Bae and Memon,
2014; Vivaracho-Pascual and Pascual-Gaspar, 2012).
Touchscreens present however some potential drawbacks for signature verification compared
to pen tablets. In contrast with touchscreens, most pen tablets usually capture more information
than the pen trajectory, namely pen orientation (azimuth and altitude) and pen pressure (see
Fig. 1.1). Moreover, pen tablets also detect the pen trajectory when the tip is not in contact with
the surface, allowing trajectory acquisition during pen-ups. Thus, due to the reduced amount
of available information, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that systems that use signatures
captured on a touchscreen for verification may have worse performance that systems using
signatures captured with a digitizing tablet.
As an evolution of traditional signature verification, touchscreen devices offer also the pos-
sibility to trace the signature, or an equivalent sequence of gestures, directly with the finger-
tip. Moreover, it has also been found that users tend to type much slower on touchscreen
keyboards (Findlater et al., 2011). Thus, finger-drawn gestures (e.g. signatures or graphical
passwords) are a convenient and intuitive alternative to traditional alphanumerical passwords.
This has been subject of research in the field of graphical passwords (Biddle et al., 2012). Graph-
ical user validation methods are also being implemented by major players in the industry (e.g.
Google pattern-lock in AndroidTM devices and Microsoft Windows 8TM Picture Password). Au-
thentication based on simple gestures or doodles traced with the fingertip on a touchscreen is
gathering as well some interest in the research community (Sae-Bae et al., 2014; Zhao et al.,
2014). Unfortunately graphical passwords tend to be much simpler than signatures and may
be in general not composed of previously learned or heavily practiced movements. This may
imply higher intra-class variability (i.e. variations between different authentication attempts)
than signatures or may cause users to forget part or the whole graphical password, that they
provided during enrolment. On the other hand, while some users may be concerned about their
privacy when registering their signature on an automatic authentication system, doodles may
have a higher acceptability.
Due to the fact that biometrics, as an automatic means of human recognition, constitutes
a relatively novel field of research (Jain et al., 2008), most efforts undertaken by the different
parties involved in the development of this technology (researchers, industry, evaluators, etc.)
have been mainly focused on the improvement of its performance (i.e., finding novel methods to
obtain lower error rates) (Cappelli et al., 2006; Wayman et al., 2005). As a consequence, other
important aspects closely related to this type of systems such as the performance degradation
effect known as aging have been left partially uncovered (Fairhurst, 2013). Although there always
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Figure 1.1: Example of a signature acquisition using a Wacom Intuos 3TM digitizing tablet and a paper
template with a delimited signing area for each sample.
exists a certain variability among biometric samples of one given user (even when they have been
acquired successively) (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2009; Doddington et al., 1998; Houmani et al.,
2009), in biometrics the term aging is generally used to refer to the gradual decrease in a system
performance caused by the changes suffered by the users’ trait in the long-term (which cannot be
avoided as is inherent to human nature) (Lanitis, 2010). These changes provoked by age imply
that, after a sufficiently long period of time, the initial enrolment template of a certain subject
substantially differs from his current biometric samples, producing this way lower similarity
scores and increasing the error rates of the system. Thus, aging may be considered as a especial
type of large intra-class variability caused by the inherent transformations of the human body
or behavior over time.
This PhD Thesis addresses the problem of user authentication on handled devices using tra-
ditional signatures and graphical passwords based on free-form doodles. The experimental work
of the Thesis pretends to analyze: (i) which are the effects of mobile conditions on signature and
doodle verification, (ii) which are the most distinctive features in mobile conditions, extracted
from the pen or fingertip trajectory, (iii) how do different similarity computation (i.e. matching)
algorithms behave with signatures and graphical passwords captured on mobile conditions, and
(iv) what are the effects of aging on signature verification.
3
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1.1. Biometrics
Biometrics are generally used for identification or verification purposes (Jain et al., 2004).
In the former mode of operation, the biometric trait that individuals present to the system is
used to determine which one of the enrolled users in the database they are, leading to a 1 : N
comparison, where N is the number of users in the database. In the latter, the biometric trait
is used to authenticate an individual claiming to be a specific user, which is performed by a
1 : 1 comparison between the provided biometric trait and the enrolled data of the claimed
user. Following a particular identity claim, the user will be accepted as client or rejected as an
impostor by the system. Throughout this work, we will address the problem of verification, also
known as authentication.
Verification systems are essentially two-class classifiers, which produce an accept or reject
decision when a biometric trait along with a user identity are presented to the system. Usu-
ally, verification is based on a decision threshold. If the similarity (or match score) between
the provided trait and the model from the claimed user is higher than a specific threshold, the
user is accepted by the system. On the contrary, the user is rejected. In this context, verifi-
cation systems face two type of errors: False Acceptance (FA) and False Rejection (FR). False
Acceptance is produced when a user that falsely claims to be another user is accepted by the
system as being the genuine user. False Rejection means that a genuine user is rejected by the
system as being an impostor. Given a population of genuine users and impostors and a series
of verification trials, the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the
biometric verification system at hand can be computed for any decision threshold.
A common measure to compare the performance of biometric systems is the Equal Error
Rate (EER). It is computed as the system error rate when the decision threshold is set to satisfy
that FAR = FRR. Due to the fact that the output of a verification system is in general a binary
decision (i.e. accept/reject), the performance of a biometric system is usually represented by a
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) or a Detection Error Trade-off (DET) plot (Martin
et al., 1997). These plots allow an easy comparison between different systems at any decision
threshold.
1.1.1. Biometric Modalities
Several biometric modalities have been proposed in the last decades (Jain et al., 2008). These
can be based on physical and behavioral traits depending on their nature. Physical traits are
related to anatomical properties of an individual, and include fingerprint, face, iris and hand
geometry among others. Behavioral traits refer to how an individual performs an action, and
include voice, signature and gait among the most typical. Some examples of popular biometric
traits are presented in Fig. 1.2.
Biometric modalities can be further classified by other measures such as the following:
Universality, which states if every person has this biometric.
4
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Iris Face Voice
Signature Handshape Fingerprint
Figure 1.2: Examples of biometric traits.
Distinctiveness, related to the discriminative power between different individuals of a bio-
metric modality.
Permanence, which is higher if the traits are invariant along periods of time.
Collectability, which refers to how easy is to acquire the biometric trait.
Performance, related to the speed, or accuracy of systems based on a given biometric.
Acceptability, related to the social perception of the biometric modality.
Circumvention, which refers to the resilience against attacks to security systems based on
the biometric.
Other criteria that may be of interest for practical implementation are costs and exception
handling, which refers to the case where a manual matching process is required when people
cannot interact with the system for any reason. A comparison between some popular biometrics
based on the aforementioned measures is presented in Table 1.1. As can be seen, no specific
biometric outperforms the rest of them on every category. Consequently, the choice of a modality
will depend on the application it is intended to be used for.
1.2. Signature Verification
Signatures have been used since centuries to validate documents and transactions. There-
fore, signature is one of the most socially accepted among all biometric traits. In the last
few decades, digitizing devices have made possible to perform machine-based signature verifica-
tion, which has been an intense research field among the biometric and handwriting recognition
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Table 1.1: Qualitative comparison of popular biometric modalities. H, M and L denote High, Medium,
and Low respectively. Adapted from (Jain et al., 2004).
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research communities. This can be corroborated by the variety of research works conducted
during the last decades (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008; Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008; Impe-
dovo et al., 2012; Leclerc and Plamondon, 1994; Plamondon and Lorette, 1989; Plamondon
and Srihari, 2000) and the amount of competitions held in recent years (Blankers et al., 2009;
BMEC, 2007; Houmani et al., 2012, 2011; Liwicki et al., 2011; Malik et al., 2013; Yeung et al.,
2004). A number of signature-specific standards have also been published related to biometric
data management (ANSI-INCITS 395-2005, 2005; ISO/IEC 19794-11, 2005; ISO/IEC 19794-7,
2005). One of the main challenges in signature verification is related to the signature variability.
While signatures from the same user show considerable differences between different captures
(high intra-class variability), skilled forgers can perform signatures with high resemblance to
the user’s signature (low inter-class variability). Moreover, when a system is designed, only a
fraction of information about skilled forgeries can be obtained as forgers with unexpected skills
can appear at any time once the system has been deployed.
Two main classes of signature verification systems exist depending on the information ex-
tracted from the signature. Off-line systems use only the signature image, while on-line or
dynamic systems employ digitized time functions of the signature.
Off-line or static signature verification systems use static signature images, which may
have been scanned or acquired using a camera, to perform verification. The approaches taken
for off-line signature verification have been heterogeneous. Some authors focus on global features
using image or shape-oriented pattern recognition techniques (Sabourin, 1997) while others use
local features, relying on stroke, texture and structural information (Ammar et al., 1990; Guo
et al., 1997; Vargas et al., 2011). Some approaches combine both global and local features
(Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2004; Huang and Yan, 1997).
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On-line or dynamic systems use captured signature time-functions. These functions are
obtained using digitizer tablets or touchscreens (e.g. Tablet-PCs, smartphones, etc.), as illus-
trated in Fig. 1.1. Traditionally, dynamic systems have presented a better performance than
off-line systems as more levels of information than the signature static image are available (Pla-
mondon and Lorette, 1989). This is the approach considered in this Thesis, and will be described
in the following chapters.
1.3. Applications of Signature Verification on Handheld Devices
Touchscreen portable devices such as smartphones or tablets provide an appropriate com-
puting platform for signature verification (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007b, 2009c; Vivaracho-Pascual
and Pascual-Gaspar, 2012). In fact, commercial devices already provide handwritten character
recognition as a text input alternative (Anquetil and Bouchereau, 2002; Ballagas et al., 2006).
Signature verification can be used for a wide range of applications. Among them, we cite
the following:
Payments in commercial environments: the signature is used to validate a payment that
is performed via wireless networks. This enables ubiquitous access to commercial trans-
actions. Currently, signatures are not always visually verified at the point of sale, so
automatic verification could provide higher security levels.
Legal transactions: legal documents or certificates are signed by the user adding additional
security as the signature is verified. This can be a convenient user validation scheme
for e-government applications. Using on-line signature verification, the protection against
repudiation of signed documents is even increased over traditional signature.
User login: the signature is used to login into a local or remote system as an access control
measure (e.g. bank account, personal records, etc.), instead of traditional methods such
as PINs or passwords.
Customer validation: a customer is validated by its signature. A client that receives a service
or a delivery (e.g. a parcel) signs in a mobile device carried by the deliverer or service
provider to certify his conformity.
Paperless office: documents are electronically signed without printing them, providing verifi-
cation of the signatures and ubiquitous access to them. This allows business process and
workflow automation where signatures are needed.
A key advantage of signature verification with respect to other biometric traits in mobile
devices is that no additional hardware is needed for acquisition, as it is the case of fingerprint
sensors or cameras for fingerprint and face verification systems respectively. Consequently, no
extra costs exist and the system complexity does not increase.
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1.4. Challenges of Signature Verification on Handheld Devices
Designers of signature verification systems must face many challenges. As has been previously
stated, inter- and intra-variability represent two of the main difficulties when trying to reach a
good verification performance, specially in the case of skilled forgeries.
Handheld devices such as smartphones or tablets are affected by size and weight constraints
due to their portable nature. While processing units, memory chips and battery components
are nowadays experimenting higher levels of miniaturization and integration, the input (e.g.
keyboard, touchscreen) and output (e.g. display) parts must have reasonable dimensions in
order to keep their usability. Poor ergonomics and small input areas on handheld devices are
two key factors that increase the variability during the signing process. Moreover, the unfamiliar
signing surface may affect the signing process.
The touchscreen digitizing quality should also be taken into account. A typical digitizing
pen tablet is based on an electromagnetic principle. The tablet has an embedded wire grid
which acts as a transmitter. The pen (which is specifically designed for the tablet) acts as an
antenna, which resonates and emits a signal that is captured by the tablet, allowing to detect
its position with high accuracy. The tablet detects the pen movement even if it is not in contact
with the tablet surface (in a reasonable range of proximity). On the other hand, touchscreens
of stylus-oriented handheld devices are based on a resistive principle. Two separated conductive
layers are connected when the screen is pressed. The position of the contact point can be
accurately detected, but only when the surface is pressed. Capacitive touchscreens are also
present in most smartphones and tables. They detect conductive bodies in contact with them
and are also unable to detect pressure, although pressure can be estimated by the size of the
object in contact. Consequently pressure, pen-azimuth or other signals that have been reported
by some authors to increase the verification performance (Muramatsu and Matsumoto, 2007),
are not usually captured by touchscreens from handheld devices (although other works suggest
that these signals are not among the most discriminative (Houmani et al., 2009)). In addition,
the pen trajectory during pen-ups, which is invisible to forgers and provides discriminative
information (Sesa-Nogueras et al., 2012), is not available when using touchscreens for acquisition.
Irregular sampling rates and sampling errors, which are common in some mobile devices,
may worsen the verification performance and must be addressed during the preprocessing steps.
The interest in security on portable devices has raised in the last decade (Khokhar, 2006). Se-
curity is a critical concern while designing a signature verification platform as a breach could give
an attacker access to personal data or bank accounts. Gaining access to the matcher could allow
an attacker to perform software attacks such as brute force or hill-climbing attacks (Galbally
et al., 2007b). The user template must be appropriately secured and encrypted (Argones Rua
et al., 2012; Freire-Santos et al., 2006; Maiorana et al., 2008) as well as the communication
channels over which signature information may be transmitted.
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1.5. Graphical Passwords
Graphical passwords are a topic that has been the subject of active research as a replacement
of alphanumerical passwords (Biddle et al., 2012; Suo et al., 2005). The term “graphical pass-
word” refers to many different graphical authentication methods, which can be broadly classified
in three categories: 1) recall, 2) recognition, and 3) cued-recall passwords. Recall-based systems
assume that users remember a graphical password during authentication. Recognition systems
present graphical information to the user during authentication, from which the user has to
perform a selection matching a set of information previously memorized. Cued-recall systems
are a hybrid between the two aforementioned, providing graphical cues that help users recall the
previously learned password. An extensive survey of graphical password algorithms has been
compiled by Biddle et al. (2012).
In the present Dissertation we focus in doodle-based passwords, which are a subset of recall
graphical passwords. Individuals are authenticated by using a drawing or sketch, that is captured
on a touchscreen during enrollment and is used afterwards for verification. Due to their graphical
nature, they are in general easier to remember than classical alphanumerical passwords or PIN
codes composed of strings of characters and numbers (Renaud, 2009).
1.6. Motivation of the Thesis
A number of observations from the state of the art have motivated this Thesis.
First, although signature verification has been extensively studied in the literature, little
research has been carried out in the field of automatic signature verification on handheld devices.
This is seen by the author as one of the currently most natural areas of application of signature-
based authentication technology. Unfortunately, the lack of trajectory information during pen-
ups, among other limitations, challenges the applicability of traditional approaches usually tested
with databases captured with pen-tablets. We understand that the effects of mobility and
touchscreens as a capture device should be studied.
Second, the problem of dynamic signature verification has usually been analyzed using pre-
defined sets of features (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2007; Jain et al., 2002; Kholmatov and
Yanikoglu, 2005; Ly-Van et al., 2007), but little attention has been paid to analyzing which
specific features are the most discriminative. We have found that feature selection is critical
to improve verification performance which has been reflected, for example, in our contribution
to the BioSecure Signature Evaluation Campaign (BSEC) 2009 (BSEC, 2009; Houmani et al.,
2012). In that competition, the systems presented by the author reached the best performance
in a number of categories due to the process of feature selection that was carried out while
training our systems.
The third observation is that, in general, signature verification systems are designed and
tuned against skilled forgeries (the case where an attacker actively tries to reproduce the forged
signature) or against random forgeries (the case where an attacker provides a random signature
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but claims to be another user), but never both. We have found that, specially in Dynamic
Time Warping-based systems, random forgeries and skilled forgeries are completely different
problems and systems can be tuned to work specifically against each type of them and afterwards
combined. This leads to a better overall performance as also proven in our results in BSEC 2009.
The fourth observation is the lack of research regarding aging and template update in sig-
nature verification. It is not easy to find databases where a statistically significant group of
people have been captured over a sufficiently long period of time (Rawls and Ricanek, 2009).
Furthermore, the acquisition process of such a database should be carried out under almost
identical conditions (in terms of acquisition devices, level of control, supervision, etc.) so that
the differences in the system performance can be attributed to the elapse of time and not to the
variability produced by other external factors. In this context, for the definitive introduction of
this biometric technology in the security market, it is relevant to take into account the problem
of aging in practical biometric applications, and to implement strategies that compensate the
gradual drift of their performance so that their valid life period (in which they are competitive)
is increased.
The last observation is that user interaction with handheld devices is becoming increasingly
simplified, and the usage of signatures as a daily authentication means may be considered too
cumbersome by users. The usage of graphical passwords has been studied in the last decade (Bid-
dle et al., 2012), although the research contributions so far reveal that this field is far from mature
(compared to signature verification). As an example, no systematic study, with a reasonably
sized and publicly available database for experiments has been carried out, to the extent of our
knowledge, except the ones carried out by the author (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2013).
1.7. The Thesis and Main Contributions
The Thesis developed in this Dissertation can be stated as follows:
While being convenient and user friendly, signature and graphical password-based au-
thentication on handheld devices is negatively affected by lack of information, sample
quality and time variability. This can be partially overcome by the selection of appro-
priate features and combination of matching algorithms.
The main contributions of this work are:
Signature feature analysis. A thorough analysis of individual feature performance has been
carried out, both for global and local features and on signatures acquired using pen tablets
and handheld devices. We have found which individual features are the most robust and
which have very low discriminative potential (pen inclination and pressure among others).
We study the impact of the lack of trajectory information when the pen tip is not in
contact with the acquisition device surface (which happens when touchscreens are used for
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signature acquisitions), and we have found that the lack of pen-up trajectories negatively
affects verification performance.
Aging. We have analyzed the effects of biometric aging in signature verification using a
novel dataset (spanning 15 months) and studied a number of ways to compensate the
observed performance degradation.
Graphical passwords. We have acquired a new graphical password database and made it
publicly available. Algorithms for finger-drawn graphical passwords and simplified signa-
tures have been compared and features analysis has also been performed.
1.8. Outline of the Dissertation
The main objectives of this PhD Thesis are as follows: 1) reviewing and studying the problem
of automatic signature verification on handheld devices, focusing on matching algorithms and
feature selection; 2) analyzing the effects of aging on signature-based authentication; 3) applying
the lessons learned from signature verification to the problem of finger-drawn graphical password
authentication on handheld devices.
This Dissertation is structured according to a traditional complex type including background
theory, practical methods, and a number of independent experimental studies in which the
methods are applied (Paltridge, 2002). The chapter structure is as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the topics addressed in this Thesis: signature verification and graph-
ical password-based authentication.
Chapter 2 summarizes the related works that have motivated this Thesis.
Chapter 3 describes the verification methods presented in this Thesis, including global and
local systems.
Chapter 4 studies the problem of signature verification on mobile devices compared to pen
tablets. The particular effects on signature features are analyzed.
Chapter 5 studies the effects of aging in handwritten signatures and possible countermea-
sures.
Chapter 6 introduces the DooDB Graphical Password Database, which is the first pub-
licly available database of finger-drawn graphical passwords. Quantitative and Qualitative
analysis of the database are performed and benchmark results are provided.
Chapter 7 studies the problem of graphical password-based authentication based on finger-
drawn doodles. A number of systems from the signature verification literature are consid-
ered and feature selection is performed in order to find the most suitable features.
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Figure 1.3: Dependencies among chapters.
Chapter 8 concludes this Dissertation. The main results are discussed and future research
areas are proposed.
The dependence between chapters is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. It is recommended to read this
Dissertation in consecutive order, although other alternate paths are shown.
If the reader has a background in Biometric Recognition (Jain et al., 2011), the experimental
chapters can be read independently.
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1.9. Detailed Research Contributions
A list of the research contributions of this PhD Thesis is provided in this section. Some
publications appear in several items of the list, they are referenced as citations after the first
appearance. Journal articles are highlighted in bold text.
LITERATURE REVIEWS.
1. Signature verification.
• M. Martinez-Diaz and J. Fierrez, ”Signature databases and evaluation”, Stan Z. Li (Eds.), Encyclopedia
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Biometrics, Springer Verlag, July 2009.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez and S. Hangai, ”Signature matching”, Stan Z. Li (Eds.), Encyclopedia of
Biometrics, Springer Verlag, July 2009.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia, ”Automatic signature veriﬁcation on handheld de-
vices”, S. Kurkovsky (Eds.), Multimodality in Mobile Computing and Mobile Devices: Methods for
Adaptable Usability, IGI Global, pp. 321-338, May 2009.
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION.
1. Experimental studies on the impact of mobility on signature verification.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, R. P. Krish, and J. Galbally. “Mobile signature verification:
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277, December 2014.
• R. P. Krish, J. Fierrez, J. Galbally, and M. Martinez-Diaz. “Dynamic signature veriﬁcation on smart
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bas, D. Muramatsu, B. Yanikoglu, A. Kholmatov, M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, J. Ortega-
Garcia, J. R. Alcobe´, J. Fabregas, M. Faundez-Zanuy, J. Pascual-Gaspar, V. Carden˜oso-
Payo, and C. Vivaracho-Pascual. “BioSecure signature evaluation campaign (BSEC2009):
evaluating online signature algorithms depending on the quality of signatures”, Pattern
Recognition, Vol. 45, n. 3, pp. 993-1003, March 2012.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, J. Galbally, and J. Ortega-Garcia. “Towards mobile authentication using
dynamic signature veriﬁcation: useful features and performance evaluation”, in Proc. Intl. Conf. on
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• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, and J. Ortega-Garcia. “Incorporating signature veriﬁcation on handheld
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in Handwriting Recognition, ICFHR, Montreal, Canada, August 2008.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, J. Galbally, F. Alonso-Fernandez and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Signature veriﬁ-
cation on handheld devices”, in Proc. MADRINET Workshop, pp. 87-95, Salamanca, Spain, November
2007.
13
1. INTRODUCTION
2. Development of a top-performing algorithm in the BioSecure Signature Evaluation
Campaign 2009.
• Houmani et al. (2012)
3. Signature dynamics analysis and signature quality.
• J. Galbally, R. Plamondon, J. Fierrez and M. Martinez-Diaz. “Quality analysis of dynamic signature
based on the Sigma-Lognormal model”, in Proc. IAPR Intl. Conf. on Document Analysis and Recog-
nition, ICDAR, pp. 633-637, Beijing, China, September 2011.
• J. Galbally, R. Plamondon, J. Fierrez, C. O’Reilly, M. Martinez-Diaz and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Kinematical
analysis of synthetic dynamic signatures using the Sigma-Lognormal model”, in IAPR Proc. Intl. Conf.
on Frontiers of Handwriting Recognition, ICFHR, pp. 113-118, Calcutta, India, November 2010.
4. User-specific model adaptation.
• Martinez-Diaz et al. (2008b)
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Universal background models for dynamic signature
veriﬁcation”, in Proc. IEEE Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications and Systems, BTAS, pp.
1-6, Washington DC, USA, September 2007.
5. Analysis of the impact of aging on signature verification.
• J. Galbally, M. Martinez-Diaz, and J. Fierrez. “Aging in biometrics: an experimental
analysis on on-line signature”, PLOS ONE, Vol. 8, n. 7, pp. e69897, July 2013.
• J. Galbally, M. Martinez-Diaz and J. Fierrez, “Ageing in biometrics: a case study in on-line signature”,
Michael Fairhurst (Ed.), chapter in Age Factors in Biometric Processing, IET, pp. 117-132, 2013.
GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS
1. Novel datasets.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, and J. Galbally. “The DooDB graphical password database:
data analysis and benchmark results”, IEEE Access, Vol. 1, pp. 596-605, September 2013.
2. Novel methods for graphical password authentication based on doodles.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, C. Martin-Diaz, J. Galbally, and J. Fierrez. “A comparative evaluation of ﬁnger-
drawn graphical password veriﬁcation methods”, in IAPR Proc. Intl. Conf. on Frontiers of Handwriting
Recognition, ICFHR, pp. 375-380, Calcutta, India, November 2010.
Contributions so far related to the problem developed in this Thesis but not presented in
this Dissertation include:
SYNTHETIC SIGNATURE GENERATION
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Analysis and Recognition, ICDAR, pp. 131-135, Barcelona, Spain, July 2009.
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BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION
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• M. R. Freire, J. Fierrez, M. Martinez-Diaz and J. Ortega-Garcia, “On the applicability of oﬀ-line sig-
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ICDAR, IEEE Press, Vol. 2, pp. 1173-1177, Curitiba, Brazil, September 2007.
Other doctoral research not included in the Thesis:
ATTACKS TO BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
1. Direct and Indirect attacks to fingerprint verification systems.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Fierrez, J. Galbally and J. Ortega-Garcia, “An evaluation of indi-
rect attacks and countermeasures in fingerprint verification systems”, Pattern Recognition
Letters, Vol. 32, pp. 1643-1651, September 2011.
• J. Galbally, J. Fierrez, F. Alonso-Fernandez and M. Martinez-Diaz, “Evaluation of direct
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cation”, in Proc. IEEE Intl. Carnahan Conf. on Security Technology, ICCST, pp. 151-159, Lexington,
USA, October 2006.
• M. Martinez-Diaz, “Vulnerabilidades en sistemas de reconocimiento basados en huella dactilar: Ataques
Hill-Climbing” (Vulnerabilities on ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation systems: Hill-climbing attacks), MSc Thesis,
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, September 2006.
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Chapter 2
Related Works and State of the Art
In this chapter, a summary of the research in dynamic signature verification, biometric
aging, and graphical passwords is provided, presenting related works and available resources.
2.1. Dynamic Signature Verification
2.1.1. Architecture of a Signature Verification System
Dynamic signature verification systems generally share a common architecture. The typical
building blocks of an automatic signature verification system are represented in Fig. 2.1. As
illustrated, the following steps are performed in most cases (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008):
1. Data Acquisition: Signature signals are captured from the pen tip using a digitizing
tablet or touchscreen. The signature trajectory is sampled and stored as a discrete-time
series. While some digitizing tablets provide pressure or pen orientation information,
these signals are not commonly available on touchscreens. The sampling rate is usually
equal to or above 100 Hz (although lower rates have also been studied (Martinez-Diaz
et al., 2007a)). This is a reasonable rate, since it has been observed that the maximum
frequencies of the signature time functions are approximately of 20 - 30 Hz (Plamondon
and Lorette, 1989). Alternative acquisition techniques have also been studied. Acquisition
with a video camera has been proposed by (Munich and Perona, 2003; Muramatsu et al.,
2009), as well as using purpose-specific pens which capture the pen dynamics (Martens
and Claesen, 1997; Wang et al., 2010). Some examples of different acquisition conditions
are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
After data acquisition, preprocessing steps are commonly performed. These include noise
filtering, resampling, or interpolation of missing samples.
2. Feature Extraction: Two main approaches have been followed in this step (Martinez-
Diaz et al., 2009a): feature-based systems extract global features (e.g. signature duration,
number of pen-ups, average velocity) from the signature in order to obtain a holistic
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Figure 2.1: Typical architecture of a signature verification system.
feature vector (Lee et al., 1996; Sae-Bae and Memon, 2014). On the other hand, function-
based systems use the signature time functions (e.g. position, pressure) for verification.
Traditionally, function-based approaches have yielded better results than feature-based
ones (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a; Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Ly-Van et al., 2007).
3. Enrollment: In model-based systems a statistical client model is computed using a
training set of genuine signatures which is used for future comparisons in the matching
step (Nanni and Lumini, 2005; Richiardi and Drygajlo, 2003). Reference-based systems
store the features of each signature provided on the training set as templates. In the
matching process the input signature is compared with each reference signature (Lei and
Govindaraju, 2005).
4. Similarity Computation: This step involves pre-alignment if necessary and a matching
process, which returns a matching score (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2009b). In feature-based
systems, statistical techniques like Mahalanobis distance, Parzen Windows or Neural Net-
works are used for matching (Nelson et al., 1994). Function-based systems use other
techniques like Hidden Markov Models - HMM (Dolfing et al., 1998; Fierrez et al., 2007b;
Ly-Van et al., 2007), Dynamic Time Warping - DTW (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005;
Martens and Claesen, 1997; Sato and Kogure, 1982), correlation (Parizeau and Plamon-
don, 1990), and structural descriptors (Bovino et al., 2003; Huang and Yan, 2003; Parizeau
and Plamondon, 1990) to compare signature models.
5. Score Normalization: The matching score may be normalized to a given range. Score
normalization is critical when combining scores from multiple classifiers or in multi-biometric
systems (Ross et al., 2006). More sophisticated techniques like target-dependent score
normalization can lead to an improved system performance (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005b;
Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007c).
An input signature will be considered to belong to the claimed user if its matching score
exceeds a given threshold.
2.1.2. Feature-based Systems
Feature-based systems, also known as global systems, have been extensively studied (Fierrez-
Aguilar et al., 2005a; Guru and Prakash, 2009; Lee et al., 1996; Lei and Govindaraju, 2005;
Richiardi et al., 2005; Sae-Bae and Memon, 2014). In these systems, a holistic vector is formed
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.2: (a) PDA signature capture process (corresponding to the BIOSECURE DS3 - Mobile Sce-
nario dataset). (b) Pen tablet capture process (corresponding to the BIOSECURE DS2 - Access Control
Scenario dataset). (c) Signature capture process on a mobile device.
by features extracted from the whole signature, such as duration, average speed, number of
pen-ups, etc. Despite the large amount of different global feature sets that have been pro-
posed (a maximum of 100 features are considered by Fierrez-Aguilar et al. (2005a)), the usually
low amount of available training data motivates the usage of feature selection techniques to
reduce the feature vector size (due to the curse of dimensionality). Several feature selection
techniques have been proposed (see Sect. 2.6), being the Sequential Forward Feature Selection
(SFFS) (Pudil et al., 1994) one of the best performing methods reported (Jain and Zongker,
1997). The matching phase is usually performed with statistical classifiers such as Gaussian
Mixture Models (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007c), Parzen Windows (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007c),
majority voting (Lee et al., 1996), or distance measures such as Mahalanobis distance (Galbally
et al., 2007b), Manhattan distance (Sae-Bae and Memon, 2014), etc.
2.1.3. Function-based Systems
Function-based systems are also known as local systems. Among these, signature verification
systems using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Martens and
Claesen, 1997; Sato and Kogure, 1982), Gaussian Mixture Models (Richiardi and Drygajlo,
2003), and Hidden Markov Models (HMM) (Dolfing et al., 1998; Fierrez et al., 2007b; Ly-Van
et al., 2007; Yang et al., 1995) are among the most popular approaches in signature verification.
In these systems, the captured time functions (e.g. pen coordinates, pressure, etc.) are used to
model each user signature. Additionally, the use of pen orientation features such as azimuth or
altitude has been reported to provide good results (Muramatsu and Matsumoto, 2007), although
it has been discussed by other authors (Houmani et al., 2009; Lei and Govindaraju, 2005).
Multi-algorithm approaches have been studied for different biometric traits such as finger-
print (Fronthaler et al., 2008) and speech (Rodriguez-Lin˜ares et al., 2003) and can also be applied
to signature verification. The combination of the feature- and function-based approaches has
been reported to provide better performance than the individual systems (Fierrez-Aguilar et al.,
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2005a).
2.1.3.1. Gaussian Mixture Models and Hidden Markov Models
Gaussian Mixture Models are popular among the speech recognition literature, and
have also been used for signature verification (Richiardi and Drygajlo, 2003). They model a
statistical distribution as a linear combination of d-dimensional Gaussian probability density
functions (pdf):
p (x |λC ) =
N∑
i=1
ωipi (x) (2.1)
where
pi(x) =
1
(2pi)d/2 |Σi|1/2
exp
{
−1
2
(x− µi)T Σ−1i (x− µi)
}
.
In order to be a valid pdf, the weights must satisfy
∑N
i=1 ωi = 1. The parameters to be
estimated are then {ωi,µi,Σi} , i = 1, ..., N , where N is the number of Gaussian components,
that has to be specified. The covariance matrices are generally chosen to be diagonal, as full
matrices do not usually provide an advantage in the model approximation (Reynolds et al.,
2000). For a given user C, the model parameters {ωi,µi,Σi} , i = 1, ..., N are estimated from
a training set of signatures using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Duda et al.,
2001).
During the enrollment phase one model is created for each user, which is later used for
matching. In addition, a world model λC¯ is created, which models the whole set of users. World
models, also known as Universal Background Models (Reynolds et al., 2000) are trained using
data from a large group of users, as explained in the corresponding experiments.
The match score, given a test vector x and a target user statistical model λC , can be
computed as a ratio of the likelihood that the test vector x is produced by the model λC and
the likelihood that the test vector has been produced by any other user, which is modeled by
the world model λC¯ .
So, following the previous notation, a match score s is obtained as follows:
s = log p (x |λC )− log p (x |λC¯ ) . (2.2)
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) have also been widely used by the speech recognition
community (Rabiner, 1989) as well as in many handwriting recognition applications (Dolfing,
1998). Several approaches using HMMs for dynamic signature verification have been proposed
in the last years (Argones Rua and Alba Castro, 2012; Dolfing et al., 1998; Fierrez et al., 2007b;
Ly-Van et al., 2007; Muramatsu and Matsumoto, 2003; Yang et al., 1995). An HMM represents
a double stochastic process, governed by an underlying Markov chain, with a finite number of
states and random function set that generate symbols or observations each of which is associated
with one state (Yang et al., 1995). Observations are modeled with GMMs in most speech and
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Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of a left-to-right N -state HMM, with M -component GMMs repre-
senting observations and no skips between states.
handwriting recognition applications. GMMs can, in fact, be considered single-state HMMs.
The basic structure of an HMM using GMMs to model observations is defined by the following
elements:
Number of hidden states N .
Number of Gaussian Mixtures per state M .
Probability transition matrix A = {aij}, which contains the probabilities of transitioning
from one state to another or staying on the same state.
In Fig. 2.3, an example of a possible HMM configuration is shown. Hidden Markov Models
are usually trained in two steps. First, state transition probabilities and observation statistical
models are estimated using a Maximum Likelihood algorithm. After this, a re-estimation step
is carried out using the Baum-Welch algorithm. A detailed description of the training process
is given by Rabiner (1989).
Within HMM-based dynamic signature verification, regional and local approaches have been
proposed. In regional approaches, the extracted time functions are further segmented and con-
verted into a sequence of feature vectors or observations, each one representing regional prop-
erties of the signature signal (Dolfing et al., 1998; Kashi et al., 1997; Yang et al., 1995). Some
examples of segmentation boundaries are null vertical velocity points (Dolfing et al., 1998) or
changes in the quantized trajectory direction (Yang et al., 1995). On the other hand, local
approaches directly use the time functions as observation sequences for the signature model-
ing (Argones Rua and Alba Castro, 2012; Fierrez et al., 2007b; Ly-Van et al., 2007; Richiardi
and Drygajlo, 2003).
Finding a reliable and robust model structure for dynamic signature verification is not a
trivial task. While too simple HMMs may not allow to model properly the user signatures,
too complex models may not be able to model future realizations due to over-fitting. On the
other hand, as simple models have less parameters to be estimated, their estimation may be more
robust than for complex models. Two main parameters are commonly considered while selecting
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an optimal model structure: the number of states and the number of Gaussian mixtures per
state (Fierrez et al., 2007b). Most of the proposed systems consider a left-to-right configuration
without skips between states, also known as Bakis topology, as illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
2.1.3.2. Dynamic Time Warping
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) is an application of Dynamic Programming to the problem
of matching time sequences. Yasuhara and Oka (1977) were the first to report its suitability for
dynamic signature verification, by using the algorithm to match time functions extracted from
digitized signature signals. Their approach was an adaptation of the original algorithm proposed
by Sakoe and Chiba (1978) in the field of speech recognition. The goal of DTW is to find an
elastic match among samples of a pair of sequences X and Y that minimize a given distance
measure. The algorithm may be defined as follows (Sakoe and Chiba, 1978). Let’s define two
sequences
X = x1,x2, ...,xi, ...,xI
Y = y1,y2, ...,yj , ...,yJ
(2.3)
and a distance measure as
d(i, j) = ‖xi − yj‖ (2.4)
between sequence samples. A warping path can be defined as
C = c1, c2, ..., ck, ..., cK (2.5)
where each ck represents a correspondence (i, j) between samples of X and Y. The initial
condition of the algorithm is set to
g1 = g(1, 1) = d(1, 1) · w(1) (2.6)
where gk represents the accumulated distance after k steps and w(k) is a weighting factor that
must be defined. For each iteration, gk is computed as
gk = g(i, j) = min
ck−1
[gk−1 + d(ck) · w(k)] (2.7)
until the I’th and J ’th sample of both sequences respectively is reached. The resulting normal-
ized distance is
D(X,Y) =
gK∑K
k=1w(k)
(2.8)
where
∑
w(k) compensates the effect of the length of the sequences.
The weighting factors wk are defined in order to restrict which correspondences among
samples of both sequences are allowed. In Fig. 2.4.a, a possible definition of wk is depicted, and
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Figure 2.4: (a) Optimal warping path between two sequences obtained with DTW and Point-to-point
distances are represented with different shades of gray, lighter shades representing shorter distances and
darker shades representing longer distances. (b) Example of point-to-point correspondences between two
genuine signatures obtained using DTW.
an example of a warping path between two sequences is given. In this case, only three transitions
are allowed in the computation of gk. Consequently, Eq. (2.7) becomes
gk = g(i, j) = min


g(i, j − 1) + d(i, j)
g(i − 1, j − 1) + d(i, j)
g(i − 1, j) + d(i, j)

 (2.9)
which is one of the most common implementations found in the literature. In Fig. 2.4.b, an
example of point correspondences between two signatures is depicted to visually show the results
of the elastic alignment.
The algorithm has been further refined for signature verification by many authors (Faundez-
Zanuy, 2007; Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Martens and Claesen, 1997; Sato and Kogure,
1982). Moreover, the implementation by Kholmatov and Yanikoglu (2005) won the Signature
Verification Competition 2004 (Yeung et al., 2004) and most systems in the BioSecure Signa-
ture Evaluation Campaign 2009 (BSEC 2009) used DTW for matching (Houmani et al., 2012).
Although the DTW algorithm has been replaced by more powerful ones such as HMMs or
SVMs for speech applications, it remains as a highly effective tool for signature verification as
it is best suited for small amounts of training data, which is the common case in signature
verification (Pascual-Gaspar et al., 2009).
2.1.4. Signature Verification on Handheld Devices
As has been stated before, there is a limited research literature related to dynamic signature
verification on handheld devices. Most research-oriented signature databases have been acquired
with a pen tablet (Martinez-Diaz and Fierrez, 2009).
Regarding large publicly available datasets, the only existing one is the BioSecure Multimodal
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Database (BMDB) (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010) which contains, among other biometric traits,
two signature datasets from the same set of donors. One dataset was captured with a pen tablet
(DS2 dataset) and another with a PDA (DS3 dataset), as described in Sect. 2.4. In Fig. 2.2, the
capture conditions of both datasets are shown.
In 2007, the BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation was held, where verification algorithms from
several European research institutions were compared using the PDA dataset (BMEC, 2007).
It was found that error rates were notably higher than in previous competitions, such as SVC
2004 (Yeung et al., 2004), where signatures had been captured on a pen tablet. In 2009, the
BioSecure Signature Evaluation Campaign was aimed towards comparing the verification per-
formance between the handheld scenario and the pen tablet scenario (Houmani et al., 2012).
Two different tasks were reported. In Task 1, a direct comparison of verification performance
using a pen tablet vs. a PDA for signature acquisition was carried out, with signatures from
the BMDB database. Task 2 studied the verification performance variation with respect to
the information content in signatures (Houmani et al., 2008). Results of Task 1 showed that
the participating signature verification algorithms had a significant lower performance against
skilled forgeries when signatures were captured on a PDA compared to a pen tablet. On the
other hand, verification performance against random forgeries was less negatively affected in the
PDA scenario.
A number of works have focused on analyzing the effects on signatures and verification
performance when they are captured on handheld devices. It has been found that features
extracted from signatures acquired with different devices present statistical distributions that
might be significantly different (Elliot, 2004). These statistical differences between features from
different devices may affect device inter-operability and may also result in large verification
performance differences among sensors. In Alonso-Fernandez et al. (2005), the authors compare
the error rates of two systems when signatures are captured with two different tablet-PCs. It is
shown that the performance depends on the sampling quality of the device used for enrolment.
In Simsons et al. (2011), the effects of constraining the available signing space are studied,
although not specifically for handheld devices. The authors show that the lack of space affects
signature complexity, may cause hesitation marks, and reduce fluency, among other factors.
Blanco-Gonzalo et al. (2013b) have carried out an usability analysis of signature verification
on mobile devices. The effects of ergonomics, different kinds of stylus and user position are
evaluated. A notable variation in the verification performance is reported depending on the user
position among other factors.
Signatures captured with a pen tablet and a handheld device have also been compared from
the point of view of their entropy, or information content. In Houmani et al. (2008) a client-
entropy measure is defined, and it is shown that signatures captured with a PDA have a higher
entropy than those captured with a pen tablet. The entropy measure defined in that work
increases in general with signature variability and graphical simplicity. Higher verification error
rates for signatures with higher entropy are reported.
The performance of a signature verification system using different handheld devices has been
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analyzed by Blanco-Gonzalo et al. (2013a). Signatures produced with a stylus and the fingertip
were used in the experiments. It was found that verification using signatures drawn with the
fingertip was comparable to signatures captured with a stylus.
2.2. Signature Aging
There are different works where the aging of human biometric traits has been studied from
a medical point of view (Coleman and Grover, 2006; Drempt et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 1994;
Mueller, 1997), to help in the early diagnosis of diseases (O’Reilly and Plamondon, 2012), or even
for its forensic implications (Albert et al., 2007; Walton, 1997). However, not many studies can
be found where aging is analyzed from a pure biometrical perspective (two surveys of these works
were recently published by Lanitis (2010) and Scheidat et al. (2011)). Furthermore, almost all of
these aging biometric works are related to the face modality, but, to the best of our knowledge,
none of them have been focused on the study of the signature trait.
Among these face-related contributions, there are works dealing with different aspects of
aging, for instance, its effect on the performance of face verification systems (Ling et al., 2007;
Ramanathan and Chellappa, 2006), methodologies for the synthetic simulation of age (Lanitis,
2008; Lanitis et al., 2002), approaches for the compensation and modeling of the aging effect (Suo
et al., 2007), automatic age estimation methods (Geng et al., 2007; Kwon and Lobo, 1999; Lanitis
et al., 2004), or descriptions of long-term facial databases (Rawls and Ricanek, 2009). All this
interest in the study of the effect of time on face recognition, led in 2004 to the creation of
a research group specialized in the analysis of the different factors related to face aging (Face
Aging Group, 2004).
Outside the face trait, Modi et al. studied the correlation between the quality of fingerprint
samples and the age of the users that produced them, and its impact on the final performance
of fingerprint recognition systems (Modi and Elliott, 2006; Modi et al., 2007). In the same
direction as the fingerprint works by Modi et al., several studies have analyzed the degree of
the signing/drawing skill of people belonging to different age groups, their ability to repeat
certain valuable recognition features and their vulnerability to eventual imitators (Erbilek and
Farihurst, 2012; Faundez-Zanuy et al., 2012; Guest, 2006; Ketcham et al., 2003). Although all
these works study an interesting issue related to aging, they are not equivalent to the analysis
carried out in the present work, as they do not track individuals over a significant period of their
life, but they are focused on establishing a relationship between a certain group of people (e.g.,
the elderly, youngsters) and a given characteristic (fingerprint quality or signing skill) of their
biometric samples (e.g., the elderly-bad quality-poor skill, youngsters-good quality-high skill).
Once the consistent-performance time interval for a given recognition system has been set,
an analysis of the best approach to overcome the effect of aging should also be carried out.
Among the different palliative methods that have been proposed in the literature, the ones
that have received more attention from researchers and industry are automatic template update
strategies (Carls, 2009; Rattani et al., 2009). These schemes use some type of target function
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(e.g., quality measure, similarity score) to automatically select from the most recent biometric
samples given by the user to access the system, those which are most suited to be used to
recompute (update) the subject’s enrolment template. In this field, different fully unsupervised
or semiautomatic approaches have been proposed for the fingerprint trait (Lumini and Nanni,
2006; Uludag et al., 2004), for face-based systems (Rattani et al., 2008), signature (Kato et al.,
2006), or even in multimodal biometric applications (Roli et al., 2007). Other strategies that try
to minimize the effect of aging, are age invariant features (Guest, 2006) and the compensation
of age changes (Park et al., 2010).
In addition to the aforementioned works, several authors have also addressed aging-related
problems (such as age estimation or age modeling), generally using relatively short-term data,
in biometric traits such as the handwriting (Scheidat et al., 2012), the voice (Dobry et al., 2011;
Hasan et al., 2012), or even the gait (Veres et al., 2005).
Although it cannot be strictly considered as aging, several works have analyzed the short term
variability of signatures using samples captured in the same session (intra-session variability,
within minutes), or in different sessions (inter-session variability, within days/weeks) of a regular
acquisition campaign (Galbally et al., 2009b; Guest, 2006; Houmani et al., 2009). In these cases,
the differences in the systems performance can be attributed more to the inherent variability
of the biometric samples (inter and intra-user short term variability) than to a real process of
aging, as the time interval between samples is in general too short (Doddington et al., 1998; Poh
et al., 2006).
2.3. Other Recent Research Topics Related to Signature Verifi-
cation
Although not directly related to the dynamic signature verification process, other contribu-
tions from the last years are worth noting.
Signature modeling has been studied by O’Reilly and Plamondon (2009). Signatures are
modeled as a plan or sequence of strokes executed by the neuromuscular system. Strokes are
represented by a Sigma-Lognormal model which models the pen-tip path as a sum of of lognormal
primitives. This model has proven to accurately model signatures.
Information content of signatures from an communications theory point of view (i.e. entropy)
has also been studied. In Houmani et al. (2008) a client-entropy measure is defined, and it is
shown that signatures captured with a PDA have a higher entropy than those captured with
a pen tablet. The entropy measure defined in that work increases in general with signature
variability and graphical simplicity. Signature complexity and feature stability has been also
studied in previous works (Brault and Plamondon, 1993; Huang and Yan, 2003).
Generation of synthetic signature samples has also been subject of research. Synthetic sig-
natures can be used for system training or for verification performance. A number of techniques
have been proposed (Galbally et al., 2012a,b; Plamondon et al., 2014; Rabasse et al., 2008).
As has been already stated, signature verification systems are exposed to security threats.
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While forgeries represent an example of direct attacks (i.e. when an attacker has direct access to
the acquisition device), indirect attacks have also been studied (when an attacker has access to
an internal part of the system, such as the matching module). Brute force attacks using synthetic
signatures have been studied by Galbally et al. (2007b) as well as hill-climbing attacks (Galbally
et al., 2009a).
2.4. Dynamic Signature Databases
Publicly available databases make possible for the research community to perform an objec-
tive comparison of verification algorithms. Until the last decade, much research had been carried
out using private databases, as no large public ones were available. This does not allow reli-
able performance comparisons of different algorithms, which may have been tuned to a specific
database. Moreover, the usage of small datasets reduces the statistical relevance of experiments.
Privacy and legal issues have also played a relevant role in the lack of public signature datasets.
The variation of signatures among different cultures must also be taken into account. As an
example, in Europe signatures are usually formed by a fast writing followed by a flourish while
in North America they usually correspond to the signers name with no flourish. On the other
hand, signatures in Asia are commonly formed by Asian characters, which are composed of a
larger number of short strokes compared to European or North American signatures.
While some authors have made public the databases used for their research (e.g. Munich
and Perona (2003)), most current dynamic signature databases are collected by the joint effort
of different research institutions. A summary of the most relevant publicly databases is provided
in Table 2.1. In this Section, a brief description of these databases, in chronological order, is
provided.
Table 2.1: Summary of the most popular on-line signature databases. The symbols x, y, p, θ, γ denote
pen position horizontal coordinate, vertical coordinate, pen pressure, azimuth and altitude respectively.
Name Device Users Sessions
Signatures per user
Signals
Interval between
Genuine Forgeries sessions
PHILIPS Pen tablet 51 3 to 5 30 up to 70 x, y, p, θ, γ 1 week approx.
BIOMET Pen tablet 84 3 15 up to 12 x, y, p, θ, γ 3 to 5 months
MCYT Pen tablet 330 1 25 25 x, y, p, θ, γ -
SVC2004 Task 1 Pen tablet 40 2 20 20 x, y min. 1 week
SVC2004 Task 2 Pen tablet 40 2 20 20 x, y, p, θ, γ min. 1 week
SUSIG Blind Subcorpus Pen tablet 100 1 8 or 10 10 x, y, p -
SUSIG Visual Subcorpus Pen tablet 100 2 20 10 x, y, p 1 week approx.
MyIDea Pen tablet ca. 100 3 18 18 x, y, p, θ, γ days to months
BioSecurID Pen tablet 400 4 16 16 x, y, p, θ, γ 1 month approx.
BioSecure DS2 Pen tablet ca. 650 2 30 20 x, y, p, θ, γ 1 month approx.
BioSecure DS3 PDA ca. 650 2 30 20 x, y, p, θ, γ 1 month approx.
PHILIPS Database. Signatures from 51 users were captured using a digitizing tablet at
a sampling rate of 200 Hz (Dolfing et al., 1998). The following signals were captured: pen-
coordinates, pen-pressure, and the pen-tilt, which is composed by the two angles resulting from
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(b)(a) (c)
Figure 2.5: Examples of signatures for a particular subject of the PHILIPS Database. (a) Genuine
signatures, (b) over-the-shoulder forgeries, and (c) home improved forgeries. (Adapted from Dolfing
et al. (1998).)
the projection of the pen in the (x, z) and (y, z) planes.
Each user contributed 30 genuine signatures, leading to 1530 genuine signatures. Three types
of forgeries are present in the database: 1470 over-the-shoulder forgeries, 1530 home-improved
and 240 professional forgeries. Over-the-shoulder forgeries were produced by letting the forger
observe the signing process. Home-improved forgeries were produced by giving to the forgers the
signature static image and letting them to practice at home (see Fig. 2.5). Finally, professional
forgeries were performed by forensic document examiners.
MCYT Signature Subcorpus. The MCYT bimodal database is comprised of signatures
and fingerprints from 330 individuals (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2003). Signatures were acquired
using a WACOM Intuos A6 tablet with a sampling frequency of 100 Hz. The capture area
was divided in frames for acquisition of 37.5 mm (width) × 17.5 mm (height). The following
time sequences are captured: position coordinates, pressure, azimuth angle and altitude angle.
Example signatures and their associated functions are shown in Fig. 2.6.
There are 25 genuine signatures and 25 forgeries per user. Signatures were captured in
groups of 5. First, 5 genuine signatures, then 5 skilled forgeries from another user, repeating
this until 25 signatures from each type were performed. Each user provided 5 forgeries for the 5
previous users in the database. As the user is forced to concentrate on different tasks between
each group of genuine signatures, the variability between groups is expected to be higher than
the one within the same group.
BIOMET Signature Subcorpus. This signature subcorpus is part of the BIOMET multi-
modal database (Garcia-Salicetti et al., 2003). The signatures were captured using a WACOM
Intuos2 A6 Pen-tablet and an ink pen with a sampling rate of 100 Hz. The pen coordinates,
pen-pressure, azimuth and altitude signals were captured. The database contains data from 84
users, with 15 genuine signatures and 12 forgeries per user. Signatures were captured in two
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Figure 2.6: MCYT example signatures and associated functions for two different subjects. One genuine
signature (left) and two forgeries (right columns) are presented for each user. (Adapted from Fierrez
et al. (2007b).)
sessions separated by 5 months. In the first session, 5 genuine signatures and 6 forgeries were
acquired. The remaining 10 genuine signatures and 6 forgeries were captured in the second
session. Forgeries were performed by 4 different users (3 forgeries each). This database contains
2201 signatures, since not all users have complete data: 8 genuine signatures and 54 forgeries
are missing.
SVC 2004 Database. Two development databases were released prior to the Signature Ver-
ification Competition (SVC) 2004 (Yeung et al., 2004). They were captured using a WACOM
digitizing tablet and a Grip Pen. Due to privacy issues, users were advised to use invented sig-
natures instead of genuine ones. The two databases differ in the available data, and correspond
to the two tasks defined in the competition. One contains only coordinate information while the
other provides also pressure and pen orientation signals. Each database contains 40 users, with
20 genuine signatures and 20 forgeries per user acquired in two sessions. Both Occidental and
Asian signatures are present in the databases. Examples of signatures from this database are
shown in Fig. 2.7.
SUSIG Database. The SUSIG database consists of two sets, one captured using a pen-tablet
without visual feedback (Blind subcorpus) and the other using a pen-tablet with an LCD display
(Visual subcorpus) (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2008). There are 100 users per database, but
these do not coincide, as the Visual subcorpus was captured 4 years after the Blind one. For the
Blind subcorpus, a WACOM Graphire2 pen tablet was used. The Visual subcorpus was acquired
using an Interlink Electronics ePad-ink tablet, with a pressure-sensitive LCD. In both subcorpus,
the pen coordinates and the pen pressure signals were captured, using a sampling frequency of
100 Hz. While performing forgeries, users had prior visual input of the signing process on a
separate screen or on the LCD display for the Blind and Visual subcorpus respectively.
For the Blind subcorpus, 8 or 10 genuine signatures were captured in a single session. The
users also provided 10 forgeries from another randomly selected user. Two sessions were per-
formed in the Visual subcorpus. During each one, users provided 10 genuine signatures and 5
forgeries.
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Figure 2.7: SVC 2004 example signatures and associated functions extracted by the pen tablet. For a
particular subject, two genuine signatures (left columns) and two forgeries (right columns) are presented.
(Adapted from Fierrez et al. (2007b).)
MYIDEA CHASM set 1. This signature set is a subset oh the MyIDea multimodal bio-
metric database (Dumas et al., 2005). A WACOM Intuos2 A4 graphic tablet was used at a
sampling rate of 100 Hz. Pen position, pressure and azimuth and altitude were captured. This
dataset has the particularity that the user must read loud what he is writing, allowing what the
authors call CHASM (Combined Handwriting and Speech Modalities). This corpus consists on
ca. 70 users. Signatures were captured in 3 sessions. During each session, each user produced 6
genuine signatures and 6 forgeries, with visual access to the images of the target signatures.
BiosecurID Multimodal Database. This database was collected by 6 different Spanish
research institutions (Fierrez et al., 2010). It includes the following biometric traits: speech,
iris, face, signature, handwriting, fingerprints, hand and keystroke. The data was captured in 4
sessions, distributed in a 4 month time span. The user population was specifically selected in
order to contain a uniform distribution of users from different ages and genders. Non-biometric
data was also stored, such as age, gender, handedness, vision aids and manual worker (if the
user has eroded fingerprints). This allows studying specific demographic groups.
The signature pen-position, pressure, azimuth and altitude signals were acquired using a
Wacom Intuos3 A4 digitizer at 100 Hz. During each session, 2 signatures were captured at the
beginning and 2 at the end, leading to 16 genuine signatures per user. Each user performed 1
forgery per session of signatures from other 3 users in the database. The skill level of the forgeries
is increased by showing to the forger more information of the target signature incrementally.
In the first session, forgers have only visual access to one genuine signature, more data (i.e.
signature dynamics) is shown in further sessions and forgers are let more time to train. Off-line
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signature data is also available, since signatures were captured using an inking pen.
BioSecure Signature Subcorpus DS2 - Access Control Scenario. This database was
captured under the BioSecure Network of Excellence (Biosecure, 2004; Ortega-Garcia et al.,
2010). It is part of the BioSecure multimodal database (Data Set 2) and consists of 667 users.
It was acquired at seven different sites in Europe. Acquisition was carried out using a WA-
COM Intuos3 A6 digitizer at 100 Hz following a procedure similar to the one conducted in
MCYT (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2003). The pen coordinates, pressure, azimuth and altitude sig-
nals are available.
Signatures were captured in two sessions and in blocks of 5. During each session, users were
asked to perform 3 sets of 5 genuine signatures, and 5 forgeries between each set. Each user
performed 5 forgeries for the previous 4 users in the database. The users had visual access to the
dynamics of the signing process of the signatures they had to forge. Thus, 30 genuine signatures
and 20 forgeries are available for each user. An example of the signature capture process of this
database including the paper template that was used is depicted in Fig. 2.2.(b).
BioSecure Signature Subcorpus DS3 - Mobile Scenario. The BioSecure Signature Sub-
corpus DS3 was acquired under the same framework than the Access Control Scenario but on a
mobile scenario (BMEC, 2007). It was acquired in 8 different sites in Europe (Alonso-Fernandez
et al., 2008; Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010). It is the first multi-session database captured on a
PDA. An HP iPAQ hx2790 with a sampling frequency of 100 Hz was used as capture device.
Only the pen coordinates and time stamps are available. Users were asked to sign while standing
and holding the PDA in one hand. This was done to emulate realistic operating conditions. The
acquisition protocol was the same than for the Access Control Scenario Signature Subcorpus,
in which signature data was captured using a pen tablet. An average of two months was left
between each session. Forgeries for each user are performed by 4 different users (5 forgeries
each) in a “worst case” scenario, where each forger has access to the dynamics of the genuine
signature in the PDA screen and a tracker tool allowing to see the original strokes. An example
of the capture process of this database can be seen in Fig. 2.2.(a). Examples of signatures from
the BioSecure Signature subcorpora DS2 and DS3 are presented in Fig. 2.8. Signatures cap-
tured with the PDA present missing samples (i.e. sampling errors) due to the PDA touchscreen
acquisition process.
2.5. Graphical Password-based Authentication
The term “graphical password” refers to a user authentication method where pictorial infor-
mation is used for validation, instead of an alphanumerical password. This method poses many
challenges, such as memorability (which refers to the easiness to be remembered), usability, and
security, since graphical passwords may tend to be visually simple and easily copied by third
parties (Biddle et al., 2012).
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Figure 2.8: Examples of signatures and associated signals from the BioSecure Multimodal Database DS2
and DS3 signature subcorpora captured using a pen tablet (top) and a PDA (bottom), respectively.
Graphical passwords can be broadly classified in three categories: 1) recall, 2) recognition,
and 3) cued-recall passwords. In recall-based systems users have to remember a graphical
password and provide it during authentication. In recognition systems, graphical information
is presented to the user during authentication from which the user has to perform a selection
that matches a set of information previously memorized. Cued-recall systems combine the two
aforementioned methods, providing graphical cues that help users recall the previously learned
password.
In the present work we focus in doodle-based passwords, which fall in the category of recall
graphical passwords. Individuals are authenticated by using a drawing or sketch, which is
captured on a touchscreen during enrollment and is used afterwards for verification. Due to
their graphical nature, they are in general easier to remember than classical alphanumerical
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passwords or PIN codes composed of strings of characters and numbers (Renaud, 2009).
An extensive survey of graphical password authentication algorithms has been compiled
by Biddle et al. (2012).
2.5.1. Recall-based Graphical Password Verification
A wide range of approaches for recall-based graphical password authentication have been
reported in the literature. Several aspects have been studied such as resilience to forgeries, mem-
orability (i.e. the easiness to remember), user acceptance, error rates, and time to enroll (Biddle
et al., 2012). The most relevant methods are surveyed in this section, and summarized in
Table 2.2.
Recall-based authentication can be broadly divided in two main categories. Exact-match ap-
proaches assume that during authentication, a user produces exactly the same drawing provided
during enrolment (Jermyn et al., 1999; Tao and Adams, 2008). As a consequence, no biometric
information is used. On the other hand, elastic approaches allow some variability between enrol-
ment and authentication (Govindarajulu and Madhvanath, 2007; Varenhorst, 2004). Graphical
password authentication systems can be also divided into static and dynamic approaches. Static
or off-line systems use the doodle image for authentication, while dynamic or on-line systems
use time functions extracted from the doodle trajectory. Dynamic approaches have traditionally
reached better verification performances than static systems in the related field of signature
verification, since more levels of information are used for authentication.
One of the pioneering contributions in the field is the Draw-A-Secret system (DAS) (Jermyn
et al., 1999). The DAS system implements a rectangular 5× 5 cell grid where users trace their
graphical password. The cell sequence that the users follow is stored as a password. Users are
accepted by the system only if they follow the same sequence of cells. The BDAS (Background
Draw-a-Secret) was later proposed by Dunphy and Yan (2007), where a background image is
shown behind the cell grid. A higher complexity in the password choice and better memorability
were reported. The Pass-Go authentication scheme was proposed also as a variation of DAS
by Tao and Adams (2008). In that approach, the graphical password is defined by a sequence
of grid intersections instead of grid cells, overcoming the limitation of the DAS scheme, where
strokes too close to adjacent cell edges could be incorrectly assigned to multiple cells.
The term “passdoodle” was introduced by Goldberg et al. (2002). A passdoodle is a graphical
password composed of a free-form drawing. In that work, the memorability (i.e. the easiness to
remember) of doodles for user authentication is studied, as well as the user preference towards
alphanumeric passwords or doodles. However, it is a preliminary study carried out with doodles
traced on a sheet of paper. A passdoodle verification system is also proposed by Varenhorst
(2004). The stroke spatial distribution and the speed are used for verification.
A doodle authentication system which uses Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) for matching is
described by Govindarajulu and Madhvanath (2007). In that work, the trajectory coordinates
(x, y), as well as their first and second order derivatives are used as features to characterize
each doodle. Recognition performance results are provided using Tamil characters, instead of
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2.5 Graphical Password-based Authentication
doodles. Gao et al. (2008) presented a static authentication method where free-form sketches
are stored as a sequence of cell relative positions. The Levenshtein distance is used to compute
distances between sequences. The Scribble-A-Secret (SAS) scheme was later proposed by Oka
et al. (2008). In that approach, the edge orientation patterns of the doodle static image are used
as features, hence no dynamic information is used for authentication. The PassShapes approach
considers graphical passwords composed as a sequence of straight strokes following eight possible
directions, at 45◦ angles (Weiss and Luca, 2008). Each stroke is encoded as one of eight different
characters, and thus a password is created.
A verification scheme based on predefined visual shapes was described by Chen et al. (2009).
The system presents a set of cues to the users, which are in general common shapes (e.g. squares,
triangles), which the users can follow to define their own free-form password. Cryptographic keys
are then generated from the passwords. Similarly, a graphical password verification system based
on a set of predefined symbols was proposed by Zada Khan et al. (2011). During enrollment,
the user first selects a set of predefined symbols (at least 3) and then draws them. The set of
symbols constitutes the user password. During authentication, the symbols must be drawn in
the same order and are then matched to the predefined templates. If the drawn set is the same
as the registered set, the user is validated. No experimental results are provided.
A multi-touch sketch-based authentication approach was described by Sae-Bae et al. (2014).
In that work, graphical passwords are composed of multi-touch sketches (i.e. drawn with several
fingers at the same time). Since the gesture used for authentication is produced with all the
fingers, information from the hand geometry is also captured. The GEAT scheme proposed
by Shahzad et al. (2013) allows user to draw a password composed of a set of ten predefined
simple gestures. Many of them are multi-touch gestures. Support Vector Machines (SVM) are
used for classification.
Frank et al. (2013) presented an authentication scheme based on continuous touchscreen
input, instead of specific gestures. SVMs and k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) classifiers are used.
A method based on the Simple K-Space (SKS) algorithm and Fre´chet distance is proposed
by Riggan et al. (2014). In this particular approach, dynamic features from the fingertip tra-
jectory as well as the pen tip pressure are used. A usability survey is also carried out on the
database users (35 participants) showing, in general, willingness to accept the use of this type
of graphical passwords as an authentication means.
Two graphical password approaches have gained popularity in the industry during the last
years: the Pattern Lock found in Android OS portable devices and the Picture Password in
Windows 8 devices. The Pattern Lock method displays a square grid of 3 × 3 points on the
screen, and users trace a pattern between the points without repeating any of them. This
resembles a simplified version of the Pass-Go scheme. Other approaches that also use dynamic
information from the Pattern Lock drawing process have been proposed (Angulo and Waestlund,
2012; De Luca et al., 2012). In the Windows 8 Picture Password method a background picture
is shown, and users trace on it a password composed of circles, straight lines and points.
The heterogeneity of the existing approaches and lack of public datasets reveals that recall-
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based graphical password verification is a research field that is still not as established as other
closely related fields such as symbol recognition (Llados et al., 2002) or signature verifica-
tion (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008).
In this PhD thesis, doodle-based graphical passwords are considered. The authentication
process is performed following the same approach than signature verification, as described in
Sect. 2.1.1.
2.5.2. Attacks to Graphical Password-based Systems
Several types of attacks against graphical password authentication systems have been studied
in the literature. Smudge attacks are those produced when an attacker follows the finger grease
path left by the user on the screen (Aviv et al., 2010). Shoulder-surfing attacks refer to the case
when the attacker has visual access to the password drawing process. Several techniques against
shoulder surfing attacks are proposed by Zakaria et al. (2011). The authors study how adding
fake strokes during the drawing process or removing strokes as they are drawn prevent against
forgers.
P. C. van Oorschot and Thorpe (2008) have studied dictionary attacks against DAS-like
systems. It was shown that users tend to select graphical passwords from a relatively small
subspace of cell combinations. Thus an attacker could be successfully accepted after a limited
number of random attempts from that particular graphical subspace.
2.6. Feature Selection
Due to the curse of dimensionality (Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2006), the performance
of a statistical classifier is degraded if the available training data is too small compared to
the number of dimensions of the feature vector (Jain and Zongker, 1997). This is usually
the case in signature verification, where the average length of a digitized signature is of a
few hundreds of samples and the available number of training signatures is relatively small (in
practical applications between 3 and 5). The amount of training signatures is mostly conditioned
by the willingness of the users to provide many samples during enrollment. Nevertheless, when
signatures are captured during only one unique session, their variability is small in general,
leading to a poorly trained model.
Feature selection techniques try to reduce the dimensionality of the feature vectors while
optimizing the verification accuracy. Their goal is to find the optimal combination of features
according to a given optimization criterion. Ideally, given a feature vector of F dimensions, all
the possible combinations from 1 to F features should be tested in order to find the optimal
combination. Unfortunately, this is not feasible due to the high amount of combinations that
have to be tested, which is
F∑
i=1
(
F
i
)
.
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A critical step when performing feature selection is the choice of the optimization criterion.
Two main alternatives can be taken: filter and wrapper methods (Theodoridis and Koutroumbas,
2006). In the former, the optimal feature subset is selected according to intrinsic properties of
the training data such as statistical properties. In the latter, the result of the classification
problem under consideration is used as the criterion to be optimized. A reasonable choice for
a signature verification system is a wrapper method in which the verification performance in
terms of the EER is set as the optimization criterion. Wrapper methods require in general more
computational resources, as the evaluation of the optimization criterion (e.g. the verification
decision) is commonly more complex than the computation of statistical properties of the training
data.
Feature selection has been applied to signature verification from several perspectives. Lee
et al. (1996) propose a method for global features which ranks the discriminative power of each
feature for each specific user, based on the distance between the user signatures and the rest of
users. They select as an optimal feature vector the one that contains the features that are most
commonly ranked among the most discriminative over all the users in the database. Fierrez-
Aguilar et al. (2005a) perform feature ranking based on their Mahalanobis distance between
signatures from different users. The optimal feature vector is then selected by iteratively adding
individual features in the order they were ranked and selecting the best performing vector in
terms of the system EER. Richiardi et al. (2005) propose a distance measure based on the
Fisher’s Discriminant Ratio and use it to perform Sequential Forward Floating Search Selection
(SFFS), which is summarized in this section. Galbally et al. (2007a) perform feature selection
by using Genetic Algorithms and setting the system EER as the optimization criterion. User-
specific feature selection approaches have been also proposed (Kim et al., 1995; Wijesoma et al.,
2000).
2.6.1. Feature Selection Algorithms
Several feature selection techniques have been proposed in the literature aimed towards re-
ducing the number of feature combinations that have to be tested. Unfortunately, all of them are
only able to find suboptimal solutions. A notable exception is the Branch and Bound algorithm,
which is however only applicable when the optimization criterion increases monotonically with
the feature subset size. While some of the algorithms are deterministic and always lead to the
same suboptimal solution, other algorithms may produce different suboptimal solutions in each
execution (Jain and Zongker, 1997). The most popular techniques are summarized next.
2.6.1.1. Scalar Feature Selection
Features are considered individually using this procedure. Each feature is ranked in terms of
its class separability using a predefined criterion C, such as the system EER or any distance mea-
sure. Then, the N top ranked features in terms of C are selected as the optimal N -dimensional
feature vector. This method has the advantage of being computationally simple. Nevertheless,
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it does not take into account the possible correlations among features. Some techniques to deal
with this problem have been proposed in the literature (Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2006).
This approach is taken by (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a).
2.6.1.2. Sequential Forward/Backward Selection
In Sequential Forward Selection, given F available features we start by selecting the most
discriminative feature xi. Then, all the possible combinations between this feature and any
other feature xf are computed and the best combination {xi, xj} is selected. The algorithm
continues by iteratively adding features in this manner until the desired feature vector size is
reached. The Sequential Backward Selection is similar to this approach but instead of starting
with a single feature it starts with all the F features and one feature is removed at a time.
2.6.1.3. Floating Search
Pudil et al. (1994) proposed a feature selection algorithm that overcomes some of the limita-
tions of the ones presented above. Namely, when a feature is selected by the previous methods
(or discarded, in the backward case), it can no longer be discarded (or selected, in the backward
case). This is known as the nesting effect. As with Sequential Selection, both a forward and
a backward approach exist. We focus on the forward method, referred to as Sequential For-
ward Floating Search (SFFS). The algorithm can be summarized as follows (Theodoridis and
Koutroumbas, 2006).
Let’s consider a set of F features, from which we wish to find the best performing subset
of N features, N ≤ F in terms of a given criterion C. Let Xn = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be the best
combination of n features and YF−n the set of remaining F − n features. In the algorithm, we
store the best sets of lower dimensions X1,X2, ...,Xn−1. The following steps are performed until
a loop with a stable set Xn is obtained.
1. Inclusion
Choose the element xn+1 from YF−n which, added to Xn produces the best value of the
optimization criterion C. Then, Xn+1 = {Xn, xn+1}.
2. Test
a) Find the feature xr that has the least negative (or most positive) effect on the criterion
C when it is removed from Xn+1.
b) If r = n+ 1, change n for n+ 1 and go to step 1.
c) If r 6= n + 1 and C(Xn+1 − {xr}) < C(Xn) go to step 1, that is, if removal of any
feature does not improve the criterion on the previously selected set Xn, no further
backward search is performed.
3. Exclusion
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a) Remove xr to get X
′
n = Xn+1 − {xr}.
b) Find the feature xs that has the least negative effect on the criterion C when it is
removed from X ′n.
c) If C(X ′n − {xs}) < C(Xn−1) then Xn = X ′n and go to step 1, that is, if removal of
another feature does not improve the criterion on the previously selected set Xn, no
further backward search is performed.
d) Remove xs by putting X
′
n−1 = X
′
n − {xs} and n = n− 1.
e) Go to step 3.a.
Note that some specific conditions on the first steps have not been considered in order to
simplify the algorithm description. The backward algorithm is equivalent to the one explained
but removing instead of adding features.
Other algorithms for feature selection include Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms (Gal-
bally et al., 2007a), although the latter produce variable suboptimal results among different
executions. Jain and Zongker (1997) performed an exhaustive comparison of several feature se-
lection algorithms and studied the impact of small training sets on them. The SFFS proved to
be highly effective, obtaining results close to the optimal set selected by the Branch and Bound
algorithm.
2.7. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented the problem of Dynamic Signature Verification and also de-
scribed the closely related challenge of automatic verification of recall-based Graphical Pass-
words. The main verification algorithms from the state of the art were described. We also
presented the most popular publicly available databases. Related research areas were also pre-
sented as well as feature selection algorithms.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Verification Systems
In the present chapter, the automatic signature and doodle verification systems proposed
in this Thesis are described. Function-based (referred to as local) and feature-based systems
(referred to as global) are considered. The global and a local feature sets that are used are a
compendium of existing features from the literature, as will be explained in this chapter.
3.1. Pre-processing
The input coordinate sequence [xˆn, yˆn], n = 1, ..., I is sampled from the writing device (or
finger-tip) trajectory on a touchscreen, as well as the time interval tˆn between samples. The
trajectory coordinate sequence [xˆn, yˆn] is first re-sampled to interpolate missing samples (due to
sampling errors or pauses between strokes). Cubic splines are used for interpolation (Catmull
and Rom, 1974). The sequences are then normalized to have zero mean, resulting in [xn, yn].
In the experimental chapters where signatures are captured on a digitizing pen tablet, the
pen azimuth, altitude, and pressure are available, (see Fig. 1.1) and are also processed. This
will be explicitly mentioned where applicable. No sampling errors happen in those devices so
interpolation is not needed.
3.2. Global Verification System
This feature-based signature verification system extracts a set of 100 global features from
each signature [xn, yn] normalized coordinate sequence. The feature set was originally described
by Fierrez-Aguilar et al. (2005a) and is an extension of other sets presented in previous works
in the literature (Lee et al., 1996; Nelson and Kishon, 1991; Nelson et al., 1994). A complete
description of the feature set is given in Table 3.1. These 100 features can be divided in four
categories corresponding to the following magnitudes (the numbering is the same used by Fierrez-
Aguilar et al. (2005a)):
Time (25 features), related to signature duration, or timing of events such as pen-ups or
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Table 3.1: Set of global features. Table adapted from Fierrez-Aguilar et al. (2005a). T denotes time
interval, t denotes time instant, N denotes number of events, and θ denotes angle. Note that some
symbols are defined in different features of the table (e.g. ∆ in feature 7 is defined in feature 15)
# Time related feature # Direction related feature
# Speed and Acceleration related feature # Geometry related feature
# Feature Description # Feature Description
1 signature total duration Ts 2 (pen-down duration Tw)/Ts
3 (1st t(vmax))/Tw 4 T (vx > 0)/Tw
5 T (vx < 0)/Tw 6 T (vy > 0)/Tw
7 T (vy < 0)/Tw 8 T (vx > 0|pen-up)/Tw
9 T (vx < 0|pen-up)/Tw 10 T (vy > 0|pen-up)/Tw
11 T (vx < y|pen-up)/Tw 12 T (1st pen-up)/Tw
13 T (2nd pen-up)/Tw 14 T (2nd pen-down)/Ts
15 T (3rd pen-down)/Ts 16 (1st t(vy,max))/Tw
17 (1st t(vy,min))/Tw 18 (1st t(vx,max))/Tw
19 (1st t(vx,min))/Tw 20
T ((dy/dt)/(dx/dt)>0)
T ((dy/dt)/(dx/dt)<0)
21 T (curvature > thresholdcurv)/Tw 22 (1st t(xmax))/Tw
23 (2nd t(xmax))/Tw 24 (3rd t(xmax))/Tw
25 (2nd t(ymax))/Tw 26 (3rd t(ymax))/Tw
27 (average velocity v¯)/vmax 28 N(vx = 0)
29 N(vy = 0) 30 v¯/vx,max
31 v¯/vy,max 32 (velocity rms v)/vmax
33 (centripetal acceleration rms ac)/amax 34 (tangential acceleration rms at)/amax
35 (acceleration rms a)/amax 36 (integrated abs. centr. acc. aIc)/amax
37 (velocity correlation vx,y)/v2max 38 standard deviation of vx
39 standard deviation of vy 40 standard deviation of ax
41 standard deviation of ay 42 average jerk ¯
43 ¯x 44 ¯y
45 jmax 46 jx,max
47 jy,max 48 jrms
49 t(jmax)/Tw 50 t(jx,max)/Tw
51 t(jy,max)/Tw 52 N(pen-ups)
53 N(sign changes of dx/dt and dy/dt) 54 T ((dx/dt)(dy/dt)>0)
T ((dx/dt)(dy/dt)<0)
55 θ(initial direction) 56 θ(1st to 2nd pen-down)
57 θ(1st pen-down to 1st pen-up) 58 θ(1st pen-down to 2nd pen-up)
59 θ(2nd pen-down to 2nd pen-up) 60 θ(before last pen-up)
61 θ(1st pen-down to last pen-up) 62 direction histogram s1
63 direction histogram s2 64 direction histogram s3
65 direction histogram s4 66 direction histogram s5
67 direction histogram s6 68 direction histogram s7
69 direction histogram s8 70 direction change histogram c2
71 direction change histogram c3 72 direction change histogram c4
73
Amin=(ymax−ymin)(xmax−xmin)
(∆x=
∑pen-downs
i=1
(xmax |i−xmin |i))∆y
74 (max distance between points)/Amin
75 (x1st pen-down − xmax)/∆x 76 (x1st pen-down − xmin)/∆x
77 (xlast pen-up − xmax)/∆x 78 (xlast pen-up − xmin)/∆x
79 (y1st pen-down − ymax)/∆y 80 (y1st pen-down − ymin)/∆y
81 (ylast pen-up − ymax)/∆y 82 (ylast pen-up − ymin)/∆y
83
(xmax−xmin)∆y
(ymax−ymin)∆x
84 (standard deviation of x)/∆x
85 (standard deviation of y)/∆y 86 (Tw v¯)/(ymax − ymin)
87 (Tw v¯)/(ymax − ymin) 88 (xmax − xmin)/xacquisition range
89 (ymax − ymin)/yacquisition range 90 (x¯− xmin)/x¯
91 spatial histogram t1 92 spatial histogram t2
93 spatial histogram t3 94 spatial histogram t4
95 N(local maxima in x) 96 (x2nd local max − x1st pen-down)/∆x
97 (x3rd local max − x1st pen-down)/∆x 98 N(local maxima in y)
99 (y2nd local max − y1st pen-down)/∆y 100 (y3rd local max − y1st pen-down)/∆y
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local maxima: 1, 13, 22, 32, 38, 40-42, 50, 52, 58-60, 62, 64, 68, 79, 81-82, 87-90, 94, 100.
Speed and Acceleration (25 features), from the first and second order time derivatives
of the position time functions, like average speed or maximum speed: 4-6, 9-11, 14, 23, 26,
29, 31, 33, 39, 44-45, 48, 69, 74, 76, 80, 83, 85, 91-92, 96.
Direction (18 features), extracted from the path trajectory like the starting direction or
mean direction between pen-ups: 34, 51, 56-57, 61, 63, 66, 71-73, 77-78, 84, 93, 95, 97-99.
Geometry (32 features), associated to the strokes or signature aspect-ratio: 2, 3, 7-8, 12,
15-21, 24-25, 27-28, 30, 35-37, 43, 46-47, 49, 53-55, 65, 67, 70, 75, 86.
In our implementation, features are normalized into the range (0, 1) using tanh-estimators (Jain
et al., 2005). A classifier based on a simplified version of the Mahalanobis distance has been
implemented, in order to compare an input signature with a claimed user model. This distance
measure has the advantage of being relatively simple to compute and generic enough to provide a
reasonable empirical estimate of the statistical class separability achieved by the feature vectors.
User models C = (µ,Σ) are created from a training set of genuine signatures, where µ and Σ
are the mean vector and covariance matrix obtained from the training signatures. A diagonal
covariance matrix is used, and values below a fixed threshold are replaced by the threshold
value. This is done to avoid obtaining a singular covariance matrix due to the limited number
of training samples in comparison to the problem dimensionality, and to simplify the implemen-
tation of this algorithm in handheld devices with limited processing power. The threshold value
is 0.00085 and has been heuristically obtained in preliminary experiments. Thus, the matching
score s is obtained as the inverse of the “simplified” Mahalanobis distance between the input
signature feature vector x and the claimed user model C:
s(x, C) =
(
(x− µ)T (Σ)−1 (x− µ)
)−1/2
. (3.1)
If the score s computed in 3.1 is above a specific threshold, the signature is considered as
genuine. On the contrary it is rejected by the system.
3.3. Local Signature Verification Systems
An HMM system, a GMM system and a DTW-based system have been implemented. In all
systems, the [xn, yn] normalized signals are used as an input to extract a set of discrete-time
functions that model each signature. When available, the [zn, γn, φn] pen pressure, pen azimuth
and pen altitude are also used. The features considered in this work are an extension from the
original set of functions described by Fierrez et al. (2007b). We have added features from other
contributions (Lei and Govindaraju, 2005; Ly-Van et al., 2007; Richiardi et al., 2005) based
on the reported results. In the original set, 7 functions were extracted from the raw signals,
from which the first and second order derivatives were computed, leading to a 21-dimensional
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feature vector. Most second order derivatives have been discarded in this work as they proved
to have a very low contribution in the verification performance (as corroborated in Richiardi
et al. (2005)). In the present Dissertation, an extended set of 15 functions is proposed, plus 12
functions obtained from the first and second order derivatives of some of them. In Table 3.2
we present the resulting set of 27 functions. All features are normalized to have zero mean and
variance equal to 1.
Visual examples of the extracted functions can be seen in Fig. 3.1. This set assumes the
availability of pressure and pen-inclination information, although this is not the case for signa-
tures acquired on touchscreens. In that case, only 21 features can be extracted from the raw
signals.
3.3.1. HMM System
The system implemented in this Thesis is an evolution of the one described by Fierrez
et al. (2007b). That system participated in the Signature Verification Competition 2004 (Yeung
et al., 2004), where it reached the first and second positions against random and skilled forgeries
respectively.
In our implementation, based on the HTK Toolkit (Young et al., 2009), an initial step is
added to the original HMM training scheme (Fierrez et al., 2007b), leading to the following
stages: i) the global mean and covariance of the training signatures is assigned to all the
mixtures, ii) k-means segmentation and Maximum Likelihood training is performed, iii) Baum-
Welch re-estimation is carried out. The first step allows to have a trainable model for step iii
(despite being inaccurate) in the case where step ii fails due to the large number of parameters
to be estimated, or other computational problems.
Similarity scores are computed as the log-likelihood of the signature (using the Viterbi al-
gorithm) divided by the total number of samples of the signature. No score alignment between
users is applied (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005b).
In order to keep scores between a reasonable range, normalized scores s˜ between (0,1) are
obtained as
s˜ = exp (s(x, C)/30) , (3.2)
where x and C represent respectively the input signature to verify and the enrolled model of
the claimed identity.
The particular implementations used in the experiments (e.g. number of states or number
of Gaussian Mixtures) are described in each chapter, where applicable.
3.3.2. GMM System
The GMM system implemented in this Thesis follows the description given in Sect. 2.1.3.
The Netlab framework is used for its implementation (Nabney, 2002).
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Table 3.2: Extended set of local features. The upper dot notation (e.g. x˙n) indicates time derivative.
Features 3, 10, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are not available on touchscreens.
# Feature Description
1 x-coordinate xn
2 y-coordinate yn
3 Pen-pressure zn
4 Path-tangent angle θn = arctan(y˙n/x˙n)
5 Path velocity magnitude υn =
√
y˙n + x˙n
6 Log curvature radius ρn = log(1/κn) = log(υn/θ˙n), where κn is the
curvature of the position trajectory
7 Total acceleration magnitude an =
√
t2n + c
2
n =
√
υ˙2n + υ
2
nθ
2
n , where tn
and cn are respectively the tangential and cen-
tripetal acceleration components of the pen
motion.
8-14 First-order derivative of features 1-7 x˙n, y˙n, z˙n, θ˙n, υ˙n, ρ˙n, a˙n
15 Pen azimuth γn
16 Pen altitude φn
17-18 First-order derivative of features
15-16
γ˙n, φ˙n
19-20 Second-order derivative of features 1-2 x¨n, y¨n
21 Ratio of the minimum over the maxi-
mum speed over a window of 5 samples
υrn = min {υn−4, ..., υn}/max {υn−4, ..., υn}
22-23 Angle of consecutive samples and first
order difference
αn = arctan(yn − yn−1/xn − xn−1)
α˙n
24 Sine sn = sin(αn)
25 Cosine cn = cos(αn)
26 Stroke length to width ratio over a win-
dow of 5 samples
r5n =
k=n∑
k=n−4
√
(xk−xk−1)2+(yk−yk−1)2
max{xn−4,...,xn}−min{xn−4,...,xn}
27 Stroke length to width ratio over a win-
dow of 7 samples
r7n =
k=n∑
k=n−6
√
(xk−xk−1)2+(yk−yk−1)2
max{xn−6,...,xn}−min{xn−6,...,xn}
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F
Figure 3.1: Examples of functions from the 27-feature extended set defined in Table 3.2 for a genuine
signature (left) and a skilled forgery (right) of a particular subject from the BIOSECURE DS2 Database.
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Given a number of training samples, the model parameters {ωi,µi,Σi} i = 1, . . . , N are esti-
mated from a training set of doodles using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Duda
et al., 2001). The initial data partition (i.e. clustering of data with respect to the Gaussian
components) is performed using the k-means algorithm.
In our work, the number of Gaussian components N is chosen to be 32 and diagonal covari-
ance matrices are used, instead of full matrices, due to the limited amount of available data,
the better performance reported by Richiardi and Drygajlo (2003) and preliminary experiments
which are omitted for the sake of clarity.
During the enrollment phase one model λC is created for each user, which is later used
for matching. In addition, a world GMM λC¯ is created, which models the whole set of users.
World models are trained using enrollment samples from a group of users, as explained in the
experiments.
Given a test vector x and a target user statistical model λC , the match score is computed
as the log-likelihood ratio:
s = log p (x |λC )− log p (x |λC¯ ) . (3.3)
GMM adaptation is a common procedure in speech-related applications (Reynolds et al.,
2000). This is not carried out in our implementation since we have observed in preliminary
experiments that it does not lead to a better performance.
3.3.3. DTW System
The Dynamic Time Warping System implemented in this work follows the description pro-
vided in Sect. 2.1.3.2. Thus, only three transitions are allowed and all weighing factors are equal
to 1. Consequently, following Eq. (2.7), gk is computed as follows:
gk = g(i, j) = min


g(i, j − 1) + d(i, j)
g(i − 1, j − 1) + d(i, j)
g(i − 1, j) + d(i, j)

 (3.4)
The accumulated distance between the two sequences is computed as
D = g(I, J)/K (3.5)
where K is the length of the warping path. A normalized match score is obtained as s˜ = exp(−D).
Given a set of reference samples provided during the enrollment phase and a test signature
(or doodle), the scores between all the reference data and the test sample are computed and the
average is taken as the match score for that particular test sample.
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3.4. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we described the verification systems implemented in this Thesis and the
associated feature sets. Both global and feature sets encompass a notable amount of features
already proposed in the literature, plus new ones based on our experience and recent research.
The verification algorithms are aligned with the state of the art and have reached top positions
in signature verification competitions, namely SVC 2004 for the HMM algorithm (Yeung et al.,
2004) and BSEC 2009 for the DTW algorithm implementation (Houmani et al., 2012).
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Chapter 4
Mobile Signature Verification
The effects of mobile acquisition conditions in automatic signature verification are stud-
ied in this chapter. We focus on the impact of mobility and the usage of touchscreens on the
feature discriminative power of different types of features (local and global) compared to the
traditional pen tablet scenario. We use for that purpose discriminant analysis of individual
features and feature selection algorithms. As described in Chapter 2, signature verification on
mobile conditions is affected by a number of factors not present in the pen tablet acquisition
scenario. Users are forced to provide their signature on a constrained space, holding a device
with their own hands, and using an unfamiliar stylus. This may affect the discriminative power
of features. Moreover, since touchscreens do not capture the pen tip trajectory when it is not
in contact with the surface, information is lost compared to pen tablets.
We study the performance of state-of-the-art verification systems in both scenarios (pen
tablet and handheld device), using the feature sets and the global system and HMM local
system described in Chapter 3.
Two different databases are used in the experiments: (i) the BioSecure Multimodal Database
(BMDB), as a standard benchmark (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010); (ii) a signature database cap-
tured specifically for this experimental work, using a state-of-the-art device (Samsung Galaxy
Note). The BMDB signature database has two subcorpora, one captured on a PDA and other
on a digitizing pen tablet. They correspond to the same users in both devices, allowing a fair
comparison between them. The reader may refer to Sect. 2.4 for a detailed description of the
BMDB database.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the verification systems used in the experiments
are referenced in Sect. 4.1. The experimental protocol is described in Sect. 4.2. Results are
reported in Sect. 4.3. Conclusions are finally drawn in Sect. 4.4.
This chapter is based on the publications: (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2008a, 2014).
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4.1. Verification systems
Global Verification System. The global system described in Sect. 3.2 is used, as well as the
100-feature set.
Local Verification System. The local HMM system described in Sect. 3.3 is used in the
experiments, as well as the 27-feature set. Each user is modeled with a 2-state HMM with 32
Gaussian mixtures per state, following the implementation described by (Fierrez et al., 2007b)
that participated in the SVC 2004 competition (Yeung et al., 2004).
4.2. Databases and Experimental Protocol
4.2.1. Databases
Two databases are used in the experiments, the Biosecure Multimodal DataBase (BMDB),
acquired using a pen-tablet and a PDA (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010), and a database captured
using a Samsung Galaxy Note device, referred to as SG-NOTE.
A subset of 120 users from the BMDB is used in this work 1. It contains 20 genuine signatures
and 20 skilled forgeries per user and acquisition device (PDA and pen tablet). Genuine signatures
were acquired in two different sessions separated by an average period of two months. The first
five signatures correspond to the initial session while the remaining 15 belong to the second
session. Signatures were captured with a PDA while the user was standing and holding the
device with one hand in the handheld scenario, whereas for the pen tablet case they were
acquired while the user was sitting, using a pen on a paper placed over the tablet (see Fig.2.2.a
and 2.2.b). This emulates real operating conditions.
In both devices, skilled forgeries for each user were performed by 4 different forgers (5
forgeries each) under “worst case” conditions: each forger had visual access to the dynamics of
the genuine signature using a tracker tool that allowed replaying the original strokes.
Only the x and y position signals and the sample timestamps are captured by the PDA,
while pressure (z) and pen orientation (θ, γ) signals are also acquired by the pen tablet. Pen
trajectories during pen-ups (when the pen tip is not in contact with the tablet surface) are
recorded by the pen tablet but are not available in the PDA dataset. It is found in the pen
tablet dataset that, for each genuine signature, an average of 18% of sampled points correspond
to pen-up trajectories (i.e. when the pen tip is not in contact with the tablet surface). A
histogram of the proportion of sample points during pen-ups compared to the total signature
samples is depicted in Fig. 4.1. In order to evaluate the effect of the lack of pressure and
inclination information and pen motion during pen-ups, a third signature dataset is artificially
created by removing the samples produced during pen-ups (i.e. having pressure values equal
to 0) in the pen tablet dataset. This set will be referred to as “Tablet interpolated pen-ups”.
1This subset corresponds to the “120 common DS2/DS3” signature dataset available in the BioSecure Foun-
dation web site: http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of signatures classified by the proportion of sampled points during pen-up trajec-
tories vs. total signature sample points, computed on the pen tablet signature dataset.
Pen-up trajectories are interpolated in the PDA and in the tablet interpolated pen-ups dataset.
For the PDA subset, an additional preprocessing step is performed to interpolate erroneous
(missing) samples.
From each of the three BMDB subsets (i.e. PDA, Tablet, and Tablet interpolated pen-
ups), each one containing 120 users, signatures from the first 50 users are used for development
purposes (i.e. individual feature analysis and feature selection), while the remaining 70 are
left to validate the performance of the optimal feature vectors selected by the SFFS algorithm.
We will refer to the development datasets as BMDB-DEV50 and to the validation datasets as
BMDB-VAL70.
This setup follows the protocol of the BioSecure Signature Evaluation Campaign (Houmani
et al., 2012), where a subset of 50 users was released for algorithm tuning prior to the competi-
tion, which was later carried out using a different test dataset.
The SG-NOTE database1 is also used for performance validation, in addition to the BMDB-
VAL70 subset. This dataset was captured by the authors using a Samsung Galaxy Note mobile
phone and contains signatures from 25 users. The SG-NOTE database was captured in two
different sessions with an average gap of 5 days between them. In each session, signatures were
acquired in two blocks of 5 samples, with a short break between blocks. No skilled forgeries are
available in this database. Consequently, the database contains a total amount of 500 signatures
(25 users × 2 sessions × 10 signatures per session). See Fig. 2.2.c for an example signature
acquisition in SG-NOTE.
The five genuine signatures from the initial session are used for enrolment, both for the global
and local systems. Genuine user scores are computed using the remaining from the second
session (15 signatures in BMDB and 10 signatures in SG-NOTE). Random forgery scores (the
case where a forger uses his own signature claiming to be a different user) are obtained by
comparing the user model to one signature sample of all the remaining users. Skilled forgery
scores for the BMDB datasets are computed comparing the 20 available skilled forgeries per user
with his or her own model (trained with five signatures, as stated before).
1This database is available at the ATVS - Biometric Recognition Group web site: http://atvs.ii.uam.es
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Figure 4.2: Diagram of the experimental setup followed in this work. The global and local systems are
presented in Chapter 3. The experimental protocol and databases are described in Sect. 4.2. Results are
reported in Sect. 4.3.
4.2.2. Development and Validation Experiments
The experiments are structured as follows: first, a global and local individual feature analysis
is performed on signatures from the BMDB-DEV50 development dataset (Experiments 1 and 2).
Optimal feature combinations are then computed using the SFFS algorithm for feature selection
(Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, results are validated using the BMDB-VAL70 and SG-NOTE
datasets (Experiment 5).
The experimental approach that has been followed is depicted in Fig. 4.2.
Experiment 1: Global Feature Analysis. The discriminative power of global features can
be measured using the Fisher’s Discriminant Ratio (FDR) for each individual feature. The
FDR provides an intuitive measure of discriminative power, as it increases with the inter-class
variability and decreases with the intra-class variability. The FDR D for the i-th feature from
user C is computed as follows:
Di(C) =
(µGi − µFi)2
σ2Gi + σ
2
Fi
(4.1)
where µ and σ are the average and standard deviation respectively of the genuine signature
sample set Gi and the forged sample set Fi. We use this measure in this work to compare the
discriminative power of each feature defined in Table 3.1 between the mobile and the pen tablet
scenario.
Experiment 2: Local Feature Analysis. Contrary to the case of global features, the appli-
cation of the FDR to compute the discriminative power of individual local features is impractical.
This is due to the fact that local features are time functions. As a consequence, the computation
of distances between average feature values as defined in the FDR does not represent a realistic
measure.
A distance-based discriminative measure using time functions is proposed in (Lei and Govin-
daraju, 2005) to overcome this limitation. In that work, a consistency value is described, which
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provides a similar measure to the FDR at least from an intuitive point of view, as it decreases
when genuine features are far apart among them and close to forgeries and viceversa. We use the
DTW algorithm to compute distances between the time functions, as in (Lei and Govindaraju,
2005). We modify the consistency value definition in order to make its notation similar to the
FDR and thus define the Distance Discriminant Ratio (DDR) R for the i-th feature of user C
as
Ri(C) =
(µDGi − µDFi)2
σ2DGi + σ
2
DFi
, (4.2)
where DGi is the set of distances among the user genuine signatures and DFi is the set of
distances between the genuine signatures and forgeries. This measure assumes that for each
user the mean distance between genuine signatures and forgeries µDFi is higher than the mean
distance between genuine signatures µDGi , which has been tested to be true in the datasets
used for experiments. As can be seen, while not being mathematically equivalent to the FDR,
the DDR provides a comparable measure in terms of the feature discriminative power. Unlike
the FDR, this measure is not scale invariant. However, in our experiments local features are
normalized to have zero mean and variance equal to 1.
The median FDR and DDR are computed differently for random and skilled forgeries. In
the case of random forgeries, for each user, the FDR and DDR between the user samples and
the rest of the genuine signatures in the database are computed, while for skilled forgeries, the
FDR and DDR are computed between the genuine signatures and the available skilled forgeries
for each user.
Experiment 3: Feature Selection. In order to select the best performing feature combi-
nations, feature selection on the global 100-feature set and the local 27-feature set is carried
out using the Sequential Forward Floating Search (SFFS) algorithm, described in Chapter 2,
which is set to minimize the system Equal Error Rate (EER) on the BMDB-DEV50 development
dataset.
Experiment 4: Validation. Finally, the verification performance in terms of the Equal Error
Rate (EER) using the optimal feature vectors selected by the SFFS algorithm for each scenario
are compared on the two available validation sets (BMDB-VAL70 and SG-NOTE).
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Experiments 1 and 2: Individual Feature Analysis
From Fig. 4.3.a, we observe that the median FDR for each feature is similar in the pen tablet
and the PDA scenario when random forgeries are considered (left column). Nevertheless, the
FDR for pen tablet tends to be always higher or equal than the FDR for PDA. In the case
of skilled forgeries, the FDR is higher in most cases for pen tablet than PDA in the case of
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Figure 4.3: (a) Fisher’s Discriminant Ratio (FDR) of each global feature for random (left) and skilled
(right) forgeries. (b) Distance Discriminant Ratio (DDR) of each global feature for random (left) and
skilled (right) forgeries.
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Figure 4.4: System EER for each possible size of the optimal feature vector as selected by the SFFS
algorithm for the global (left) and local (right) system.
skilled forgeries (right column). This suggests that the verification performance in the PDA
scenario against skilled forgeries would be a priori lower than for pen tablet independently
from the classifier used. Interestingly, the FDR for the interpolated pen-ups tablet subset is in
general lower than the original subset, especially for skilled forgeries. This suggests that pen-up
trajectories are more resilient to forgeries (i.e. harder to imitate).
The DDR is in general higher for pen tablet than for PDA, independently of the availability
of pen-up trajectories (see Fig. 4.3.b). As for global features, when pen-up trajectories are
interpolated, the DDR is more negatively affected for skilled forgeries than for random forgeries.
In random forgeries, the most relevant difference is observed in the vertical coordinate feature y,
which is the one that best characterizes the shape of signatures. The first derivative of y has also
a notably higher DDR in the pen tablet scenario. This suggests a higher geometrical variability
in the PDA scenario. As can be seen, first and second x, y derivatives are more discriminative
when pen-ups are interpolated, which may reflect unstable motion during pen-ups. The path
velocity magnitude υ and its first derivative are also considerably more discriminative in the
pen tablet dataset. This suggests higher variability in the writing speed on the PDA, which can
be motivated by the unfamiliar signing surface (touchscreen) and device.
4.3.2. Experiments 3 and 4: Feature Selection
In Fig. 4.4 the evolution of the global and the local system EER using the optimal feature
vector, as selected by the SFFS algorithm, is depicted for each possible vector size. It can be
observed that while the behavior for the case of random forgeries is similar on both scenar-
ios (mobile and tablet), the optimal verification performance is significantly better for skilled
forgeries in the pen tablet scenario.
In the global system, the verification performance for pen tablet does not significantly vary
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of global feature types (Time, Speed & Acceleration, Direction, and Geometry)
selected by the SFFS algorithm on each optimization scenario using the BMDB-DEV50 subcorpus. Feature
vectors of 40 elements are considered. Rd denotes random forgeries, Sk skilled forgeries and “interp.”
refers to the interpolated pen-ups dataset.
when pen-up trajectories are interpolated. On the other hand, the EER increases notably in
the local system when pen-ups are interpolated. This corroborates the results from the indi-
vidual feature analysis, that is, trajectories during pen-ups provide considerable discriminative
information against skilled forgeries.
Experiment 3: Global Features As can be seen in Fig. 4.4.a, the optimal feature vectors
have an approximate size of 40 features. The specific features which conform the optimal 40-
feature vectors are shown in Table 4.1. The proportion of each feature type (Time, Speed &
Acceleration, Direction and Geometry, as described in Table. 4.1) in each optimization scenario
is represented in Fig. 4.5, considering feature vectors of 40 elements. As can be seen, Geometry
features have a higher relevance in the PDA dataset. On the contrary, Time and Speed &
Acceleration features are more relevant in pen-tablet feature vectors, specially against skilled
forgeries. Geometry features are in principle the easiest to forge, so their higher presence in
PDA feature vectors may lead to a lower verification performance.
Experiment 4: Local Features The optimal local feature combinations selected by the
SFFS algorithm for each optimization scenario are presented in Table 4.2.
Several remarks can be extracted from these results. First, neither pressure nor pen orientation-
related features are present in the pen tablet optimal feature vectors, suggesting that the lack of
them should not penalize the verification performance (contrary to the results presented by Mu-
ramatsu and Matsumoto (2007) and aligned with the findings of Houmani et al. (2009)). For
the two original datasets (PDA and pen tablet), three features are present in all vectors, namely
the x coordinate, the first derivative of the y coordinate and the cosine c of the trajectory angle
α.
These results also reveal that less features are needed for HMM-based signature verification
compared to the ones commonly considered in other works such as Fierrez et al. (2007b); Ly-Van
et al. (2007); Richiardi et al. (2005), at least under these experimental conditions. The absence
of pressure in the optimal feature vectors suggests that a pen tablet-based system does not have
a priori advantage over a handheld device due to the capture of pressure information per se.
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Table 4.1: Global feature set described in Chapter 3. The optimal 40-feature subsets, as described in
the Experimental Results (Sect. 4.3.2), are shown for each optimization scenario: “Ps” and “Pr” denote
PDA skilled and random forgeries, “Ts” and “Tr” pen tablet skilled and random forgeries and “Us” and
“Ur” refer to pen tablet with interpolated pen-ups against skilled and random forgeries respectively.
# Time related feature # Direction related feature
# Speed and Acceleration related feature # Geometry related feature
# Feature Description
Optimal features
# Feature Description
Optimal features
Ps Pr Tr Ts Ur Us Ps Pr Tr Ts Ur Us
1 signature total duration Ts X X X X X X 2 (pen-down duration Tw)/Ts
3 (1st t(vmax))/Tw 4 T (vx > 0)/Tw X X X X X
5 T (vx < 0)/Tw X 6 T (vy > 0)/Tw X
7 T (vy < 0)/Tw X 8 T (vx > 0|pen-up)/Tw
9 T (vx < 0|pen-up)/Tw X X 10 T (vy > 0|pen-up)/Tw X X
11 T (vx < y|pen-up)/Tw 12 T (1st pen-up)/Tw X X
13 T (2nd pen-up)/Tw X X 14 T (2nd pen-down)/Ts X X
15 T (3rd pen-down)/Ts X X X 16 (1st t(vy,max))/Tw X X X X
17 (1st t(vy,min))/Tw X X X X X 18 (1st t(vx,max))/Tw X X X
19 (1st t(vx,min))/Tw X X X X X 20
T ((dy/dt)/(dx/dt)>0)
T ((dy/dt)/(dx/dt)<0)
X X
21 T (curvature > thresholdcurv)/Tw 22 (1st t(xmax))/Tw X X
23 (2nd t(xmax))/Tw X X X 24 (3rd t(xmax))/Tw X
25 (2nd t(ymax))/Tw X X X 26 (3rd t(ymax))/Tw X X
27 (average velocity v¯)/vmax X X 28 N(vx = 0) X X X
29 N(vy = 0) X X X X X 30 v¯/vx,max X X X X X X
31 v¯/vy,max X 32 (velocity rms v)/vmax X X X X
33 (centripetal acceleration rms ac)/amax X X 34 (tangential acceleration rms at)/amax X X X X
35 (acceleration rms a)/amax X X 36 (integrated abs. centr. acc. aIc)/amax X X X X X
37 (velocity correlation vx,y)/v2max X X X X 38 standard deviation of vx X
39 standard deviation of vy X X X 40 standard deviation of ax
41 standard deviation of ay X X X X 42 average jerk ¯ X X
43 ¯x 44 ¯y
45 jmax X X X 46 jx,max X X
47 jy,max X X X 48 jrms X
49 t(jmax)/Tw X X 50 t(jx,max)/Tw X X X X X
51 t(jy,max)/Tw X X X X 52 N(pen-ups) X X X X X
53 N(sign changes of dx/dt and dy/dt) X X X X X X 54 T ((dx/dt)(dy/dt)>0)
T ((dx/dt)(dy/dt)<0)
55 θ(initial direction) X 56 θ(1st to 2nd pen-down) X X X X
57 θ(1st pen-down to 1st pen-up) X X 58 θ(1st pen-down to 2nd pen-up) X
59 θ(2nd pen-down to 2nd pen-up) X X X X 60 θ(before last pen-up) X X
61 θ(1st pen-down to last pen-up) X 62 direction histogram s1 X X X X
63 direction histogram s2 X X X X X 64 direction histogram s3
65 direction histogram s4 X X X X X 66 direction histogram s5 X X
67 direction histogram s6 68 direction histogram s7
69 direction histogram s8 X X 70 direction change histogram c2 X X
71 direction change histogram c3 X 72 direction change histogram c4 X
73
Amin=(ymax−ymin)(xmax−xmin)
(∆x=
∑pen-downs
i=1
(xmax |i−xmin |i))∆y
X X X 74 (max distance between points)/Amin
75 (x1st pen-down − xmax)/∆x X X X X 76 (x1st pen-down − xmin)/∆x X X X X
77 (xlast pen-up − xmax)/∆x X X 78 (xlast pen-up − xmin)/∆x X
79 (y1st pen-down − ymax)/∆y X X 80 (y1st pen-down − ymin)/∆y X X X X
81 (ylast pen-up − ymax)/∆y X X X X 82 (ylast pen-up − ymin)/∆y X
83
(xmax−xmin)∆y
(ymax−ymin)∆x
X X 84 (standard deviation of x)/∆x X X X
85 (standard deviation of y)/∆y X X 86 (Tw v¯)/(ymax − ymin) X X X
87 (Tw v¯)/(ymax − ymin) X X 88 (xmax − xmin)/xacquisition range X X X X
89 (ymax − ymin)/yacquisition range 90 (x¯− xmin)/x¯ X
91 spatial histogram t1 X X X 92 spatial histogram t2 X X X X
93 spatial histogram t3 X X 94 spatial histogram t4 X
95 N(local maxima in x) X X X X 96 (x2nd local max − x1st pen-down)/∆x X
97 (x3rd local max − x1st pen-down)/∆x X 98 N(local maxima in y) X X X X X
99 (y2nd local max − y1st pen-down)/∆y 100 (y3rd local max − y1st pen-down)/∆y X X X X
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Table 4.2: Local feature sets selected by the SFFS algorithm on the development datasets. “SK.” denotes
skilled forgeries and “RD.” random forgeries.
Optimization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
scenario xn yn zn θn υn ρn an x˙n y˙n z˙n θ˙n υ˙n ρ˙n a˙n γn φn γ˙n φ˙n x¨n y¨n υ
r
n αn α˙n sn cn r
5
n r
7
n
SK.
PDA X X X X X X X
Pen tablet X X X X X X X X X
Pen tablet interp. X X X X X X X
RD.
PDA X X X X X X X X
Pen tablet X X X X X X
Pen tablet interp. X X X X X X X
Table 4.3: System performance in terms of EER on the BMDB-VAL70 validation set using global or
local features on both scenarios for random (rd) and skilled (sk) forgeries. The combined EER (EERc) is
also presented, as described in Sect. 4.3.3. Vectors of 40 features have been selected in every configuration
for the global system.
Optimization Global Local
scenario EERrd(%) EERsk(%) EERc(%) EERrd(%) EERsk(%) EERc(%)
SK.
PDA 7.2 16.3 9.7 6.0 17.5 9.1
Pen tablet 5.6 11.3 7.5 4.5 9.3 5.7
Pen tablet interp. 6.9 10.9 7.9 6.8 12.1 8.1
RD.
PDA 5.4 17.7 9.2 5.8 22.2 9.5
Pen tablet 6.7 13.0 8.6 3.8 11.1 7.1
Pen tablet interp. 6.7 10.9 7.7 5.8 15.3 8.9
The main disadvantage of a handheld device would be the lack of trajectories during pen-ups,
which penalizes verification performance.
4.3.3. Experiment 5: Validation
The verification performance (in terms of EER) on the BMDB-VAL70 validation set using the
optimal feature vectors in each scenario is shown in Table 4.3. As can be seen, global features
provide better results in general on mobile conditions, at least compared to an HMM-based
system. It can also be observed that when pen-up trajectories are not available, the performance
of the local system is significantly degraded against skilled forgeries. This corroborates the
reduction of the individual feature discriminative power (FDR and DDR) against skilled forgeries
observed in the individual feature analysis (Sect. 4.3.1).
It can also be observed in Table 4.3 that, comparing both optimization scenarios, when
the systems are optimized against random forgeries, there is a significant degradation in the
performance against skilled forgeries. On the contrary, the EER against random forgeries is
nearly not degraded (or even enhanced) when the systems are optimized against skilled forgeries.
A combined EER (EERc) is also presented in Table 4.3, where all available scores (genuine,
random forgeries and skilled forgeries) are used for its computation. This implies that, for each
user, 15 genuine user scores, 20 skilled forgery scores and 69 random forgery scores are used for
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Table 4.4: System performance in terms of EER on the SG-NOTE set using global or local features on
both scenarios for random (rd) forgeries. Vectors of 40 features have been selected in every configuration
for the global system. “SK.” denotes skilled forgeries and “RD.” random forgeries.
Optimization Global Local
scenario EERrd(%) EERrd(%)
SK. 4.2 6.2
RD. 2.1 6.8
Table 4.5: System performance in terms of EER in the BSEC 2009 Signature Evaluation Campaign
both for random (rd) and skilled (sk) forgeries. Table data has been extracted from Houmani et al. (2012).
System ID
DS2 Pen tablet Dataset DS3 PDA Dataset
EERsk(%) EERrd(%) EERsk(%) EERrd(%)
UPM1 4.9 2.3 7.4 1.9
UPM2 4.4 1.9 8.2 2.0
SKU 2.9 1.6 7.9 1.3
ASU 3.8 2.7 31.6 30.6
VDU 2.2 1.0 6.6 1.7
SU 3.0 2.2 5.0 4.3
UAM-DTWr 4.2 0.5 12.2 0.6
UAM-DTWs 2.9 1.5 5.8 1.5
UAM-HMM 19.2 24.2 25.8 21.3
UAM-GLO 6.7 3.3 13.2 4.7
UAM-FUS 2.2 0.6 5.5 0.7
Reference 4.5 1.7 11.3 4.8
the (EERc) computation. It can be observed that in most cases the systems optimized against
skilled forgeries present a better overall performance under these experimental conditions.
In Table 4.4, the verification performance in terms of EER against random forgeries is shown
for the SG-NOTE validation dataset. As can be seen, the performance is similar than in the
BMDB database when the local system is used. On the contrary, the global system verification
performance is better than with the BMDB database.
Results of the BSEC 2009 Signature Evaluation Campaign (Houmani et al., 2012) Task 1,
are reported in Table 4.5. Performance in terms of EER of the eleven participating systems and
a reference system is shown. The BMDB signature corpus was used for the competition, which
contains 382 users. As can be seen performance is degraded on mobile conditions. The UAM-
GLO system is based on the global system presented in this work, and the UAM-HMM system is
based on the local system. Unfortunately, the UAM-HMM system had an implementation error
that led to a poor performance in the BSEC 2009 competition. The DTW systems presented by
the authors (UAM-DTWs and UAM-DTWr) reached top positions in many categories of BSEC
2009, and were based on the same local features and approach followed in this chapter, using a
DTW-based matcher. A detailed report of the results may be found in BSEC (2009).
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4.4. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
The effects on the feature discriminative power produced by the usage of handheld devices for
signature acquisition have been studied. It has been observed that mobile conditions negatively
affect feature discriminative power, specially when local features are considered, at least for
the HMM-based system used in the experiments, which is based on the one that reached top
positions in the SVC-2004 competition (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005).
The performance difference against skilled forgeries between the mobile and pen tablet
BMDB datasets may also be due to the different forgery acquisition protocols. On the mo-
bile scenario, forgers had access to an on-screen replay of the signature while the replay shown
was on a separate screen when using pen-tablet. Nevertheless, it has been clearly seen that
verification performance decreases when pen-up samples are not available, except for the case of
the global system and skilled forgeries. These results indicate that trajectories during pen-ups
contain relevant biometric information, corroborating the findings reported by Sesa-Nogueras
et al. (2012) in the field of handwriting recognition. The verification performance when using
global features presents a more robust behavior than the local approach based on discrete-time
functions against the lack of pen-up samples.
It has also been observed that the optimal feature set selected by the SFFS algorithm has
a similar performance on the SG-NOTE database in the case of local features, while it presents
lower error rates for the global system. The performance of the global system is better while
the local system has a similar performance. This corroborates the apparent robustness of global
features against degraded signature acquisition conditions, at least in this experimental setup.
At an individual feature level, it has also been observed that on handheld devices the feature
discriminative power is more negatively affected for skilled forgeries than for random forgeries.
The discriminative power on the mobile scenario is penalized by the lack of pen-up trajectories,
the unfamiliar screen surface where users must sign and the poor ergonomics of a handheld
device stylus. Features related to pen inclination and pen pressure, not available in this scenario,
have not proven to be among the most discriminant in the pen tablet setup, corroborating the
observations reported by Houmani et al. (2009).
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Chapter 5
Aging in Signature Verification
It has not been until recently that different European and national efforts have led to
the acquisition of compatible (regarding certain traits) multimodal databases with a relatively
large number of common users which have been captured in different sessions over a several year
time span. Some examples include the Biosec (Fierrez et al., 2007a), BiosecurID (Fierrez et al.,
2010) and BioSecure (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010) projects. For the current Thesis, the signature
modality of the common subset of users in BiosecuriID and BioSecure has been used to generate
a new Long-Term dynamic signature dataset. This new dataset has been used to analyze the
effect of aging on three state-of-the-art on-line signature verification systems working on totally
different features and matchers. In addition to the study of the signature performance stability
over time, several template update strategies have also been explored in order to assess their
efficiency as a way to maintain the consistency of the system performance in the long-term.
Furthermore, several experiments regarding the changes suffered by signatures with time and
their most/least robust features have also been carried out.
This way, although some novelty may be found in the algorithms and techniques used in the
experiments, the most relevant contributions of the present chapter lie on: i) the presentation
of the first dataset where the signature of different subjects may be tracked over more than a
year; ii) the rigorous methodology followed to reach the experimental results, which may be
generalized in the future for similar aging studies focused on other biometric traits; iii) the
experimental findings and practical conclusions extracted from them, which help to shed some
light into the difficult problem of handwriting evolution over time.
The chapter is structured as follows. The on-line signature Long-Term DB used in the ex-
periments is presented in Sect. 5.1. The experimental protocol followed is described in Sect. 5.2,
while results are given in Sect. 5.3. Limitations of this study and open questions are discussed
in Sect. 5.4. Conclusions are finally summarized in Sect. 5.5.
The findings of this chapter have been published by the author with Galbally et al. (2013).
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SIGNATURE LONG-TERM DB (29 users, 46 samples/user, 6 sessions)
BID 1
4 samp.
BID 2
4 samp.
BID 4
4 samp.
BID 3
4 samp.
2 months 2 months 2 months
BiosecurID (16 samples/user, 4 sessions) Biosecure (30 samples/user, 2 sessions)
Bure 1
(Bure11 + 
Bure12 + 
Bure13)
15 samp.
Bure 2
(Bure21 + 
Bure22 + 
Bure23)
15 samp.
3 months
6 months
15 months
Figure 5.1: General time diagram of the different acquisition sessions that conform the Signature Long-
Term Database.
5.1. The On-Line Signature Long-Term Database
The dataset used in the experimental section of this work comprises the on-line signature data
of the 29 common users to the BiosecurID and the BioSecure databases. These two signature
subsets, which were acquired in a 15 month time span, present some unique features that make
them especially suited for the aging evaluation performed in the present work. A description of
the databases can be found in Sect. 2.4
The BiosecurID Signature Subset (Fierrez et al., 2010). As described in Sect. 2.4, it
comprises 16 genuine signatures and 12 skilled forgeries per user, captured in 4 separate
acquisition sessions (named here BID1, BID2, BID3 and BID4 ). A two month interval was
left between capture sessions, and signatures were acquired in a controlled and supervised
office-like scenario.
The BioSecure Signature Subset (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010). This dataset was cap-
tured 6 months after the BiosecurID acquisition campaign had finished (the time sequence
of the two databases is shown in Fig. 5.1). As described in Sect. 2.4, it comprises 30
genuine signatures per user, and 20 skilled forgeries, distributed in two acquisition ses-
sions separated three months (named here Bure1 and Bure2 ). The 15 original samples
corresponding to each session were captured in three groups of 5 consecutive signatures
with an interval of around 15 minutes between groups (named here Bure11-12-13 and
Bure21-22-23, respectively). The signature dataset was designed to be fully compatible
with BiosecurID.
For the final dataset used in the present work, only the genuine signatures were considered.
This way, it comprises 1,334 signatures coming from the 29 common users of the two databases
with 46 samples per user (16 from BiosecurID, and the remaining 30 from BioSecure) which are
distributed in 6 sessions (BID1-2-3-4 and Bure1-2) according to the general time diagram shown
in Fig. 5.1.
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It constitutes the first signature dataset where we can track, over a 15 month time span (as
there are 6 almost uniformly distributed acquisition sessions in this interval), the signature of a
given user, and assess if that period of time is sufficient to detect a decrease in the verification
performance of signature-based biometric systems. Furthermore, as all the samples of the same
subject have been acquired under almost identical conditions we may discard external factors
as the cause of a possible degradation in the recognition rates.
All users in the database are Spanish, white Caucasian with higher level education, between
18 and 51 years of age. In particular, the age distribution of the subjects is: 24 donors between
18 and 25; 3 donors between 25 and 45; and 2 donors above 45 years old. The gender distribution
within the database is quite balanced with 11 women and 18 men.
It should also be noted that all the users included in the database may be considered as adults
in terms of writing. This means that their signature is a well learned sequence of movements
which may be considered as permanent and that has already gone through the transitional
learning period which usually happens in the youth. The effect of aging during the time in
which the signature has not yet been fully fixed may be different and would be the subject of
future work.
Some typical examples of the signatures that can be found in the different sessions comprised
in the Signature Long-Term DB are shown in Fig. 5.2. The Signature Long-Term DB is publicly
available for research purposes1.
5.2. Experimental Protocol
The experimental framework has been designed to evaluate the effect of aging on the per-
formance of signature-based systems and to assess the stability of signatures through time. In
particular, five different objectives are pursued in the experiments, which may be divided into
two main groups:
Signature recognition performance. On the one hand, i) to evaluate the loss of per-
formance of different competitive signature recognition systems as a consequence of the
changes suffered by the signature trait with time (i.e., aging); ii) to determine the depen-
dencies of this performance degradation (e.g., signature-dependent vs. user-dependent);
and iii) to assess the effectiveness of different template update approaches to compensate
this effect.
Signature evolution. On the other hand, iv) to determine which are the changes over
time that motivate the previously evaluated decrease in the signature recognition perfor-
mance; and v) to establish which are the most stable features in the signature trait.
In order to achieve these goals the experimental protocol includes two groups of tests which
are described in the next sections.
1Available at: http://atvs.ii.uam.es/databases.jsp
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 USER 1 USER 2 USER 3 USER 4 USER 5 
BID1
BID2
BID3
BID4
Bure11 
Bure12 
Bure13 
Bure21 
Bure22 
Bure23 
Figure 5.2: Typical samples that can be found in the Signature Long-Term DB. Each signature corre-
sponds to each of the acquisition sessions of five different users.
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5.2.1. Signature Recognition Performance Experiments
The first objective of this group of experiments is to evaluate the degree of aging that may be
observed in the recognition performance of signature-based systems. The results will also shed
some light on the user- and signature-dependency of aging, that is, if certain type of signatures
are more prone to worsen their performance in the long term, or if this only depends on the
signer (second objective).
The third objective of these tests is to analyze different template update approaches that
can help to reduce the performance deterioration that signature recognition systems suffer with
time.
In order to reach these goals, several sets of genuine matching scores (i.e., those computed
between samples of the same user and therefore affected by aging) are computed on the Signature
Long-Term DB simulating two different scenarios:
Aging experiments: Fixed template and varying test. In this case the user models
enrolled to the system are always computed using the same samples (i.e., those belonging
to the first session of the Signature Long-Term DB, BID1), while the test signatures are
taken from the following sessions (BID2-3-4 and Bure1-2).
Template update experiments: Varying template and fixed test. In this case the
test samples are always taken from session Bure13, while the enrolled models are updated
with signatures coming from different previous sessions (BID2-3-4 and Bure11-12).
Not all the systems working on a given trait may be necessarily affected in the same way by
aging. In order to account for possible differences, we have carried out this set of experiments
on three different competitive on-line signature verification systems using totally diverse feature
sets (feature- and function-based) and matchers (Mahalanobis distance, Hidden Markov Models,
and Dynamic Time Warping, presented in Chapter 3). A brief description of each of the three
systems is given next:
System A: function-based + HMM. An HMM system, as described in Chapter 3,
is used. A subset of 12 discrete-time signals are derived from the coordinate (x and y)
and pressure (p) functions, while no pen inclination signals are used as its utility for
automatic signature recognition is at least unclear (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2014). This
subset corresponds to the first 12 features described in Table 3.2. After some preprocessing
(position and rotation alignment) and the computation of the 12 functions, similarities are
computed using a 12-state left-to-right HMM with 4 Gaussian mixture components per
state, which is a common implementation in the literature (Dolfing et al., 1998; Ly-Van
et al., 2007).
System B: feature-based +Mahalanobis distance. This system models the signature
as a holistic multidimensional vector composed of 100 global features described in Table 3.1.
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Features #
Static 2,7,8,12,15-19,24,27-28,30,34-37,43,46,51,53-57,61,63,65-67,
70-73,75,77-78,84,86,93,95,97-99.
Dynamic 1,3-6,9-11,13-14,20-23,25-26,29,31-33,38-42,44-45,47-48,50,52,58-60,
62,64,68-69,74,76,79-83,85,87-92,94,96,100.
Table 5.1: Division of the feature set introduced in Table 3.1 according to the type of information they
contain.
The similarity scores are computed using the simplified Mahalanobis distance method
described in Sect. 3.2.
System C: function-based + DTW. The Dynamic Time Warping system described
in Sect. 3.3 is used. A set of 9 functions is extracted from the signatures, namely features
1, 2, 5, 9, 11, 12, 21 23 and 25 from Table 3.2. These functions correspond to the best
performing set of features against skilled forgeries on the training set of the BioSecure
Signature Evaluation Campaign 2009. It outperformed other systems based on HMMs
and global features (Houmani et al., 2012)
5.2.2. Signature Evolution Experiments
In this case, the aim of the experiments is to give some indication on whether there is a
common trend in the evolution through time of signatures coming from different users (objective
four), and if there are certain types of features (e.g., static vs dynamic) which are more stable
(objective five).
To reach these objectives, the Signature Long-Term DB is parameterized using the set of 100
features described in Table 3.1. This 100-feature set may be divided into two classes according
to the information contained by each of the parameters, namely: static or dynamic. All the
features assigned to each class are specified in Table 5.1 (the numbering criterion is the same
used in Table 3.1).
5.3. Results
The results obtained for the two sets of experiments described in Sect. 5.2 are presented in
the next sections.
5.3.1. Signature Recognition Performance Results
As already mentioned, aging may be defined as the loss of performance experimented by
biometric systems due to the transformations suffered by biometric traits in the long term.
With this in mind, the questions raised in this section are: Is aging present in the signature
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Aging Experiments
Enrollment Test
Exp. A BID1 (4 sig.) BID2 (4 sig.)
Exp. B BID1 (4 sig.) BID3 (4 sig.)
Exp. C BID1 (4 sig.) BID4 (4 sig.)
Exp. D BID1 (4 sig.) Bure1 (15 sig.)
Exp. E BID1 (4 sig.) Bure2 (15 sig.)
Table 5.2: Enrollment and test signatures used to compute the genuine scores in the aging experiments.
trait? To what extent? Are some users more prone to be affected by aging than others? How
can it be corrected?
In order to give an answer to these questions, several sets of genuine scores (i.e., those affected
by aging) are computed in order to evaluate the performance of signature recognition systems.
Before presenting the results, it is very important to notice that, given a fixed set of impostor
scores, the best possible performance results are reached when the genuine similarity score
distributions have a mean value as high as possible and a variance as low as possible. Therefore,
a worsening of the systems performance with time (i.e., aging) may be caused by two factors: i)
a decrease of the genuine distributions mean value, or ii) an increase of the genuine distributions
variance.
5.3.1.1. Objective 1: Aging analysis
As mentioned before, these experiments are aimed at estimating the impact of aging on
signature recognition systems. For this purpose, the enrolled models of the 29 users present
in the Signature Long-Term DB are trained using the 4 signatures corresponding to the first
session (BID1). Then, the sets of genuine and impostor scores are computed as follows:
Genuine scores are generated matching the models against the signatures of the following
5 sessions: BID2-3-4 and Bure1-2. This way, for each user 5 different sets of genuine scores
are computed: BID1 vs BID2, BID1 vs BID3, BID1 vs BID4, BID1 vs Bure1, and BID1
vs Bure2 (see Table 5.2).
On the other hand, the same set of impostor scores is used for all the experiments A-E
(i.e., we assume impostor signatures may come from any of the acquisition sessions as they
are not affected by aging). To compute the set of impostor scores one signature from each
session of the rest of the users is matched against the enrolled model of the subject at
hand, leading this way to a total of 29× 6× 28 = 4, 872 impostor scores.
As the impostor score distribution is fixed for all the scenarios, any changes observed in the
performance of signature recognition systems among experiments A-E will be caused by changes
in the genuine score distributions.
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Figure 5.3: Performance evolution of the three signature recognition systems considered in the experi-
ments. For the DTW-based system only two curves appear as for experiments A-C its EER is close to
zero. The EER for the three systems and for the different experiments are reported in Table 5.3.
The DET (Detection Error Trade-off) curves obtained with the aforementioned genuine and
impostor scores for the five scenarios (A-E) and for the three recognition systems are shown in
Fig. 5.3. A darker gray level corresponds to a better performance of the evaluated system. It
may be observed that, as the test signatures are more distant in time from those samples used
for enrollment, the performance of all the three systems drops. For completion, the Equal Error
Rate (EER) corresponding to the curves shown in Fig. 5.3 is given in Table 5.3.
In order to further analyze this performance loss, in Fig. 5.4 we show the evolution of the
genuine scores when the test signatures move away (in terms of time) from the model. The
distributions for each of the five sets of genuine scores are depicted on the right planes (in
vertical) with a darker gray representing a better performance. On the left planes we can
see the mean (circles) and variance (vertical lines) for each of the five distributions. Several
observations can be extracted from the results shown in Figs. 5.3 and 5.4:
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Aging Experiments - EER (%)
Exp. A Exp. B Exp. C Exp. D Exp. E
HMM-based 3.2 5.5 5.6 22.7 27.8
GF-based 1.0 2.0 4.2 4.9 5.0
DTW-based 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5
Table 5.3: EER for the aging experiments defined in Table 5.2. The whole DET curves for these
experiments are shown in Fig. 5.3.
The performance of the three systems consistently decreases as the testing signatures move
away from the model (the DET curves in Fig. 5.3 are further away from the origin), which
means that the users discriminant power decreases with time or, in other words, that all
the three recognition approaches are affected by aging. The previous observation indicates
that this effect is not particular of a certain signature recognition technology, but that, as
expected, it is inherent to the signature trait itself.
Not all the systems are affected in the same way by the passing of time, that is, not all the
curves in Fig. 5.4 present the same decreasing slope. In particular, the system based on
DTW presents a decrease in the average genuine score between the first and the last test
set of signatures of 5.6%, compared to a 16.7% of the one based on global features and
a 21.8% for the HMM. Thus, we may conclude that the signature recognition technology
based on DTW is not only more accurate but also more robust to aging.
The effect of aging may also be observed in the worsening of the scores variance through
time, that is, the scores are not only lower but also more disperse. This way we can see how
the variance increases around 45% from experiment A to E for all the three technologies
tested.
Another important observation to be made from the results shown in Fig. 5.4 is that the
effect of aging on the signature trait is not negligible. There is a significant drift in the
genuine score distributions (from the first to the last signature test set) in a relatively
short period of time (15 months).
5.3.1.2. Objective 2: Aging user-dependency analysis
The sets of genuine scores generated in the previous experiments (Sect. 5.3.1.1) are used here
to determine if certain users are more prone to suffer from aging. For this purpose we compute
an Aging Coefficient (AC) defined as: AC = ∆µ · ∆σ, where ∆µ and ∆σ are respectively the
mean and variance relative variation between two sets of scores. This way both aging effects
(i.e., decrease of the genuine scores mean value and increase of the variance) are taken into
account in one metric, so that the higher the AC of a user, the more affected that subject’s
signature is by the elapse of time.
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The AC is computed for all the users in the database between the genuine scores of exper-
iments A and E, which are the two score distributions more separated in time. In Fig. 5.5 the
AC is shown for all the subjects ordered according to their level of aging, from the lowest to
the highest, for all the three systems considered in the experiments. Please note that the least
affected user, the most affected user, or any of the users in between, do not necessarily have to
coincide (i.e., be the same signer) for all three systems. The three AC curves are shown on the
same figure for an easier visual comparison across systems.
The five most/least affected subjects by aging (i.e., those with respectively a higher/lower
AC) are shown in Table 5.4 for all the three systems tested. For completion, the individual
mean and variance variation indexes (i.e., ∆µ and ∆σ) are also given.
Different observations may be extracted from the results shown in Fig. 5.5 and Table 5.4:
As expected, not all the systems present the same AC values. The DTW-based system
has the lowest values (i.e., most consistent system over time), compared to the one based
on global features (GF-based) and the HMM. This is consistent with the results obtained
in Sect. 5.3.1.1 and confirms that the AC is a valid metric to evaluate the level of aging.
In all the three systems there is a very big difference (around 95% on average) between
the AC of the least and most affected users. Thus, even for the most robust technologies
(DTW), the degree of aging is very dependent on the signer.
In general the users tend to perform consistently well (3, 19) or badly (1, 17, 11) regardless
of the recognition system used. Furthermore, none of the top five users in a system (i.e.,
those least affected by aging) appear in the list of the worst five users of the other two
systems, and vice versa. This means that, as a general rule, a subject that despite of the
aging effect presents high recognition rates on a given system, will be very likely to be
consistently recognized if the system is changed.
Therefore, we may conclude that, although some technologies are more robust than others
to aging, the degree of deterioration of a subject’s signature depends mainly on the subject and
not on the recognition system being used.
Those subjects with the highest number of appearances in the AC rows of Table 5.4 (shown
in bold) are considered to be those with a more/less stable signature. The signatures of these
users are depicted in Fig. 5.6 where we can see that the complexity of the signature is not a
key factor in the level of aging. That is, complex signatures (i.e., long signatures, with the
written name and flourish) may be very affected by aging or, on the contrary, can also be very
stable through time. The same happens for short and simple signatures. In other words, these
initial results suggest that the degree of aging does not depend on the type of signature, but on
the signer. However, these findings regarding aging and signature complexity should be further
addressed on a specific database where signatures are classified into different complexity groups.
70
5.3 Results
Figure 5.4: Evolution through time of the mean (circles) and variance (vertical lines) of the genuine
score distributions (in vertical on the right) for the three systems considered in experiments A-E. A darker
gray level represents a better performance of the given system.
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Figure 5.5: Aging Coefficient (AC) from the least affected to the most affected user by aging in the
Signature Long-Term DB, for the three systems considered in the experiments. Please note that the least
affected user, the most affected user, or any of the users in between, do not necessarily have to coincide
(i.e., be the same signer) for all three systems. The three AC curves are shown on the same figure for an
easier visual comparison across systems.
Aging: user dependency
Most affected users Least affected users
∆µ 15, 17, 16, 22, 4 19, 27, 3, 9, 28
HMM ∆σ 17, 4, 5, 26, 12 28, 6, 1, 9, 3
AC 17, 4, 5, 22, 11 28, 3, 6, 27, 19
∆µ 16, 24, 11, 23 19, 21, 3, 2, 27
GF ∆σ 14, 1, 21, 6, 9 18, 12, 16, 17, 13
AC 1, 24, 7, 11, 21 18, 12, 21, 19, 3
∆µ 7, 16, 11, 1, 8 19, 13, 3, 14, 26
DTW ∆σ 11, 9, 16, 14, 2 19, 24, 26, 8, 29
AC 16, 11, 1, 18, 7 19, 13, 26, 3, 24
Table 5.4: Most and least affected users by aging in the Signature Long-Term DB according to the three
systems considered in the experiments. Users with the most appearances in the AC rows (in bold) are
depicted in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Most (left) and least (right) affected users by aging in the Signature Long-Term DB according
to Table 5.4.
5.3.1.3. Objective 3: Template update analysis
The results presented in Sects. 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2 confirm the necessity to develop strategies
that can help to minimize the effect of aging, especially in those behavioral or learned traits,
such as the signature, which are more sensitive to time. Here, we analyze the efficiency of
different template update approaches varying the enrollment signatures used to compute the
users models and testing always with the same set of samples, as shown in Table 5.5. In
particular, the scenarios considered are:
Baseline result (Exp. F). This represents the scenario with no template update strategies
to correct aging. There is a 14 month difference between the enrolled model (BID1) and
the test set (Bure13).
Complete update (Exp. G). The first template update approach considered is to discard
the old enrollment samples (BID1) and replace them by new samples acquired very close
in time to the test set (Bure11).
Mixed update (Exp. H). In this case we do not discard the old samples but we update the
enrolled model with newly acquired samples (BID1+Bure11). Thus, in this scenario there
will be more available data to train the model than in the previous two cases (experiments
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Figure 5.7: Mean (circles) and variance (vertical lines) of the genuine score distributions (in vertical
on the right) for the 4 different template update strategies tested and for the three systems considered in
the experiments. A darker gray shade represents a better performance of the given system.
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Template Update Experiments
Enrollment Test
Exp. F (baseline) BID1 (4 sig.) Bure13
Exp. G (complete) Bure11 (4 sig.) Bure13
Exp. H (mixed) BID1 (4 sig.) + Bure11 (4 sig.) Bure13
Exp. I (complete) Bure11 (4 sig.) + Bure12 (4 sig.) Bure13
Table 5.5: Enrollment and test signatures used to compute the genuine scores in the template update
experiments.
F and G).
Complete update (Exp. I). Here, we consider the same amount of training data as in
experiment H, but all of it comes from recent acquisitions (Bure11+Bure12).
The results of the previously described setups for the three considered systems are shown
in Fig. 5.7. As in the case of the aging experiments the score distributions for each of the four
considered scenarios is shown on the right planes in vertical with a darker gray shade representing
a better performance of the given system. On the left plane we can see the evolution of the
mean (circles) and variance (vertical lines) of the score distributions. Although all the template
update strategies studied improve the performance with respect to the baseline experiment (in
all cases there is an increase of the mean value and a decrease of the variance), two different
behaviors may be observed in Fig. 5.7 depending on the signature recognition system considered:
HMM system. HMM-based systems heavily depend on the amount of training data avail-
able (Fierrez et al., 2007b). As a consequence, it is better to perform a mixed update
(i.e., do not discard the old samples, exp. H) so that the model is trained with as many
signatures as possible (8 signatures, in this particular case), instead of using few recent
samples (i.e., exp. G, where only 4 signatures are used for enrollment).
Global features and DTW systems. On the other hand, the systems based on DTW and
global features do not rely as much on the amount of enrollment data, but on the quality
of these data (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2009b). Therefore, the performance reached using 4
recently acquired samples (exp. G) is almost the same as the one obtained using 8 of
those signatures (exp. I). This means that, as can be seen in Fig. 5.7, in these cases it is
preferable to perform a complete update with the most recent samples (i.e., exp. G) than
to keep the old ones (i.e., exp. H) even if this means training the enrolled model with a
smaller number of signatures.
As could be expected, in all cases the best possible template update strategy is to use for
enrollment all the most recent samples available (i.e., exp. I). However, this may represent a
somewhat unrealistic scenario, as we are assuming that we have access to as many as 8 signatures
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captured in a time period very close to the test set. The amount of new collected data will rarely
comply with this condition.
5.3.2. Signature Evolution Results
The results presented in Sect. 5.3.1 clearly show that the effect of aging is patent in the
signature trait. The purpose of the present set of experiments is to further investigate the
causes of the deterioration in the performance of signature recognition systems.
From a human perspective, the changes experienced with age by certain biometric traits
are easily distinguished. For instance, we know that the face gradually loses its oval shape and
that the wrinkles and sun-stains make its texture less smooth (in fact, these characteristics are
successfully used for automatic age estimation purposes). However, what are the changes and
transformations, if any, undergone by signatures with age?
In order to shed some light on this difficult question, the aging-related issues raised in this
section are: How do signatures typically evolve over time? What type of transformations do
they suffer? Are some signature-defining features more stable over time than others?
5.3.2.1. Objective 4: Signature evolution analysis
In order to determine the way in which signatures typically evolve with time, five of the most
representative global features given in Table 3.1 have been analyzed for the whole Signature
Long-Term DB. Not all the features proposed in Table 3.1 have a direct physical meaning,
thus, the selected parameters have been those with an easy interpretation, namely: duration of
the signatures (parameter 1 in Table 3.1), number of maxima points in x (parameter 8) and y
(parameter 12), number of pen-ups (parameter 2) and the average speed (parameter 26).
These parameters have been averaged for all the users in the database in a sample by sample
basis. That is, in the end, for each of the features, a 46-dimensional vector is computed where
each element is the result of averaging the value of that parameter for the corresponding sample
(from 1 to 46) of all the users in the database. In that way, we can see the evolution of the
feature value from the first acquisition (month 0) to the last one (month 15). The results are
shown in Fig. 5.8.
We can observe that, regardless of the user, the general trend for the signatures is to become:
shorter, with fewer singular points and penups, and faster. That is, the results imply that
signatures tend to be simplified with time.
5.3.2.2. Objective 5: Parameter evolution analysis
In this case the goal is to determine which of the global features proposed in Table 3.1
are more stable through time and, on the contrary, which are those that suffer the largest
variations in the long term. For this purpose we use a Variation Coefficient (VC) analogue to
the Aging Coefficient (AC) computed in Sect. 5.3.1.2. This new Variation Coefficient is defined
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Figure 5.8: Evolution through time of the duration, maxima points in x, maxima points in y, number
of penups and speed of the signatures in the Signature Long-Term Database.
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as: VC = ∆µgf · ∆σgf , where ∆µgf and ∆σgf are respectively the mean and variance relative
variation of a certain global feature between two acquisition sessions.
Prior to compute the VC, the values of the global features are averaged for all the users
in the database on a sample by sample basis. That is, for each sample (1-46) we compute a
100-dimensional vector where each dimension is the mean value of that global feature for all the
users in the dataset. Then, in order to evaluate the degree of variation through time of each
global feature, the VC is computed between the samples of acquisition sessions BID1 and Bure2,
which are the two most distant in time.
In Fig. 5.9 we show the value of the Variation Coefficient from the least variable to the most
variable static and dynamic features. On the other hand, in Table 5.6 the 10 most and least
variable features are shown following the numbering criterion used in Table 3.1. The ‘S’ and
‘D’ stand for Static and Dynamic features respectively, according to the classification given in
Table 5.1.
In Table 5.6 we can see that 9 out of the total 10 most unstable features correspond to pa-
rameters measuring dynamic information. Furthermore, Fig. 5.9 shows how, in general, dynamic
features present a higher variability with time. From these results it may be concluded that the
static information of a signature (e.g., geometric, spatial, or angular) is more robust over time
than the dynamic data (e.g., velocity or acceleration). In other words, with time, signers tend
to be more consistent repeating the shape of their signature rather than the way in which this
shape is produced. These results are in line with the findings of previous related studies (Dixon
et al., 1993; Houmani et al., 2009; Walton, 1997).
5.4. Limitations of the Study and Open Questions
The main limitations of the present study are derived from the characteristics of the database
used in the experiments. It has been mentioned in the chapter that the On-Line Signature Long-
Term DB is unique regarding the number of subjects whose signature has been uniformly tracked
over more than a year. Nevertheless, although this was the best available possibility, it is still
limited both in terms of individuals (29) and time span considered (15 months).
The present work sets a first landmark in the understanding of aging in a behavioral bio-
metric. Its conclusions should be confirmed by further analysis and assessment on databases
comprising a big number of uniformly-acquired samples for a larger number of individuals (sev-
eral hundreds) and over a longer period of time (several years). However, we do believe that the
experimental protocol and posterior analysis carried out in the present work is general and may
serve as a baseline to be applied in future studies.
Therefore, the results, findings and conclusions presented in the article should be taken as a
first approximation to the challenging problem of assessing aging in the signature trait, but not
as conclusive and demonstrated facts. Furthermore, the study is also constrained to the type of
subjects present in the database: Spaniards white Caucasians, mostly between 20 and 25 years
of age, with a higher education degree (or pursuing it). For similar studies concerning other
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Figure 5.9: Variation Coefficient (VC) from the least variable to the most variable dynamic and static
features (see Table 5.1).
Most variable global features
∆µgf 33(D), 36(S), 47(D), 95(S), 66(S), 64(D), 31(D), 10(D), 76(D) ,85(D)
∆σgf 73(S), 86(S), 76(D), 19(S), 85(D), 13(D), 90(D), 77(S), 65(S), 28(S)
VC 33(D), 47(D), 76(D), 85(D), 10(D), 64(D), 31(D), 36(S), 9(D), 32(D)
Least variable global features
∆µgf 38(D), 59(D), 3(D), 17(S), 20(D), 7(S), 19(S), 40(D), 46(S), 60(D)
∆σgf 93(S), 72(S), 58(D), 45(D), 17(S), 97(S), 21(D), 62(D), 67(S), 54(S)
VC 17(S), 58(D), 38(D), 93(S), 59(D), 72(S), 3(D), 45(D), 97(S), 7(S)
Table 5.6: Most and least variable features over time. The numbering criterion is the same used
in Table 3.1. ‘S’ stands for Static and ‘D’ for Dynamic according to the classification established in
Table 5.1.
79
5. AGING IN SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
sectors of the population, specific data should be acquired.
Accordingly, the present study should be understood as a valuable but limited start which
leaves different open questions to be addressed in similar future works. For instance:
Is 15 months a sufficiently long period of time to be in the presence of real “aging”?
Although all the results given in the present work point in that direction, as mentioned
above, this end should still be fully confirmed on a database acquired over a larger time
span.
What is the relationship (if any) between signature complexity and aging? In the current
work an initial approach to address this issue has been followed. However, more rigor-
ous studies should be carried out on databases where signatures have been grouped into
different complexity levels either by experts, different human observers, or some type of
objective measure.
Can the results presented here (using data acquired in laboratory conditions) be general-
ized to real world scenarios? For this type of study specific data from a real application
should be employed.
Are the signatures from men/women more prone to aging? A large gender-balanced
database may be used to study this issue.
Is the aging effect more pronounced in individuals with low writing skills? The current
study was carried out only taking into account subjects with higher education degrees.
5.5. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
We have conducted the first systematic study on the degradation of on-line signature with
time and how this aging effect may be compensated. For this purpose, we have introduced
the Signature Long-Term DB which contains the dynamic signature samples of the 29 common
users of the BiosecurID and the BioSecure databases. All the subjects were captured under very
similar conditions over a 15 month time span. The experiments, carried out using three totally
different state-of-the-art systems representing the most usual technologies in on-line signature
recognition, have proven that the aging effect is present in this trait even for time lapses of
several months. Several conclusions have been extracted throughout the work thanks to the
consistent and reproducible experimental protocol followed:
Aging in the signature trait is a user-dependent effect. This means that:
• In general, a user affected by aging perform badly regardless of the system being used
(this deterioration will be higher in those systems more sensitive to time).
• Complex and simple signatures can present the same amount of aging. Aging does
not seem to depend on the type of signature but on the signer.
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Not all signature recognition technologies are equally affected by aging. The one based on
DTW has demonstrated that it is not only the most accurate (Houmani et al., 2012), but
also the most robust against time.
Global features containing dynamic information are in general less stable with time than
those which comprise static information.
With time, signatures evolve towards a higher simplicity. They become: shorter, faster
and with fewer singular points and pen-ups.
Depending on the signature recognition system being used some template update strategies
are more efficient than others.
In summary, due to its very high user-dependency, the analysis and subsequent compensation
of aging in the signature trait should be done, ideally, on a user by user basis. Given a specific
signature recognition technology, different template update approaches should be adopted for
different users, depending on the performance degradation that each of the subjects present
with time. This is consistent with previous research works which also emphasize the strong user
dependencies found in signature recognition (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005b; Jain et al., 2002).
In light of the experimental results obtained in the present work, a possible strategy to
detect the appearance of aging in the signature of a given individual would be to follow a
constant monitoring over time of the Aging Coefficient. A possible “aging detection” protocol
for a signature-based application would be:
1. Set a suitable AC threshold (i.e., δAC) for the given application depending on the amount
of aging allowed.
2. With every new genuine access attempt, estimate the mean and variance of the last known
N genuine access attempts and compare them to the mean and variance of the first N
attempts (i.e., attempts that were recorded when the individual first started using the
application).
3. Given the variation of the mean and variance between both sets of scores (new and old)
compute the AC.
4. If δAC is exceeded, apply a suitable template update strategy depending on the signature
recognition technology being used.
In this suggested protocol both δAC and N will depend on the type of application where
it is being implemented (e.g., high security, commercial, high convenience), and on the level of
restriction that will be imposed on aging. If only a small amount of aging is allowed a small
value of both variables should be selected. On the contrary, if the designer prefers to be quite
flexible with aging, larger values would be acceptable.
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In summary, the main contribution of this chapter is the theoretical and practical new
knowledge built in the fields of signature recognition and biometric aging, which may be directly
applied by researchers and companies for the future development of the biometric technology.
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Chapter 6
The DooDB Graphical Password
Database
It is well known that publicly available databases together with their associated evaluation
protocols make possible that researchers develop and objectively compare pattern recognition
algorithms on the same benchmark. Experiments carried out using private databases are usually
hard to replicate since database-specific effects, which cannot be reproduced by a third party,
may take place. Unfortunately, there is no such a public database in the field of doodle-based
graphical passwords, to the extent of our knowledge. Research on doodle verification has tra-
ditionally relied on private databases (Goldberg et al., 2002; Govindarajulu and Madhvanath,
2007; Jermyn et al., 1999; Oka et al., 2008; Sae-Bae et al., 2014). Moreover, in those works there
is no reference to forgeries, since only genuine doodles are considered.
The objective of this chapter is the presentation and analysis of DooDB, a doodle and pseudo-
signature database containing data from 100 users. Pseudo-signatures are doodles based on a
simplified version of the user signature, being thus composed of learned and natural movements.
The database has been captured on a handheld device under realistic conditions. It has two
main advantages compared to other databases used in the literature: two acquisition sessions
were performed, so inter-session variability effects can be analyzed, and skilled forgeries are
provided for each user. The DooDB database is publicly available from the ATVS - Biometric
Recognition Group website (http://atvs.ii.uam.es).
Another objective of this analysis is to obtain a baseline doodle verification performance that
can be used to compare this method with current well known authentication alternatives such as
signatures or with future doodle-based recognition algorithms. We also analyze the differences
in the verification performance between doodles and pseudo-signatures. Since pseudo-signatures
are simplified versions of real signatures, and thus composed of learned movements, it can be
hypothesized that they present a lower variability and a better verification performance. The
effects of inter-session variability are also studied.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 6.1 the database is described. Quantitative
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Figure 6.1: Doodle acquisition setup.
and qualitative properties of the database are analyzed in Sect. 6.2. Preliminary verification
experiments using the data from DooDB are reported in Sect. 6.3 and conclusions are finally
drawn in Sect. 6.4.
This chapter is based on the publications: (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2013, 2010a).
6.1. The DooDB Database
The DooDB database comprises two subcorpora, each one containing a different modality:
Subcorpus 1: Doodles. Participants were asked to draw with their fingertip a doodle
on a handheld device touchscreen that they would use as a graphical password on a regular
basis for authentication (e.g. instead of the PIN code). There were no restrictions regarding
duration or shape. In most cases, users invented their own doodle at the time of acquisition.
Subcorpus 2: Pseudo-signatures. Participants were also asked to draw with their
fingertip a simplified version of their signature, which they would also use as a graphical
password on a regular basis. This could be, for example, their initials or part of their
signature flourish. The main difference between doodles and this modality is that in this
case, the dynamic process to produce the drawing is in general composed of natural and
well trained movements.
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6.1.1. Acquisition Protocol
Acquisition was performed using an HTC Touch HD smartphone (see Fig. 6.1). The device
has a resistive touchscreen of 2×3.5 in (ca. 5×8.5 cm). The x and y coordinates of the fingertip
position are sampled at discrete time values t at 100Hz when the user presses the screen. The
coordinate values represent milli-inches, so xt values range between [0, 2000] (width) and yt
values between [0, 3500] (height). The time interval ∆t between consecutive samples is also
stored. However, the device has some sampling errors, such as lost samples or samples that
are not captured due to insufficient pressure. The device assigns [0,0] coordinate values to
the erroneous samples. To summarize, each drawing is stored as a sequence of discrete values
[xt, yt,∆t]. Some examples of doodles and pseudo-signatures are shown in Fig. 6.2.
The acquisition process was divided in two sessions, separated by an average period of two
weeks. This period was chosen in order to allow enough inter-session variability while trying
to avoid that users forgot their doodles. Participants were briefed in the first session about
the purpose of the acquisition. Each modality (doodles and pseudo-signatures) was explained
to them following the same instructions so that each user received the same information. The
donors were asked to draw with their fingertip on the handset screen holding it in their own
hand, simulating thus real operating conditions. They were allowed to practice their drawings
until they felt comfortable with them.
Forgeries have also been captured in this database. To perform forgeries, users had visual
access to the doodle or pseudo-signature they had to imitate. The acquisition software replayed
the strokes on the screen showing their dynamic properties (e.g. speed). This animation was
shown to users up to three times, and then they were allowed to train until they felt confident
with their forgery. The usage of the replay software makes possible to produce forgeries with a
notable degree of accuracy, as can be observed in Fig. 6.2.
During the two sessions, the same protocol was followed for each user and modality: 5 genuine
samples, then 5 forgeries, 5 genuine samples, followed by 5 forgeries and finally 5 genuine samples.
This separation in blocks of 5 signatures allows analyzing intra-session variability. Consequently,
at the end of the two sessions, each user had produced 30 genuine drawings (15 per session) and
20 forgeries. In the first session, user n produced forgeries for users n − 1 and n − 2, while in
the second, forgeries for users n− 3 and n− 4 were produced.
6.1.2. Demographics and Memorability
The 100 participants in the database present the following age distribution: 75 are less than
25 years old, 14 are between 25 and 40 years old, and 11 are older. The gender distribution is 44
women and 56 men. It was observed during the capturing process that participants not familiar
with touchscreen devices required a significant longer training time than the rest. This case was
more common in older participants.
A subset of 13 participants of this database have also participated in the BioSecure Mul-
timodal Database (BMDB) (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010). In that database, on-line signatures
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Figure 6.2: (a) Example of doodles from the database, classified following the criteria explained in
Sect. 6.2. The doodle on the right is a forgery of the one on the left. (b) Example of pseudo-signatures
from the database. Genuine pseudo-signatures (left), forgeries (middle) and the corresponding handwritten
signature (right) from the BioSecure database (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010).
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were captured using both a pen-tablet and a PDA with a stylus. This overlap makes possible to
observe the evolution of signatures from a controlled scenario (signature with ink pen and paper
placed on a pen-tablet), towards more degraded conditions (signature on a PDA with a stylus)
and, finally, the most challenging case of pseudo-signature (simplified signature traced with the
fingertip). Some examples of genuine signatures and their corresponding pseudo-signatures from
the same user are shown in Fig. 6.2.b.
One of the critical issues in graphical passwords is memorability. During the second acquisi-
tion session, it was observed that approximately 90% of the participants remembered correctly
their pseudo-signature. On the other hand, nearly 40% of the participants had difficulties to
recall their doodle from the first session. Users could request to see the tracing process of their
own drawings from the first session. This was done by using the aforementioned functionality
designed to train forgers. The high percentage of users that requested help to recall their doodles
is related to the fact that they did not use them between sessions on a regular basis. In a real
scenario with more frequent use, memorability may certainly improve.
6.2. Database Analysis
6.2.1. Statistical Properties
Given the different nature of doodles and signatures it is expected that they present dif-
ferences in their properties such as their length or graphical complexity. A statistical analysis
of the properties from the two captured subcorpora has been performed. They have also been
compared with the ones from a BioSecure PDA Signature subcorpus of 120 users (also captured
by the ATVS - Biometric Recognition Group), allowing thus a comparison between handwrit-
ten signatures, finger-traced pseudo-signatures and doodles. The following properties have been
analyzed: graphical complexity (as the number of trajectory intersections), average speed and
duration.
In Fig. 6.3.a, the distribution of the number of intersections in the drawings is represented.
We observe that signatures present a considerably higher number of intersections, as expected.
The difference between doodles and pseudo-signatures is small in this case. A low amount of
intersections can be associated to low graphical complexity. This lower complexity indicates
that doodles and pseudo-signatures may be easier to forge.
The stroke average speed distributions are compared in Fig. 6.3.b1. As can be seen, doodles
are the “slowest” from the three datasets. The main cause for this may be that doodles are in
general newly invented drawings for the participants, while pseudo-signatures are (or at least
contain) previously learned movements. It can also be observed that pseudo-signatures are
on average also produced faster than signatures. This is a reasonable result, since the motor
process is different for the production of doodles and signatures. When producing a signature,
the writer moves the stylus with a combination of his fingers and wrist movements (i.e. the
1This graph is a corrected version from the one presented in Martinez-Diaz et al. (2010a), which had an
erroneous scaling for the signature duration histogram.
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Figure 6.3: Histograms normalized to [0,1] and box plots of (a) number of intersections, (b) average
drawing speed and (c) duration.
natural writing process), while in the case of finger-drawn sketches, the wrist is the main motor
element, as the finger used for drawing is kept almost fixed. This way, signatures are based on
more precise movements than doodles, and composed of small graphical elements compared to
pseudo-signatures, which are produced by faster movements and larger shapes.
In Fig. 6.3.c, the statistical distribution of the three sets in terms of their total duration is
represented. As can be seen, handwritten signatures tend to have a higher duration than the
finger-traced drawings. Moreover, signatures present a higher variability in terms of duration.
Doodles also tend to require more time than pseudo-signatures, which are in general composed
of initials or simplified signature flourish.
6.2.2. Variability Analysis
Three types of variability may increase the error rate of a verification system. Intra-user
variability reflects the difference between genuine samples of the same user. Inter-user variabil-
ity represents the variance between samples of different users. Last, inter-session variability is
related to the difference between samples of the same user over time. In general, verification per-
formance will be best if intra-user and inter-session variability are low and inter-user variability
is high.
An analysis of the three variability classes in DooDB is carried out in this section. A
simple DTW-based verification system trained with the 5 first samples from session 1 is im-
plemented (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2009b), using three pairs of features: the coordinate sequence
[x, y], the speed sequence, [x′, y′] and the acceleration sequence [x′′, y′′].
Skilled and random forgeries are considered. To compute skilled forgery scores, the 20
available forgeries per user are employed. Random forgeries represent the case where a user
claims to be a different one while providing his or her own doodle or pseudo-signature to the
system. Random forgery scores are obtained by comparing the user reference set to the first
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genuine signature sample from each of the remaining users.
The verification performance for the three feature pairs is shown in Table 6.1 using separately
genuine samples from session 1 and from session 2 as test samples. In the case of Session 1, the
10 remaining samples are used for verification (since the first 5 are used for training), while for
session 2, all 15 samples are used for verification.
The score distributions of genuine samples from session 2, random forgeries and skilled
forgeries are represented for each modality and for each feature pair in Fig. 6.4. The Equal
Error Rates (EERs) of these systems are also shown in Table 6.1.
Several observations can be made from Fig. 6.4 and Table 6.1:
Intra-user Variability In Fig. 6.4, we observe that the genuine score distribution for doo-
dles presents a long tail towards low scores. This effect reflects the presence of users who vary
significantly the aspect or the dynamics (including stroke order) of their doodles. The highest
intra-user variability (i.e. the most spread genuine score distribution) is observed for the ac-
celeration features on doodles, which reflects the variation not only in the doodle aspect but
also in the dynamics between different sessions. This indicates that in general users concentrate
in reproducing the shape of their own doodles, but tend to vary the speed and acceleration of
their strokes. The effect is reduced with pseudo-signatures, since generally these are based on
better learned movements, and is clearly minimized for signatures, which are the best trained
passwords of the three categories.
Inter-user Variability Regarding random forgeries, it can be observed in Fig. 6.4 that ran-
dom forgery score distributions for doodles are shifted significantly towards lower scores, com-
pared to pseudo-signatures and signatures. This is especially visible for the [x, y] feature pair,
revealing a higher inter-user variability, at least in shape, for doodles. This is not reflected in a
lower EER in Table 6.1, since the tail towards lower scores for the genuine score distribution over-
laps with forgery scores. When skilled forgeries are considered, inter-user variability is inversely
related to the easiness of forging samples from another user. As can be seen in Fig. 6.4, there is a
high overlap between skilled forgeries scores and genuine user scores for doodles. Skilled forgery
scores decrease when dynamic features (speed and acceleration) are selected. However, since
genuine user scores also decrease for these features on doodles, the overlap does not decrease
significantly nor does the EER (for doodles). A predictable effect is that dynamic features such
as speed and acceleration provide a higher separation between genuine and skilled forgery scores
for signatures since they are harder to imitate, leading to lower EERs.
Inter-session Variability As expected, the error rates are higher in every case when genuine
samples from session 2 are used (see Table 6.1). We observe that the performance degradation
between sessions for doodles and pseudo-signatures is significantly higher than for signatures
both in relative and absolute terms. It is also worth noting that the verification performance
against random forgeries is in some cases better for doodles and pseudo-signatures than for
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Table 6.1: Verification performance in terms of EER (%) using samples from different sessions for
authentication. EERsk refers to the EER for skilled forgeries and EERrd for random forgeries.
Features Session
Doodles Pseudo-signatures Signatures
EERrd EERsk EERrd EERsk EERrd EERsk
[x, y] 1 2.7 28.0 3.5 28.6 3.2 23.9
[x′, y′] 1 3.4 26.7 1.6 23.9 2.1 18.0
[x′′, y′′] 1 4.5 28.1 2.2 19.8 2.8 13.8
[x, y] 2 7.6 36.4 5.0 34.5 4.6 27.0
[x′, y′] 2 6.3 33.9 3.8 29.7 3.2 21.5
[x′′, y′′] 2 7.3 34.1 4.3 25.0 4.0 17.8
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Figure 6.4: Score distributions for Doodles (left), pseudo-signatures (middle) and signatures (right)
using different feature pairs.
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Figure 6.5: Average genuine sample duration for each capture block during database acquisition (3 blocks
of 5 samples per session).
signatures. This suggests a higher variability in size and shape between users, compared to
signatures. However, the higher error rates against skilled forgeries also reflects that pseudo-
signatures, and especially doodles are significantly easier to forge.
6.2.3. Learning Curve
The learning curve for the three modalities (doodles, pseudo-signatures and signatures) is
studied by analyzing the average genuine sample duration for each capture block during the
database acquisition. As described in Sect. 6.1.1, during the database acquisition process, users
were asked to draw genuine samples in blocks of 5, separated by the production of forgeries.
It can be hypothesized that if the average duration significantly decreases between different
blocks, the users are still not used to the acquisition method or they are still learning how to
produce their graphical password. The average duration for each modality among consecutive
blocks is represented in Fig. 6.5. The average duration between the first block and the last block
for the case of doodles has a 20% difference, while for pseudo-signatures and signatures there is
only a 10% difference.
These observations corroborate the fact that doodles were in general specifically created for
the experiments while pseudo-signatures are composed of well-learned movements.
6.2.4. Graphical and Qualitative Properties
When the whole doodle dataset is visually inspected, it can be seen that there are three
main types of doodles:
Abstract doodles, which cannot be directly interpreted as representing an object or idea.
Conceptual doodles, which represent an object or idea (e.g. a flower).
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Symbolic doodles, which are known and recognizable symbols, like currency or musical
notation.
Doodles that are abstract for an observer may be conceptual to another that is able to
interpret them. However, it seems reasonable to assume that abstract doodles may be more
resilient to forgers with visual access to them, since they are harder to remember (Renaud,
2009). The proportion of these three doodle types in the DooDB database is: 43 abstract, 37
conceptual, and 20 symbolic doodles, although this is based on a subjective evaluation. It has
also been observed some repetitions among the doodles provided by participants, specially for
common drawings. Some examples of repeated doodles are a flower symbol and a smiling face.
Examples of each type of doodle are shown in Fig. 6.2.
Regarding pseudo-signatures, a clear classification between different types cannot be estab-
lished. It is observed that most participants tend to produce a simplified version of the signature,
including flourish. However, approximately 20% of the participants have written their initials,
their name or a shortened version of their name without flourish.
6.3. Benchmark Results
In order to assess the authentication performance based on doodles and pseudo-signatures,
preliminary experiments have been carried out. A simple verification system, based on Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) to compare the captured time sequences has been used, following the
algorithm as described in Martinez-Diaz et al. (2009b).
Two representative local feature sets from the state of the art are studied in this benchmark.
First, the one from the doodle authentication system proposed in Govindarajulu and Mad-
hvanath (2007). In that system, 6 local features are extracted from the doodle trajectory. These
are the coordinate sequence [x, y], and its first and second derivatives (speed and acceleration).
Thus, each doodle is described by the 6-dimensional sequence [x, y, x′, y′, x′′, y′′]. Matching is
performed using the DTW algorithm. We refer to this feature set as HP-LOCAL.
The other system is based on the one presented by the Biometric Recognition Group -
ATVS to the BioSecure Signature Evaluation Campaign BSEC 2009 (Houmani et al., 2012). In
particular, the system is the one based on DTW that was tuned to maximize its performance
against skilled forgeries, identified as system “DTWs” in Houmani et al. (2012). It was one of
the best performing systems in most evaluation scenarios against skilled forgeries. This feature
set is referred to as ATVS-BSEC. The system extracts the following 7 local features:
x-coordinate, x
Second-order derivative of x-coordinate, x′′
First-order derivative of y-coordinate, y′
Second-order derivative of y-coordinate, y′′
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Path velocity, υ =
√
(y′)2 + (x′)2
First-order derivative of path velocity, υ′
First-order derivative of the log curvature radius, ρ′, where ρ = log(υ/θ′) and θ =
arctan(y′/x′) is the curvature of the position trajectory.
6.3.1. Experimental Protocol
The experimental protocol follows the one described in Sect. 6.2.2, but only genuine signa-
tures from session 2 are used for authentication.
The whole sets of doodles and pseudo-signatures from the DooDB database are used for
the experiments. The first 5 genuine samples from the first session of each user are used for
enrollment as reference templates. The 15 genuine signatures of the second session are used to
compute genuine user scores, simulating thus real operating conditions, in which inter-session
variability affects the verification performance.
Random and skilled forgery scores are obtained following the same protocol described in
Sect. 6.2.2.
For each comparison against the 5 reference templates, an output score is generated by
averaging the inverse of the 5 DTW distances obtained.
6.3.2. Results
The verification performance in terms of Equal Error Rate (EER) is shown in Table 6.2 and
DET (Detection Error Tradeoff) curves for each dataset are represented in Figure 6.6. As can
be seen, the performance is higher (i.e. lower error) for pseudo-signatures compared to doodles
both for random and skilled forgeries.
Comparing Table 6.2 (which considers state-of-the-art feature sets) to the results shown
in Table 6.1 using only samples from session 2 (with simple feature pairs) for verification, we
can see that the performance is similar. This is an indication that the selected state-of-the-art
feature sets may not be totally adequate for doodles, and better performance may be achieved
by considering feature extraction adjusted to the doodle recognition problem. This is subject
to future work.
In Table 6.1 we also saw that the performance against skilled forgeries improved for pseudo-
signatures when dynamic properties (i.e. speed or acceleration) were used. This effect may
be due to the higher consistency in the drawing process of pseudo-signatures, since they are
composed in general of natural or learned movements. On the other hand, when doodles are
considered, the usage of speed or acceleration properties does not increase the performance in
the same proportion. This may be due to an increased variability in the drawing process. In
fact, it was observed during the doodle subset acquisition, that some users varied the stroke
order of their doodles even in the same session. This was not the case for pseudo-signatures.
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Table 6.2: Verification performance in terms of EER (%) using samples from session 2 for authentica-
tion. EERsk refers to the EER for skilled forgeries and EERrd for random forgeries.
Features
Doodles Pseudo-signatures Signatures
EERrd EERsk EERrd EERsk EERrd EERsk
HP-LOCAL 5.4 33.8 3.1 28.4 2.1 17.8
ATVS-BSEC 3.4 34.4 3.1 26.9 2.5 15.8
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Figure 6.6: DET plots for (a) doodles, (b) pseudo-signatures and (c) signatures.
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6.4. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
The DooDB database has been presented. This database comprises doodles and pseudo-
signatures from 100 users and skilled forgeries for all of them. The acquisition protocol has been
described and various data analyses have been performed. Benchmark verification experiments
have been carried out, revealing that one of the main challenges of doodle and pseudo-signature
verification may be the protection against forgeries.
We have also observed that there is a high intra-user variability in the production of doodles,
which negatively affects the verification performance. Unlike the case of signature verification,
where dynamic features such as acceleration of velocity clearly increase the verification accu-
racy (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008), the variability found in doodles defies the utility of
dynamic features for doodle-based authentication. On the other hand, pseudo-signatures are
more stable and thus provide promising results. Users may produce doodles more naturally over
time, assuming a frequent usage, leading to an improvement in their verification performance
which would become closer to pseudo-signatures in the long term.
Based on the results, doodles and pseudo-signatures are seen as a potential lightweight
authentication method oriented to mobile devices. One of the main advantages of this kind
of graphical password is its convenience and the possibility of performing user authentication
without extra hardware unlike, for example, fingerprint authentication. As previously stated,
revocability is an advantage of doodles with respect to other biometric traits.
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Chapter 7
Free-form doodle verification
Graphical passwords have become popular due to the proliferation of touchscreen devices,
in particular smartphones and tablets. However, the prevalent approaches are based on simple
graphical passwords which can be easily remembered and reproduced by potential attackers.
This chapter focuses on free-form graphical passwords captured on touchscreen devices. Au-
thentication is based on features extracted from the dynamics of the doodle drawing process
(e.g. speed or acceleration). These features contain behavioral biometric information, which has
been successfully used for automatic user verification based on handwritten signatures (Fierrez
and Ortega-Garcia, 2008). As a consequence, a potential attacker would have to copy not only
what the user draws, but also how the user draws it. Unfortunately graphical passwords tend
to be much simpler than signatures and are not composed, in general, of previously learned or
heavily practiced movements. This can lead to a higher intra-user variability (i.e. variations
between samples produced by the same person) than in the case of signatures or may cause users
to forget part or the whole graphical password that they provided during enrolment. On the
other hand, while users may be concerned about their privacy when registering their signature
on an authentication system, doodles can be a potential solution to overcome this type of legal
and social issues. Doodles have also a high revocability compared to signatures.
In this chapter, we study the advantages, drawbacks and limits of user authentication based
on finger-drawn free-form doodles and authentication based on pseudo-signatures, which are
simplified versions of the signature drawn with the fingertip (see Fig. 7.1). To the extent of
our knowledge, this is the first exhaustive and systematic analysis of user authentication on
touchscreens based on free-form sketches, using a publicly available database. The recently
acquired DooDB Graphical Password Database, described in Chapter 6 is used for this pur-
pose (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2013). The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as
follows:
1. Two verification systems are proposed, one based on Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs),
and another based on the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), which are state-of-the-art
approaches for signature verification. We analyze the performance of these systems against
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Figure 7.1: Examples of doodles and pseudo-signatures from the DooDB database (Martinez-Diaz et al.,
2013).
random forgeries (when attackers claim to be another user but use their own password)
and intentional forgeries (when attackers have visual access to the password being forged).
2. Feature selection is carried out in order to understand which features provide the highest
discriminative power for doodles and pseudo-signatures.
3. The impact of inter-session variability (i.e. the effects of time between enrolment and
authentication) is studied.
4. We study the impact of the number of available training samples during enrolment on the
verification performance.
5. An improved authentication system based on the best selected features and the fusion of
the two aforementioned matchers (GMM and DTW) is presented.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 7.1 the proposed verification systems are
described. Experiments and results are reported in Sect. 7.2, and conclusions are finally drawn
in Sect. 7.3.
Preliminary results of the work presented in this chapter were reported by the author
in Martinez-Diaz et al. (2010b).
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Figure 7.2: Main components of a Doodle Verification System.
7.1. Proposed Algorithms
In this section, the proposed Doodle Verification Systems are described. In both systems,
the input coordinate sequence [xˆn, yˆn] is sampled from the finger-tip trajectory on a touchscreen,
as well as the time interval tˆn between samples. A generic model of a doodle verification system
is shown in Fig. 7.2 (following the signature verification architecture described in Chapter 2).
7.1.1. Preprocessing and Feature Extraction
The trajectory coordinate sequence [xˆn, yˆn] i = 1, . . . , I is first resampled to interpolate
missing samples (due to sampling errors or pauses between strokes). Cubic splines are used for
interpolation. The sequences are then normalized to have zero mean, resulting in [xn, yn].
A set of 19 additional features are extracted from the [xn, yn] coordinate sequence. A de-
scription of the feature set can be found in Table 3.2. All features are normalized to have zero
mean and variance equal to 1. Thus, each doodle is described by a total amount of 21 time
functions.
7.1.2. Gaussian Mixture Model system
For each user u, the distribution of d features extracted from the fingertip motion is modeled
by a d-dimensional Gaussian Mixture Model λu, as described in Sect. 2.1.3.
In our work, the number of Gaussian components N is chosen to be 32, and diagonal covari-
ance matrices Σi are used, based on the benchmark results reported by Richiardi and Drygajlo
(2003), and preliminary experiments which are omitted for the sake of clarity. The model param-
eters {ωi,µi,Σi} i = 1, . . . , N are estimated from a training set of doodles using the Expectation
Maximization (EM) algorithm.
During the enrollment phase one model is created for each user, which is later used for
matching. In addition, a world GMM is created, which models the whole set of users. World
models are used during the matching phase and are trained using doodles from a separate group
of users, as explained in the experiments.
A graphical representation of a GMM is depicted in Figure 7.3.a. A GMM with 8 Gaussian
components (represented by circles of 2σ width) trained with the pair of features [xn, yn] of 5
user samples is shown.
The match score, given a test vector x and a target user statistical model λC , can be
computed as a ratio of the log-likelihood that the test vector x is produced by the model λC and
99
7. FREE-FORM DOODLE VERIFICATION
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
x
y
Trainingsamples
GMM Gaussian components
(a)
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
x
y
Test sample
Training sample
(b)
Figure 7.3: (a) Representation of an 8-component GMM trained with the [xn, yn] features of 5 user
samples. The 2σ contour is depicted for each Gaussian component. (b) Representation of the point to
point correspondences between two doodles obtained using the DTW algorithm.
the log-likelihood that the test vector has been produced by any other user, which is modeled
by the world model λC¯ .
So, following the previous notation, a match score s is obtained as follows:
s = log p (x |λC )− log p (x |λC¯ ) . (7.1)
7.1.3. Dynamic Time Warping system
The DTW system described in Sect. 2.1.3 is used.
An example of a set of corresponding samples between two doodles from the same subject,
using the [xn, yn] functions is depicted in Fig. 7.3.b.
7.2. Experiments
7.2.1. Database and Experimental Protocol
The doodle and pseudo-signature sets from the DooDB database1 are used for the exper-
iments (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2013). As described in Chapter 6, the doodle dataset consists
of free-form doodles, while the pseudo-signature dataset is composed of simplified finger-drawn
signatures. Doodle and pseudo-signature examples are provided in Figure 7.1. A brief overview
of the database is given in this chapter for the sake of clarity.
The database was captured in an HTC Touch HD touchscreen mobile phone at a sampling
rate of 100Hz. Both datasets were produced by the same set of 100 users in two sessions,
separated by an average of 2 weeks. Users were requested to hold the handheld device in their
own hands while drawing. Participants were briefed to provide a graphical password that they
1Available at: http://atvs.ii.uam.es/databases.jsp
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would use as an authentication method and were left to train until they felt comfortable with the
capture method. For each password, the [xˆn, yˆn] coordinate sequence is captured, and the time
interval between each sample. The time interval is in general constant, except in the transitions
between consecutive strokes.
During each session, each user provided 15 genuine samples of each type (doodle and pseudo-
signature) and 10 forgeries. To increase the quality of forgeries, the system replayed the target
sample drawing process.
In the experiments, the first 50 users of the database are selected as the development set for
feature selection purposes, while the remaining users are left for validation. In the development
experiments, the GMMworld models are estimated using the genuine samples from the validation
set and vice-versa. Enrollment is done with the first 5 genuine samples from the first session
of each user. Unless stated otherwise, genuine scores are obtained with the 15 genuine doodles
from the second session, to take into account inter-session variability.
Two types of forgeries are considered. Skilled forgery scores are obtained using the 20
available forgeries per user. Random forgery scores are computed for each user by comparing
the user reference set (DTW system) or model (GMM system) to one sample from each of the
other users. Random forgeries represent the situation where a forger claims to be a different
user but provides his or her own doodle or pseudo-signature.
Throughout the next section, when results are presented, EERsk refers to the Equal Error
Rate (EER) for skilled forgeries and EERrd for random forgeries.
7.2.2. Experiment 1: Feature Selection
First, we analyze which are the most discriminative features for each verification system.
Feature selection on the local 21-feature set using the Sequential Forward Floating Search (SFFS)
algorithm is carried out (see Sect. 2.6.1). The algorithm, is used here to find a near-optimal
feature set that minimizes the system EER on the development datasets.
Feature selection is performed in 2 different scenarios for each dataset (doodles and pseudo-
signature):
PSEUDO-SK & DOODLE-SK: minimize the system EER against skilled forgeries.
PSEUDO-RD & DOODLE-RD: minimize the system EER against random forgeries.
In both scenarios, the 15 doodles and pseudo-signatures from the second session are used for
genuine score computation, while the first 5 signatures from Session 1 are used for enrollment.
Thus, inter-session variability is taken into account.
The best performing feature sets selected by the SFFS algorithm for each optimization
scenario are shown in Table 7.1, where several patterns can be observed. Feature y¨n (vertical
acceleration) is present in 7 of the 8 sets, and features y˙n (vertical speed) and ρ˙n (variation of
log curvature radius) are present in 6 of the 8 sets. This indicates that vertical dynamic features
may be more stable than horizontal features. However, it can also be observed that feature x¨ is
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present in the four GMM optimal feature sets. This implies that GMMs may be more robust to
users that change the usual left-to-right drawing order of their sketches. This last observation
is aligned with the fact that GMMs, contrary to DTW, do not consider the temporal order of
time series for matching.
The performance in terms of EER against random (EERrd) and skilled (EERsk) forgeries
using the optimal feature sets on the development and validation datasets is shown in Table 7.2.
The average of the user-specific EERs (referred to as aEER) is also reported. It is computed
by averaging the individual user EERs that are obtained with user-specific decision thresholds.
This represents the best EER that can be obtained if user scores are optimally normalized. As
can be seen, the verification performance on the development and on the validation set is similar
in general.
It can be observed that the GMM has a notably better verification performance against
skilled forgeries than the DTW system. On the other hand, the DTW system has a significantly
higher performance against random forgeries. The error rates against skilled forgeries are higher
for doodles, contrary to the case of random forgeries, where doodles have a better performance.
This may imply that pseudo-signatures are harder to imitate but are more similar between them
than doodles.
It can be seen in Table 7.2 that, for the GMM system, the EER for random and skilled
forgeries does not vary significantly independently of whether the system is optimized for either
of the two forgery types. This is not the case for the DTW system, where the EERs vary
significantly between the two optimization scenarios. This may reveal that for DTW-based
doodle authentication, different features are suitable for random and skilled forgeries respectively.
That behavior is corroborated by the results of the BSEC 2009 signature verification competition,
where DTW systems tuned separately for random or skilled forgeries reached top performances
against each kind of forgery (Houmani et al., 2012).
7.2.3. Experiment 2: Inter-session variability
Using the feature sets obtained in Experiment 1, we analyze the impact in the verification
performance of providing samples from the first session for authentication (instead of samples
from Session 2). Consequently, user models are trained with the first 5 samples from Session
1, and genuine scores are computed using the 10 remaining samples of Session 1. Results are
shown in Table 7.3. As can be seen, the EER improves significantly in all scenarios, compared
to the previous experiment (where the test samples were taken from the second session). This
reflects a high inter-session variability, which may be due to the limited training period that
users had while defining their own graphical password.
For the GMM system, the EER improvement is homogeneous in relative terms (around
35% − 45%), except in the case of doodle random forgeries. An improvement of nearly 70% in
the EER against random forgeries is observed (from 7,2% to 2,2% in the development subsets).
This corroborates that users may be failing to reproduce accurately their own doodle in Session 2.
Regarding the DTW system, the EER improvement against skilled forgeries is around
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Table 7.1: Feature sets selected by the SFFS algorithm on the development datasets.
System Scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
xn yn θn υn ρn an x˙n y˙n θ˙n υn ρ˙n a˙n x¨n y¨n υ
r
n αn α˙n sn cn r
5
n r
7
n
GMM
PSEUDO-SK X X X X X X
DOODLE-SK X X X X X
PSEUDO-RD X X X X X X X X
DOODLE-RD X X X X X X
DTW
PSEUDO-SK X X X
DOODLE-SK X X X X
PSEUDO-RD X X X X X X
DOODLE-RD X X X X X X
Table 7.2: Verification performance in terms of EER and average individual EER (aEER) using the
feature sets selected by the SFFS algorithm (Table 7.1). Results on the development (left) and valida-
tion (right) datasets are shown. Enrollment with Session 1 (5 signatures) and testing with Session 2.
Data in (%).
System Scenario
Development subset Validation subset
EERsk EERrd aEERsk aEERrd EERsk EERrd aEERsk aEERrd
GMM
PSEUDO-SK 17.2 12.9 13.5 7.6 20.9 12.0 14.9 6.8
DOODLE-SK 24.3 9.2 18.5 4.9 23.0 7.9 17.8 4.1
PSEUDO-RD 18.6 9.5 14.8 4.8 23.1 12.9 17.2 6.4
DOODLE-RD 24.6 7.2 20.4 2.9 23.7 6.7 17.2 3.4
DTW
PSEUDO-SK 21.6 5.2 15.4 1.1 29.0 2.7 19.5 0.9
DOODLE-SK 31.9 4.1 24.8 0.9 33.0 5.2 29.0 1.3
PSEUDO-RD 29.1 2.0 23.2 0.7 33.6 1.3 21.0 0.4
DOODLE-RD 36.7 1.6 26.5 0.3 32.7 1.4 27.3 0.3
Table 7.3: Verification performance using samples from Session 1 both for enrollment and testing. The
feature sets described in Table 7.1 are considered. Data in (%).
System Scenario
Development subset Validation subset
EERsk EERrd aEERsk aEERrd EERsk EERrd aEERsk aEERrd
GMM
PSEUDO-SK 11.5 7.3 8.3 3.3 16.2 8.8 11.0 4.0
DOODLE-SK 15.5 5.1 10.7 2.1 14.4 3.6 10.4 1.5
PSEUDO-RD 12.4 5.9 8.2 3.3 16.4 7.5 12.5 3.2
DOODLE-RD 14.60 2.2 11.3 0.8 13.5 2.6 9.2 1.0
DTW
PSEUDO-SK 15.2 1.4 8.4 0.3 22.8 2.2 12.8 1.1
DOODLE-SK 25.2 1.2 15.6 0.1 26.1 3.3 17.5 1.1
PSEUDO-RD 20.2 0.6 10.8 0.0 27.0 0.8 15.3 0.2
DOODLE-RD 29.3 0.4 16.2 0.2 23.7 1.4 15.5 0.3
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Figure 7.4: Evolution of the EER in each scenario in terms of the number of training samples.
20%− 30% in relative terms, while against random forgeries is around 70% in most cases. This
reinforces the previous observations about a high inter-session variability. It is worth noting
that the DTW system reaches remarkably low EERs, below 1%, and average EERs near 0%.
7.2.4. Experiment 3: Training set size
The effect of the available number of samples during enrollment is also studied. Maintaining
the previously computed optimal feature sets, the EER is obtained on each scenario using from
1 to 15 samples from Session 1 for training. Samples from Session 2 are used for authentication.
In Fig. 7.4, the EER evolution with respect to the number of graphical samples used for
training is shown. As might be expected, the EER decreases in general when more training
samples are available. However, this is not the case for the DTW system against random
forgeries on both datasets. The EER does not vary significantly when additional samples are
available. In the rest of the cases, the EER starts to stabilize at 6-7 training samples.
7.2.5. Experiment 4: Fusion
Finally, the verification performance combining the best systems of Experiment 1 is studied
by applying score fusion. Thus, the GMM system optimized against skilled forgeries and the
DTW system optimized against random forgeries are combined and results are computed for
both datasets (doodles and pseudo-signatures)
A simple fusion scheme based on score weighted sum is used. This approach has shown a
remarkable performance over other techniques (Kittler et al., 1998). The fusion score is computed
as s = (1− k)sD + ksG, where sD and sG are the DTW and GMM system scores respectively
and k is the fusion weighting factor. The optimal value of k is estimated heuristically on the
development dataset and is equal to 0.5 on both datasets.
The verification performance of both resulting fused systems on the validation datasets is
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Figure 7.5: Verification performance applying score fusion.
shown in Fig. 7.5, represented by the DET plot and the corresponding EERs. As can be observed,
there is no significant performance increase on the pseudo-signature dataset. On the other hand,
combining both systems on the doodle dataset improves the performance of the GMM system
against skilled forgeries and random forgeries, due to the DTW system contribution.
7.3. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
Two different algorithms have been analyzed for the problem of free-form graphical password
verification, and the effects of feature selection, inter-session variability, and training set size
have been studied. It has been observed that vertical features tend to be more prevalent than
horizontal ones in the optimal feature sets, indicating a possible higher discriminative power.
It has also been noticed that, using DTW, different feature sets provide highly different
performances against random and skilled forgeries. This is aligned with the results of the DTW
systems presented by the author to the BSEC 2009 Signature Evaluation Campaign (Houmani
et al., 2012). It was found that, using DTW, systems could be optimized independently (using
feature selection) against random forgeries and for skilled forgeries. These systems could be
afterwards combined, via score fusion, and result in a very high performance against both types
of forgeries.
Session inter-variability has proven to cause a considerable negative impact in verification
performance, as already observed by Martinez-Diaz et al. (2013), probably due to users that
fail to reproduce correctly their own graphical passwords. Although the GMM systems may
overcome partially this issue (since they do not take into account the stroke order), verification
performance is still considerably degraded. It has also been found that the optimal enrollment
set size is around 7 samples, a bit higher than the common trend in the signature verification
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literature (5 samples) (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008).
It has also been observed in the experimental results, that depending on the optimization
scenario (skilled or random forgeries) very different optimal feature sets are selected by the SFFS
algorithm. In addition, the GMM system has a better performance against skilled forgeries while
the DTW system has a better performance against random forgeries. This suggests that random
and skilled forgeries may be a different problem from a pattern recognition point of view. This
corroborates results already observed in the signature verification field, namely in the BioSecure
Signature Evaluation Campaign 2009 (Houmani et al., 2012), where verification systems from
many international research groups were compared. It was found that the best performing
systems against random and skilled forgeries were tuned for each scenario respectively, and
fusion of both systems provided an overall good performance in both scenarios. In our case,
score fusion has shown to provide better results than individual systems, especially in the case
of doodles.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This Thesis has studied the problem of automatic user authentication on handheld devices
using signatures and gesture-based graphical passwords. The effects of aging on signature recog-
nition have also been analyzed. A summary of the state of the art on these topics has been first
presented and the verification systems used in this Thesis have been also described. The experi-
mental studies have analyzed the effects of mobility on signature features compared to traditional
capture conditions, the feasibility and performance of user authentication based on doodles, and
the influence of aging on the verification performance.
8.1. Conclusions
Chapter 1 outlines the basic principles and methods of biometric recognition, focusing on
signature-based authentication. The motivation of this Thesis and the specific contributions
are also described. The state of the art on related topics is reviewed in Chapter 2, covering
signature verification, graphical password-based authentication, feature selection and biometric
aging. In Chapter 3, the verification systems and feature sets used in the experimental body of
this Thesis are described.
The experimental contributions start in Chapter 4. The effects of mobile capture conditions
on signature verification performance are first studied. Signature datasets captured on mobile
conditions and on a traditional scenario (pen tablet) are used for the experiments. A local HMM
system and a global system are used for the experiments. It is found that the lack of trajectory
information during pen-ups (which happens on mobile conditions due to the use of touchscreens
for signature acquisition) negatively affects verification performance. This is specially remarkable
for the local system used in the experiment, compared to the global system. Thus, global features
appear to be more robust in mobile conditions, although it is well known that they usually
provide a worse verification performance than local features. The methodology followed in these
experiments (i.e. comprehensive set of features, feature subset selection, and robust matchers)
has led the author to remarkable success in the BioSecure Signature Evaluation Campaign,
ranking first in several tasks (BSEC, 2009; Houmani et al., 2012). The author also reached
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second position in the on-line category of the ICDAR 2009 Signature Verification Competition
(SigComp2009) (Blankers et al., 2009), following this methodology.
The effects of aging on signature verification are studied in Chapter 5. This is the first
systematic study on the degradation of on-line signature with time and how this aging effect
may be compensated. The experiments are carried out using three state-of-the-art systems
(HMM, DTW and distance-based). It has been observed that the aging effect is present in this
trait even for time lapses of several months. We have found that aging in the signature trait
is a user-dependent effect. A user affected by aging performs badly regardless of the system
being used. Not all signature recognition technologies have been found to be equally affected by
aging. The one based on DTW is the most robust to the passing of time. Regarding different
feature types, we observe that global features containing dynamic information are in general less
stable with time than those which comprise static information. We have also found that in the
datasets used in the experiments, signatures evolve towards a higher simplicity over time. They
become shorter, faster and with fewer singular points and pen-ups. Template update strategies
have been studied, in order to mitigate the effects of aging. Their efficiency has found to be
variable depending on the signature recognition system being used.
Research works such as the one presented here try to shed some light into the difficult
problem of biometric aging. Performing systematic studies of biometric systems sensitivity to
time is essential before effective strategies that minimize the impact of the detected effects can
be developed, so that the user acceptability of this rapidly emerging technology is improved.
This way, we believe that this work can be of great utility not only for researchers, but also
for developers and vendors in order to produce more secure and trustful applications based on
the signature trait, to better understand its strengths, and to be able to foresee the weaknesses
of this biometric modality. Furthermore, this type of study can also help to develop the ongoing
biometric standards and to better define the requirements that real applications should comply
with (ANSI-INCITS 395-2005, 2005; ISO/IEC 19794-11, 2005; ISO/IEC 19794-7, 2005).
In Chapter 6, the DooDB graphical password database has been presented. This database
contains doodles (free-form finger-drawn sketches) and pseudo-signatures, which are finger-
drawn and simplified versions of signatures. The acquisition protocol has been described and
various data analyse have been performed. Benchmark verification experiments have been con-
ducted, revealing that one of the main challenges of doodle and pseudo-signature verification
may be the protection against forgeries. A high intra-user variability in the production of doo-
dles has also been observed. On the other hand, pseudo-signatures are more stable and thus
provide promising results. Based on the results, doodles and pseudo-signatures are seen as a
potential lightweight authentication method oriented to mobile devices. One of the main ad-
vantages of this kind of graphical password is its convenience and the possibility of performing
user authentication without extra hardware unlike, for example, fingerprint authentication.
Chapter 7 studies the problem of graphical password-based user authentication using doodles.
The DooDB database, presented in Chapter 6, is used for that purpose. Two algorithms from the
signature verification state of the art are used: DTW and GMMs. A feature selection process is
108
8.2 Future Work
also carried out in order to study which features are most discriminative for graphical passwords.
It is found that vertical movement related features are more prevalent in the optimal features
sets. We have also observed that different feature sets work best against random or skilled
forgeries respectively. That is, random forgery or skilled forgery detection is a different problem
and may be approached using different classifiers (which can be afterwards combined). This
was also observed for the case of signature verification in the results of the BioSecure Signature
Evaluation Campaign (BSEC) 2009 (Houmani et al., 2012), where the algorithms developed by
the author reached top positions against random and skilled forgeries independently. It has also
been found that the optimal number of training features is slightly higher than in the case of
signature verification (7 vs. 5).
To summarize, the main contributions of this Thesis are:
The up-to-date survey on mobile signature verification, biometric aging and recall-based
graphical passwords.
The experimental analysis of which signature features are more robust on mobile conditions
and the evidence of performance degradation when pen-up trajectories are not captured.
The novel experimental setup to analyze the effects of biometric aging on signature veri-
fication.
Experimental evidence on the effect of aging in signature verification, and its compensation
through template update approaches.
The acquisition and analysis of the first publicly available finger-drawn graphical password
database, including also pseudo-signatures.
The experimental analysis of graphical password-based user authentication, showing that
using feature selection and score fusion, a promising verification performance can be ob-
tained.
8.2. Future Work
Based on the work presented in this Thesis, several research paths arise. The following ones
are considered of interest by the author:
This Thesis has focused on the problem of user authentication on mobile conditions, com-
pared to traditional desktop scenarios. There is however a need to analyze the impact of
device inter-operability, that is, the impact of acquiring biometric samples in a device that
is different than the one that has been used to train the user model (e.g. two different
brands of smartphones, or one smartphone and one pen tablet). Some research contri-
butions already addresses this challenging scenario (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2005), but a
systematic study on inter-operability with a large and publicly available database is yet
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to be performed. Recent efforts are going in this line (Blanco-Gonzalo et al., 2013a; Vera
et al., 2015).
Regarding aging, this Thesis has shed some light on its effects in signature verification.
However, several questions arise. Is 15 months a sufficiently long period of time to be in
the presence of real “aging”? Although all the results given in the present work point in
that direction, this should still be fully confirmed on a database acquired over a larger
time span. Other factors, such as gender, or writing skills may also be of interest when
aging is considered. A recent reference in this regard is Fairhurst (2013).
Sketch-based graphical passwords are still a relatively novel field of research and still
represent a challenging authentication scenario. Future research using additional datasets
should be carried out, (like the set recently presented by Riggan et al. (2014)), taking into
account other usage profiles compared to the acquisition scenario of the DooDB database,
which was captured considering only a span of two weeks between sessions.
Inter-session variability has been found to be one of the main factors for performance
degradation, when doodles are used for authentication. Template update techniques (Di-
daci et al., 2014; Uludag et al., 2004) could help to alleviate this problem.
This Thesis has studied free-form graphical passwords produced on touchscreens. With the
proliferation of front cameras on smartphones and body motion capture technologies (such
as Microsoft KinectTM), in-air gestures should be studied as an authentication means. It
has also been found that users tend to prefer gestures than touchscreen interaction in some
scenarios (Parada-Loira et al., 2014). Some recent works in this field are (Lai et al., 2012;
Wu et al., 2014)
As we have seen, the acquisition scenario (e.g. smartphone, tablet) affects verification
performance. There is in general a trade-off between usability and performance. Some
recent works have studied the impact of usability and acquisition conditions on signature
verification (Blanco-Gonzalo et al., 2014, 2013b; Brockly et al., 2014). Future research
may be carried out in this area, in order to identify measurable usability features and
analyze their correlation with verification performance.
This work has relied on well-established matching techniques (HMM, GMM, DTW and
distance measures). Other complementary approaches that have gained popularity, such
as Support Vector Machines (SVM) (Ferrer et al., 2005), Deep Neural Networks and hybrid
HMM/Neural Network approaches (Dahl et al., 2012; Povey et al., 2011) should be explored
in order to identify other possible top performing verification algorithms.
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Ape´ndice A
Resumen Extendido de la Tesis
Verificacio´n de Firma y Gra´ficos Manuscritos: Caracter´ısticas Discriminantes y
Nuevos Escenarios de Aplicacio´n Biome´trica
En la actualidad los sistemas de reconocimiento biome´trico son una alternativa a me´todos
tradicionales de autenticacio´n, como contrasen˜as, llaves f´ısicas o electro´nicas. La biometr´ıa
permite validar la identidad de un usuario mediante la utilizacio´n de un rasgo anato´mico (p.ej.
huella dactilar) o comportamental (p.ej. firma manuscrita) inherente a una persona (Jain et al.,
2008), y es algo habitual dentro del a´mbito forense y judicial desde hace ma´s de un siglo.
En comparacio´n con los me´todos cla´sicos comu´nmente utilizados, como llaves o claves, los
rasgos biome´tricos no pueden, en general, ser prestados, robados o copiados. El usuario emplea
directamente su propia huella dactilar, retina, voz u otro rasgo para ser reconocido. Por otro
lado, esta clase de sistemas suele ser fa´cil de mantener y en general no requiere la intervencio´n
de ma´s agentes que el propio usuario para funcionar.
Los rasgos biome´tricos pueden clasificarse segu´n varias caracter´ısticas (Jain et al., 2008).
Entre ellas cabe mencionar su unicidad, su distintividad o individualidad, su universalidad, su
facilidad de proceso y adquisicio´n o su variabilidad con el tiempo. La firma manuscrita reu´ne
muchas de estas caracter´ısticas y es adema´s uno de los medios ma´s utilizados desde la antigu¨edad
para validar la autor´ıa de documentos escritos. Otra ventaja es la facilidad de captura electro´nica
de la firma, especialmente tras la masiva proliferacio´n de dispositivos con pantallas ta´ctiles. Son
ejemplos de ello las tabletas, los tele´fonos inteligentes (smartphones), los ordenadores porta´tiles,
y terminales de punto de venta con pantalla ta´ctil.
El reconocimiento biome´trico es un a´rea de investigacio´n madura, con libros de referen-
cia (Jain et al., 2008, 2011; Ratha and Govindaraju, 2008; Ross et al., 2006), conferencias es-
pec´ıficas en el a´rea (ICB, 2015; IJCB, 2014; Vijaya-Kumar et al., 2010), revistas espec´ıficas (Fair-
hust, 2012), proyectos internacionales (BBfor2, 2010; Biosecure, 2004; Tabula Rasa, 2010), con-
sorcios dedicados al reconocimiento biome´trico (BC, 2015; BI, 2015; EAB, 2015) y esta´ndares
internacionales (ANSI/NIST, 2009; SC37, 2005). La investigacio´n en firma manuscrita es adema´s
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un a´rea que, si bien esta´ muy activa desde hace varias de´cadas (Plamondon and Lorette, 1989),
continu´a suponiendo un problema para el que se siguen buscando soluciones. Prueba de ello es
el nu´mero de competiciones en firma manuscrita celebradas en los u´ltimos an˜os (Blankers et al.,
2009; BMEC, 2007; Houmani et al., 2012, 2011; Liwicki et al., 2011; Malik et al., 2013; Yeung
et al., 2004) y el alto volumen de publicaciones cient´ıficas en el a´rea (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia,
2008; Impedovo and Pirlo, 2008; Impedovo et al., 2012; Plamondon and Lorette, 1989).
Los dispositivos porta´tiles con pantalla ta´ctil (smartphones, tabletas, etc.) esta´n motivando
un cambio en cuanto a la interaccio´n hombre-ma´quina. Permiten, por un lado la captura de
firmas en movilidad, y por otro una interaccio´n basada en gestos trazados con los dedos sobre la
pantalla. La autenticacio´n puede estar, de hecho, no solo basada en firma sino en un conjunto
diferente de trazos escogidos por el usuario (denominado password gra´fico), o en una versio´n
simplificada de la firma. Se abre por tanto un nuevo escenario de aplicacio´n, en donde estos
trazos, ya sean la firma completa trazada con el dedo o un conjunto de trazos, pueden ser
utilizados como rasgo biome´trico.
A.1. Resumen y Conclusiones
Esta Tesis aborda la verificacio´n de firma manuscrita centra´ndose en tres ejes principales,
la autenticacio´n en dispositivos mo´viles, el efecto del paso del tiempo (conocido como biometric
aging) y un nuevo escenario de aplicacio´n: la autenticacio´n basada en gestos o firmas simplifi-
cadas realizadas con el dedo sobre una pantalla ta´ctil.
A.1.1. Cap´ıtulo 1: Introduccio´n
En el Cap´ıtulo 1 se presenta en primer lugar una introduccio´n a la biometr´ıa y en particular
el reconocimiento de firma manuscrita. Se explica adicionalmente la motivacio´n de la Tesis y se
describen y detallan las contribuciones de la misma, proporcionando un listado de publicaciones
cient´ıficas del autor resultantes del trabajo de la Tesis, clasificadas por tema´tica.
A.1.2. Cap´ıtulo 2: Trabajos Relacionados y Estado del Arte
El Cap´ıtulo 2 contiene una descripcio´n del estado del arte en verificacio´n automa´tica firma
manuscrita, con especial atencio´n a la autenticacio´n en condiciones de movilidad, as´ı como del
estado del arte en verificacio´n de passwords gra´ficos y en el estudio de los efectos aging. Se
proporciona tambie´n una descripcio´n de las bases de datos disponibles de firma manuscrita
on-line en la comunidad cient´ıfica y una revisio´n de algoritmos de seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas.
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A.1.3. Cap´ıtulo 3: Sistemas de Verificacio´n Propuestos
En el Cap´ıtulo 3 se describen los sistemas de verificacio´n utilizados en los experimentos
desarrollados a lo largo de la Tesis. Se emplean dos tipos de sistemas: locales y globales. El
sistema global esta´ basado en la extraccio´n de un vector de 100 para´metros globales de cada
firma (Tabla 3.1), las cuales han sido previamente muestreadas en una pantalla ta´ctil o tableta
digitalizadora y normalizadas, y realiza el ca´lculo de similitud empleando la distancia de Maha-
lanobis. En cuanto a los sistemas locales, se han implementado tres sistemas diferentes, uno
basado en Modelos Ocultos de Markov (Hidden Markov Models, HMM), otro en Modelos de
Mezclas Gaussianas (Gaussian Mixture Models, GMM) y otro basado en el me´todo de alinea-
miento ela´stico Dynamic Time Warping (DTW). En el caso de los sistemas locales, se extraen
un total de 27 funciones (Tabla 3.2) de cada firma, que suponen un compendio de las funciones
utilizadas en la literatura cient´ıfica en los u´ltimos an˜os.
A.1.4. Cap´ıtulo 4: Verificacio´n de Firma en Movilidad
Las contribuciones experimentales comienzan en el Cap´ıtulo 4. En e´l se aborda el problema
de la verificacio´n de firma manuscrita en dispositivos mo´viles. Se basa en las publicaciones
del autor (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2008a, 2014). En este cap´ıtulo se utiliza la base de datos de
firmas BioSecure Multimodal Database (BMDB) (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010) la cual contiene un
conjunto de firmas capturadas tanto en una tableta digitalizadora como en una PDA, del mismo
grupo de usuarios. El principal objetivo del cap´ıtulo es evaluar cua´les son los efectos provocados
por la captura en condiciones de movilidad en el rendimiento de los sistemas de verificacio´n de
firma. Es razonable suponer que la menor ergonomı´a de un dispositivo mo´vil comparado con
una tableta as´ı como las condiciones de captura, en movimiento frente a en una superficie firme,
pueden afectar negativamente al proceso de verificacio´n, incrementando las tasas de error. Se
observa adema´s en la base de datos que, dado que las pantallas ta´ctiles no capturan la trayectoria
del estilete cuando e´ste no esta´ en contacto con la pantalla (al contrario que en el caso de las
tabletas digitalizadoras), se dejan de muestrear en promedio el 18% aproximadamente de la
trayectoria de las firmas. En el cap´ıtulo se realiza un ana´lisis del poder discriminante individual
de los vectores de caracter´ısticas locales y globales definidos en el Cap´ıtulo 3. Este ana´lisis
se realiza sobre 3 conjuntos de firmas, el capturado en la PDA, el capturado en la tableta
digitalizadora, y uno adicional que se crea a partir del capturado en tableta, eliminando los
puntos muestreados cuando el bol´ıgrafo no esta´ en contacto con la superficie e interpola´ndolos.
Para el ana´lisis individual de los para´metros globales, se utiliza el Fisher’s Discriminant
Ratio (FDR), y se define una medida ad-hoc para los para´metros locales, que denominamos
Distance Discrimant Ratio (DDR), descrita en el Apartado 4.2. Se realiza tambie´n un ana´lisis
del poder discriminante de combinaciones de para´metros. Para ello se realiza seleccio´n de ca-
racter´ısticas mediante el me´todo Sequential Forward Floating Search (SFFS) (Theodoridis and
Koutroumbas, 2006), con el fin de encontrar cua´les son los conjuntos de caracter´ısticas que
proporcionan una menor tasa de error en cada escenario (mo´vil y tableta) y tipo de impostor
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(casual o intencionado). Se realiza seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas sobre los conjuntos de para´metros
globales y locales descritos en el Cap´ıtulo 3 y empleando el sistema global basado en distancia
de Mahalanobis y el sistema local basado en HMMs.
En los resultados se observa que en general las caracter´ısticas tienen un un poder discrimi-
nante individual superior en el caso de la tableta con respecto a la PDA (ve´ase Figura 4.3), y
que el hecho de interpolar las trayectorias cuando el bol´ıgrafo no esta´ en contacto con la su-
perficie (imitando lo que sucede en la PDA) tambie´n reduce el poder discriminante. Esto se
observa especialmente en el caso de las imitaciones intencionadas, por lo que cabe suponer que
las trayectorias del bol´ıgrafo en el aire son ma´s dif´ıciles de imitar.
En cuanto a la seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas, se observa que en general el nu´mero o´ptimo
de para´metros globales esta´ en torno a 40, con respecto al total de 100 (ve´anse Figura 4.4 y
Tabla 4.1). Se observa adema´s que los para´metros de naturaleza geome´trica (relacionados con
caracter´ısticas geome´tricas de la firma) son los que prevalecen en los vectores o´ptimos (ve´ase
Figura 4.5).
El taman˜o de los vectores o´ptimos de para´metros locales oscila entre 6 y 9 caracter´ısticas
(ve´ase Tabla 4.2). Se observan varios comportamientos en el caso de los para´metros locales.
En primer lugar, ninguna caracter´ıstica relacionada con presio´n u orientacio´n del bol´ıgrafo esta´
presente en los conjuntos o´ptimos de caracter´ısticas. Se entiende por tanto que su ausencia en
el caso de la PDA, dado que no es posible capturarlas en pantallas ta´ctiles, no deber´ıa afectar
la tasa de error del sistema (al contrario que lo los resultados presentados por Muramatsu and
Matsumoto (2007) y alineado con las observaciones de Houmani et al. (2009)). Se observa
adema´s que la coordenada x, la derivada de y, el coseno c y el a´ngulo de la trayectoria α
esta´n presentes en la mayor´ıa de los vectores (estos para´metros esta´n descritos en la Tabla 3.2).
Se observa tambie´n que el nu´mero de caracter´ısticas es menor al comu´nmente empleado en la
literatura (Fierrez et al., 2007b; Ly-Van et al., 2007; Richiardi et al., 2005).
Finalmente se realizan experimentos de validacio´n, sobre conjuntos de firmas diferentes a los
empleados para la seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas (ve´ase el protocolo detallado en el Apartado 4.2).
El rendimiento de los sistemas en te´rminos de Equal Error Rate (ERR) se muestra en la Ta-
bla 4.3. Se observa que el sistema global presenta en general un mejor rendimiento en el caso
de la PDA. Cuando se interpolan las trayectorias en el aire, la tasa de error se ve incremen-
tada, especialmente en el caso de imitaciones intencionadas. Se puede observar tambie´n que
cuando los sistemas se optimizan frente a imitaciones aleatorias, el rendimiento empeora nota-
blemente frente a imitaciones intencionadas. Al contrario, si se optimizan frente a imitaciones
intencionadas, el rendimiento frente a imitaciones aleatorias no empeora en gran medida.
La metodolog´ıa seguida en este cap´ıtulo (conjunto inicial muy amplio de caracter´ısticas,
seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas y algoritmos robustos) ha permitido al autor obtener resultados
muy exitosos en la competicio´n de firma manuscrita BioSecure Signature Evaluation Campaign,
alcanzando el primer puesto en varias categor´ıas (BSEC, 2009; Houmani et al., 2012). Obtuvo de
forma similar el segundo puesto en la categor´ıa on-line de la competicio´n ICDAR 2009 Signature
Verification Competition (SigComp2009) (Blankers et al., 2009).
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A.1.5. Cap´ıtulo 5: Aging en Firma Manuscrita
El Cap´ıtulo 5 estudia los efectos del paso del tiempo (conocido como “aging”) en el rendi-
miento de los sistemas de verificacio´n de firma manuscrita. Se basa en las publicacio´n del autor
con Galbally et al. (2013). Supone la primera contribucio´n cient´ıfica en la que se presenta un
conjunto de firmas capturadas durante un periodo superior a un an˜o y se analizan los efectos del
aging sobre el mismo. Se propone una metodolog´ıa nueva para analizar los efectos del paso del
tiempo, que puede ser extrapolable a otros rasgos biome´tricos. Esta metodolog´ıa es utilizada
para extraer conclusiones acerca de los efectos del aging y co´mo pueden ser mitigados.
La base de datos utilizada se denomina Signature Long-Term Database y contiene firmas de
29 usuarios comunes de las bases de datos BiosecurID (Fierrez et al., 2010) y BioSecure (Ortega-
Garcia et al., 2010). En total, el periodo de captura se extiende a lo largo de 15 meses. Los
detalles del protocolo de adquisicio´n se muestran en la Figura 5.1.
En el apartado experimental, se analizan dos principales aspectos. En primer lugar cua´l es
el impacto del aging en el rendimiento (en cuanto a tasas de error) de la verificacio´n de firma
manuscrita, y en segundo lugar cua´les son los cambios espec´ıficos que experimentan las firmas
con el paso del tiempo, y que´ para´metros son ma´s estables. Se utilizan para los experimentos los
sistemas locales HMM, DTW y el sistema global basado en distancia de Mahalanobis descritos
en el Cap´ıtulo 3.
En cuanto a los experimentos relacionados con el rendimiento de los sistemas, se observa que
las tasas de error (EER) se incrementan con el paso del tiempo, segu´n las firmas de test han sido
capturadas ma´s tarde con respecto a las capturadas en el registro de los usuarios. Este efecto
se observa en los tres sistemas de verificacio´n empleados (ve´anse Figuras 5.3 y 5.3). El sistema
DTW es el ma´s robusto ante el paso del tiempo. Se observa adema´s que la varianza de las
puntuaciones de los sistemas de verificacio´n aumenta con el paso del tiempo. Se analiza tambie´n
co´mo afecta el aging a cada usuario de la base de datos individualmente (ve´anse Figura 5.5 y
Tabla 5.4), aprecia´ndose que el aging afecta en medida muy diferente a cada usuario, existiendo
usuarios a los que les afecta en escasa medida y otros en gran medida. Finalmente, se analiza el
efecto de actualizar las plantillas de usuario con firmas ma´s recientes, con respecto a las de test.
Se comprueba que cuanto ma´s recientes son las firmas de entrenamiento, mejor es el rendimiento,
entre otras observaciones (ve´ase Figura 5.7).
En relacio´n a los experimentos acerca de los cambios que experimentan las firmas con el
tiempo, se analiza en primer lugar la evolucio´n de los para´metros globales con el aging (ve´ase
Figura 5.8). Se observa que en general, con el paso del tiempo, las firmas son ma´s cortas, ra´pidas,
con menores puntos singulares y nu´mero de trazos. En definitiva, las firmas se simplifican con
el paso del tiempo. Se mide tambie´n cua´l es el efecto del aging en los para´metros globales,
observa´ndose que en general los para´metros relacionados con caracter´ısticas dina´micas son los
que ma´s var´ıan con el paso del tiempo, frente a los para´metros geome´tricos que son ma´s robustos.
Este cap´ıtulo trata por tanto de mostrar los efectos del aging en la firma manuscrita y co´mo
pueden ser mitigados mediante la actualizacio´n de las plantillas de usuario. Se considera que
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este tipo de ana´lisis puede ser de utilidad para la comunidad cient´ıfica y la industria, en la
medida que ayudan a desarrollar sistemas ma´s robustos ante el paso del tiempo. Este tipo de
estudios pueden adema´s ayudar a la definicio´n de requerimientos para aplicaciones biome´tricas
reales en esta´ndares como ANSI-INCITS 395-2005 (2005); ISO/IEC 19794-11 (2005); ISO/IEC
19794-7 (2005).
A.1.6. Cap´ıtulo 6: DooDB, Base de Datos de Passwords Gra´ficos
El Cap´ıtulo 6 describe la adquisicio´n y caracter´ısticas de la base de datos DooDB, que
contiene passwords gra´ficos y firmas simplificadas trazados con el dedo sobre la pantalla ta´ctil
de un dispositivo mo´vil. Esta´ basado en las publicaciones (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2013, 2010a).
La base de datos DooDB es la primera base de datos disponible para la comunidad cient´ıfica
que contiene passwords gra´ficos capturados de forma sistema´tica. Contiene muestras de 100
usuarios, para cada una de las dos modalidades, capturadas en dos sesiones separadas por dos
semanas en promedio. Cada sesio´n se divide en 3 bloques de captura de 5 muestras por bloque.
En la Figura 6.2 se pueden observar algunas muestras de la base de datos. En primer lugar
se realiza un ana´lisis estad´ıstico de las muestras capturadas, compara´ndolas con una base de
datos de firmas capturadas en una PDA (de la base de datos BioSecure). Se observa que en
general los passwords gra´ficos tienden a ser ma´s sencillos gra´ficamente que las firmas y que
se trazan ma´s ra´pido (ve´ase Figura 6.3). Se analiza tambie´n la variabilidad de los passwords
gra´ficos y firmas simplificadas, observa´ndose una mayor variabilidad de las muestras genuinas en
comparacio´n a la firma manuscrita, as´ı como una variacio´n sensiblemente mayor con el paso del
tiempo entre sesiones de captura (ve´anse Figura 6.4 y Tabla 6.1). Para este ana´lisis se emplea un
clasificador DTW y se analizan por separado la variabilidad de la secuencia de coordenadas [x, y],
su primera derivada (velocidad) y su segunda derivada (aceleracio´n). La mayor variabilidad se
observa en la aceleracio´n. Se puede apreciar tambie´n que las firmas simplificadas presentan
menor variabilidad que los passwords gra´ficos, probablemente porque esta´n compuestas por
movimientos ma´s practicados que los passwords. Se analiza tambie´n la curva de aprendizaje de
cada rasgo (passwords, firmas simplificadas y firmas tradicionales), comparando la duracio´n en
promedio de las muertas a lo largo de cada bloque de captura. Se observa que en general la
duracio´n va decreciendo con el tiempo, pero en mucha mayor medida en el caso de los passwords
que las firmas (ve´ase Figura 6.5).
En el cap´ıtulo tambie´n se lleva a cabo un ana´lisis cualitativo de los passwords gra´ficos.
Se observan tres grandes tendencias: passwords abstractos, que no pueden ser interpretados;
passwords conceptuales, que representan un concepto reconocible y passwords simbo´licos, que
representan un s´ımbolo o letra reconocible. En cuanto a las firmas simplificadas, un 80% de los
usuarios realizan una versio´n simplificada de su firma original, mientras que el resto emplean
sus iniciales o una versio´n acortada de su nombre. Por u´ltimo, se realizan experimentos de
verificacio´n a modo de benchmark, utilizando un sistema basado en DTW y los para´metros
globales del sistema con mejor rendimiento ante imitaciones intencionadas en la competicio´n
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de firma manuscrita BSEC 2009 (Houmani et al., 2012). Se observa en general tasas de error
mayores al caso de firma manuscrita, especialmente en el caso de las imitaciones intencionadas.
A pesar de las mayores tasas de error, que pueden derivar en escenarios de aplicacio´n diferentes
a la firma manuscrita, una de las principales ventajas observadas de este rasgo biome´trico es la
usabilidad y facilidad de captura, que puede realizarse en cualquier smartphone o tableta del
mercado de forma intuitiva y sin elementos adicionales.
A.1.7. Cap´ıtulo 7: Verificacio´n de Passwords Gra´ficos
El Cap´ıtulo 7 estudia el rendimiento de diferentes sistemas y conjuntos de caracter´ısticas
ante el problema de la verificacio´n de passwords gra´ficos y firmas simplificadas trazadas con el
dedo. Para ello se emplea la base de datos DooDB descrita en el Cap´ıtulo 6. Se proponen dos
sistemas de verificacio´n basados en para´metros locales, utilizando GMMs y el algoritmo DTW.
Se analiza mediante seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas cua´les son los para´metros o´ptimos en diferentes
escenarios: passwords gra´ficos o firmas simplificadas e imitaciones aleatorias o intencionadas.
Se estudia tambie´n el impacto de la variabilidad inter-sesio´n, el impacto del nu´mero de firmas
de entrenamiento y se propone finalmente un sistema de verificacio´n basado en fusio´n de los
sistemas GMM y DTW analizados.
En cuanto a la seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas, se aprecia que las caracter´ısticas relacionadas con
el movimiento vertical, especialmente la aceleracio´n en la coordenada vertical, esta´n presentes
en la mayor´ıa de los vectores o´ptimos, al contrario que los para´metros relacionados con el mo-
vimiento horizontal (ve´ase Tabla 7.1). Se observa que el sistema GMM presenta en general un
rendimiento mejor ante imitaciones intencionadas, y al contrario en el caso de aleatorias, donde
el sistema DTW alcanza una tasa de error EER mucho menor (ve´ase Tabla 7.2). En la Tabla 7.3
se muestra el rendimiento en te´rminos de EER de los sistemas bajo estudio y los vectores de
caracter´ısticas previamente seleccionados cuando se utilizan muestras de test de la misma sesio´n
que las de entrenamiento (sesio´n 1). Se observa un rendimiento mucho mayor de los sistemas,
alcanza´ndose en algunos casos tasas de error cercanas a 0%. Esto da lugar a entender que existe
una muy alta variabilidad inter-sesio´n, probablemente debida a que los passwords gra´ficos en
general no esta´n compuestos por movimientos muy practicados y naturales, como es el caso de
la firma manuscrita. En cuanto al nu´mero o´ptimo de muestras de entrenamiento, se comprueba
que se situ´a en torno a 6-7 muestras, al contrario que el caso general de firma que esta´ en torno
a 5 muestras (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008) (ve´ase Figura 7.4). Por u´ltimo, mediante la
fusio´n de ambos sistemas, se alcanza un rendimiento combinado frente a imitaciones aleatorias
e intencionadas mejor que los sistemas independientes.
A.1.8. Contribuciones de la Tesis
En resumen, las principales contribuciones de esta Tesis Doctoral son:
La revisio´n actualizada del estado del arte en verificacio´n de firma manuscrita en condi-
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ciones de movilidad, el aging y el reconocimiento basado en passwords gra´ficos.
El ana´lisis experimental de que´ caracter´ısticas de la firma son ma´s robustas en condiciones
mo´viles y la evidencia de la degradacio´n del rendimiento si las trayectorias del bol´ıgrafo o
estilete no se capturan cuando no esta´ en contacto con la superficie.
Un nuevo protocolo experimental para analizar los efectos del aging sobre la firma como
rasgo biome´trico.
La evidencia experimental del efecto del aging en la verificacio´n de firmas, y su compen-
sacio´n a trave´s de me´todos de actualizacio´n de plantillas.
La adquisicio´n y el ana´lisis de la primera base de datos disponible para la comunidad
cient´ıfica de passwords gra´ficos trazados con el dedo, incluyendo tambie´n firmas simplifi-
cadas.
El ana´lisis experimental de la autenticacio´n de usuario basada en passwords gra´ficos (y
firmas simplificadas), mostrando que si se lleva a cabo seleccio´n de caracter´ısticas y fusio´n
de clasificadores, se obtienen tasas de reconocimiento prometedoras.
A.2. L´ıneas de Trabajo Futuro
En base al trabajo presentado en esta Tesis, surgen varias l´ıneas de trabajo futuro relacio-
nadas. Las siguientes l´ıneas de investigacio´n son consideradas de intere´s por parte del autor:
Esta Tesis se ha centrado en el problema de la autenticacio´n de usuarios en condiciones
de movilidad, en comparacio´n con escenarios tradicionales basados en una tableta digita-
lizadora sobre un escritorio. Sin embargo, existe la necesidad de analizar el impacto de
la inter-operabilidad entre dispositivos, es decir, el impacto de la adquisicio´n de muestras
biome´tricas en un dispositivo que es diferente de la que se utiliza para autenticar posterior-
mente al usuario (por ejemplo, dos diferentes marcas de smartphones, o un smartphone y
una tableta). Algunas contribuciones ya abordan este escenario (Alonso-Fernandez et al.,
2005) pero esta´ todav´ıa por realizar un estudio sistema´tico sobre la inter-operabilidad con
una gran base de datos a disposicio´n del pu´blico. Algunos trabajos recientes van en esta
l´ınea (Blanco-Gonzalo et al., 2013a; Vera et al., 2015).
En cuanto al aging, esta Tesis ha arrojado algo de luz sobre sus efectos en la verificacio´n
de firmas. Sin embargo, surgen varias preguntas. ¿Es 15 meses un per´ıodo suficientemente
largo de tiempo para analizar los efectos del aging? Aunque los resultados obtenidos en
el presente trabajo apuntan en esa direccio´n, esto au´n debe ser confirmado por completo
con una base de datos adquirida a lo largo de un lapso mayor de tiempo. Otros factores,
como el sexo, o las habilidades en la escritura pueden ser tambie´n de intere´s cuando se
considera el envejecimiento. Una referencia reciente en este sentido es Fairhurst (2013).
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Los passwords gra´ficos son todav´ıa un campo de investigacio´n relativamente novedoso y
continu´an representando un escenario de autenticacio´n desafiante, en comparacio´n con
otros rasgos biome´tricos. Debe llevarse a cabo ma´s estudios con otras bases de datos
(como la base de datos presentada recientemente por Riggan et al. (2014)), teniendo en
cuenta otros perfiles de uso en comparacio´n con el escenario de adquisicio´n de la base
de datos DooDB, que fue capturada considerando so´lo un lapso de dos semanas entre las
sesiones.
Se ha observado que la variabilidad inter-sesio´n es uno de los principales factores para el
aumento en las tasas de error en la autenticacio´n en el caso de los passwords gra´ficos. Las
te´cnicas de actualizacio´n de plantillas de usuario (Didaci et al., 2014; Uludag et al., 2004)
podr´ıan ayudar a mitigar este problema.
Como hemos visto, el escenario de adquisicio´n (por ejemplo, smartphone, tableta) afecta a
la tasa de error en la autenticacio´n. Hay en general un compromiso entre la facilidad de uso
y el rendimiento. Algunos trabajos recientes han estudiado el impacto de las condiciones
de usabilidad y de adquisicio´n en la verficacio´n de firma (Blanco-Gonzalo et al., 2014,
2013b; Brockly et al., 2014). Se puede llevar a cabo ma´s investigacio´n en este a´rea, con
el fin de establecer caracter´ısticas de usabilidad medibles y analizar su correlacio´n con las
tasas de error de los sistemas.
Esta Tesis se ha basado en te´cnicas de comparacio´n de similitud (matching) bien estable-
cidas (HMM, GMM, DTW y medidas de distancia). Otros enfoques complementarios y
populares en los u´ltimos an˜os, tales como Support Vector Machines (SVM) (Ferrer et al.,
2005), redes neuronales profundas y modelos h´ıbridos HMM/red neuronal (Dahl et al.,
2012; Povey et al., 2011) deber´ıan ser explorados con el fin de identificar otros algoritmos
de verificacio´n con buen rendimiento.
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